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BEYOND ENLIGHTENMENT
What is enlightenment? For Buddhists it involves the discovery of the truth of
duhkha—pain, suffering, and sorrow—followed by the realization that duhkha
can be brought to an end. In like manner, Protestant Christians speak of
enlightenment as a moment when, touched by God, one becomes aware of one’s
own escape from eternal damnation. Likewise, European philosophers have
imagined an age of Enlightenment, a time of individual freedom and social
equality. In all three cases, enlightenment, as insight into reality, is conjoined with
enlightenment, as a state of harmony and peace, beyond politics.
Beyond Enlightenment treats the political implications of this apolitical ideal.
It is a sophisticated study of some of the assumptions underlying, and ramifications
involved in, the study of Buddhism (especially, but not exclusively, in the West),
and of the tendency of scholars to ground their study of Buddhism in particular
assumptions about the Buddha’s enlightenment and a particular understanding of
religion, traced back through Western orientalists to the Enlightenment and
the Protestant Reformation. Richard Cohen’s book will be of interest to
buddhologists, indologists, scholars of comparative religion, and intellectual
historians.
Richard S. Cohen is Associate Professor of South Asian Religious Literatures at
the University of California, San Diego. This is his first book, though he has
published numerous articles in such venues as the Journal of the American
Academy of Religion and History of Religions. He is now working on a study of
Buddhism and counterculture.
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FOR NANCY
Perhaps there is no religion the study of which is likely to be so
useful to Europeans as Buddhism. Discarding, as it does, those
primary beliefs which we are tempted to regard as the essential
ideas of religion generally, Buddhism forces us to reconsider the
question to what extent these beliefs can be pronounced universal
or necessary ingredients of the religious consciousness of
mankind.
(John R. Amberley, “Recent Publications on Buddhism,”
The Theological Review 9 (July 1872): 293)
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You are walking down a forest path. You meet a man who positively beams
serenity. You ask his teacher’s name. He replies,
Nobody is my teacher.
Nobody is comparable to me.
I am the only perfect buddha in the world.
I have attained supreme enlightenment.
I am conqueror over all.
I know everything.
I am not contaminated by anything at all . . .
I have all the powers of the omniscient.
I am an arhat in the world.
I am unrivaled in all realms, including those of the gods.
I am the victor who conquered Mara.1
This happened—so we are told—to a wanderer named Upagu, sometime in the
fifth century BCE. Upagu answered with a shrug, “perhaps,” and left quickly by a
different road. Now we remember Upagu as the fool. He could have been
Fakyamuni Buddha’s first disciple. But where a wiser man would have recognized
the truthful words of a buddha fresh from enlightenment, Upagu heard a
megalomaniacal rant: violent words of conquest seemingly at odds with the
serene visage of the man who spoke them.
Would you have recognized the man as enlightened? Would you have discerned
a spirit of universal peace, beyond politics, in words that valorize hierarchy,
celebrate raw power, and speak well of battle? If so, then Beyond Enlightenment
is a book about you. If, however, you are puzzled that anybody would answer
these questions in the affirmative, if you find Upagu’s laconic “perhaps” a
reasonable response, perhaps too reasonable, then Beyond Enlightenment is a
book for you.
For me, the book grows out of wonderment at the politics of the apolitical. By
politics I mean simply the existential situation in which imperfect people,
unaware of the full reasons they act as they do and uncertain about the full
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ramifications of their decisions, nevertheless make choices that ramify upon others.
Our everyday world is a political world, for there are inevitable contingencies to
how we choose to express our wills. We struggle, we clash, we strive, we harm, we
suffer. Apolitics describes an alternate existential state, in which power is exercised
with autonomy, certainty, stability, supremacy, in sum enlightenment.
Beyond Enlightenment asks how political action comes to be accepted as
apolitical; how contingent paths become necessary routes to absolute freedom. To
return to Fakyamuni and Upagu, the buddha positively celebrates the fact that he
alone dominates the world. But his words also guarantee that this ascendancy is
a force for universal good because his power is the power of a fully enlightened
being. His omniscience allows him to exercise power completely apart from
the contingency of politics. For somebody who takes Fakyamuni at his word,
enlightenment functions as something like a philosopher’s stone, transmuting
the base-metal of political contingency into the certitude of power’s apolitical
expression.
In common speech, the word “enlightened” can be applied as readily to a group
of people as to an individual. Thus it is a truism that there would be no Buddhism
if claims for the buddha’s enlightenment had gained no social traction, if there
were no sakgha. This truism can be rephrased, however, shifting focus to a matter
that is worth further investigation: There would be no Buddhism if the ideological
transformation of the political into the apolitical had not been supplemented by
the installation of that ideology at the heart of a social order. That is, the study of
the political–apolitical is supplemented by the study of hegemony. Hegemony is
found where one segment of a society proffers its own desires and ideals as
universal values bearing on the social whole, necessary for social peace. The
erasure of contingency, the disavowal of partisanship, the representation of truths
as absolute and experiences as spontaneous—unsullied by arbitrary wants or
selfish calculations—are the foundational social acts.
Such are Beyond Enlightenment’s basic concerns: the political function of the
apolitical; enlightenment as an instrument of hegemony. Here now is a brief
outline of its structure.
Chapter 1 explains the meaning and import of several abstract nouns—religion,
enlightenment, hegemony—and explores linkages among them. It proposes that the
Enlightenment of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe provides the political
context for understanding Buddhist enlightenment as the simultaneous, coequal,
perfection of rationality, religiosity, morality, and humanity, beyond politics.
The next three chapters provide a set of case studies for investigating the
hegemonic workings of enlightenment. All three draw their major examples from
the Ajanta caves, a western Indian archaeological site dating to the fifth century
CE. We might see these three as elements in a postmodern microhistory of Ajanta.
The first and fifth chapters, by contrast, mention Ajanta only in passing; the sixth,
not at all.
Chapter 2 treats the hegemony of enlightenment—conceived as a source
of exceptional universal value—over the discursive construction of Ajanta’s
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spatiality. In 1983 Ajanta was enrolled on UNESCO’s list of World Heritage
Monuments as a site possessing “exceptional universal value.” What was involved
in the transvaluation of Ajanta from isolated archaeological site into locus of
universality?
Chapter 3 explores the hegemony of intentionality over the discursive
construction of Ajanta’s temporality. Based upon inscriptions and art created in
ancient times, Ajanta is invariably identified as a Buddhist site. This chapter
wonders how Ajanta’s identity might change if one narrates its history in terms of
its graffiti, since graffiteers who scratched their names onto Ajanta’s walls
demonstrate no interest in Buddhism.
Chapter 4 explores the hegemony of a “scriptural anthropology” (a view of
humanity as necessarily and universally religious) over the discursive construction
of Ajanta’s materiality. In the nineteenth century, archaeologists expected that the
distinctions between Buddhism, Hinduism, and Jainism were so thoroughgoing
that a few simple criteria might allow them to distinguish instantly Buddhist
artifacts from those that are Hindu or Jain. What truth about religion made them
think this project could succeed? What truth about humanity?
Chapter 5 integrates the major problems outlined in the first chapter with specific
solutions offered in the subsequent three. Thus whereas Chapter 1 considered
Enlightenment in its European forms, Chapter 5 considers how contemporary
Buddhists assert hegemony through enlightenment-claims. Indeed, many
Buddhists today are ambivalent about being called “Buddhists.” They observe
that the buddha did not teach Buddhism but dharma; and that following dharma
is not the same as belonging to a religion. For them, the word “Buddhism”
signifies a religion for folk who remain ensnared by a superstitious concern for
gods and other mythological errors. Of course, they hold off Buddhism with one
hand, only to lay hold on it with the other. In their eyes, they alone are
Fakyamuni’s true followers. As seekers of dharma who reject the supernatural,
these modern Buddhists also represent themselves as empiricists, rationalists, and
secularists. And they believe that the dharma, as rational and secular, provides the
legitimate groundwork for a universal society of freedom and peace.
A brief conclusion, Chapter 6 proposes that religious tropes and religious
institutions are incapable of eradicating the structural conditions that produce





This book has been a long time in coming. So many teachers and friends helped
me along the way that I cannot acknowledge all by name. Still, several do deserve
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to Luis Gómez, a master of Buddhism’s complexities and nuance. Two friends
who deserve my warmest gratitude are Chuck Prebish and John Strong. Neither
man has borne a formal institutional obligation to me, yet both have been my
constant advocates and benefactors. I would also like to acknowledge their
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Routledge, John for his many fine suggestions as a reader.
There is no way this book could have been written had I not had the good
fortune of being hired into UCSD’s (University of California, San Diego)
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Hellman, benefactors of the fellowship that bears their name. While I’m on the
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Speaking of discipline, my parents David and Bernice Cohen tried to instill it
sometimes, but not too often and not too much. Their love, acceptance, and
support are the very cornerstones of this work.
Finally, and fully, there’s Nancy. By the end of this work, a reader might be
wondering whether nothing is sacred to the author. If there is one thing that could
fit that category, it would have to be my love for Nancy. But love is not the half
of it. I read her intelligent suggestions, her critical acumen, her writerly sensibility,
and stylistic excellence on every page.





. . . at least do no harm.
(Hippocrates, The Epidemics, 1.2)
A trip to the bodhi tree
Did you know that approximately 90 percent of books in Los Angeles’ Bodhi
Tree Bookstore describe the buddha using the word “enlightened” rather than
“awakened”?1 Anyone familiar with English-language writings on Buddhism will
already be aware that such a bias exists. But even an avid reader might be
surprised by the magnitude of the imbalance. And for a reader of Sanskrit, the
preference for “enlightened” must be especially puzzling as well.
I remember learning in graduate school that the basic denotation for budh—the
Sanskrit root that gives us buddha (enlightened or awakened) and bodhi (enlight-
enment or awakening)—is to wake up or to recover consciousness. My professor
presented “enlightenment” as an infelicitous translation and instructed his students
to use “awakening” instead. This directive later found its way into print: Awakening
is preferable to enlightenment because bodhi “is not the result of an ‘illumination’
as much as a process of realization, of coming to understand.”2 However, one
should not understand Professor Gómez to be valorizing the literal over the
metaphoric, or the real over the imaginary: to awaken to truth is no less metaphor-
ical than to be enlightened by it. The issue, rather, has to do with the materiality of
the two metaphors. The event-oriented connotations of enlightenment are less accu-
rate, conceptually and etymologically, than those of process-oriented awakening. Be
that as it may, my survey at the Bodhi Tree Bookstore demonstrated that Buddhism
continues to be the eponymous religion of enlightenment. This book investigates
the political context within which enlightenment holds such discursive power.
Beyond Enlightenment is not an intellectual history of native Indian doctrines
concerning the cognitive state we call enlightenment. Nor is it primarily a
linguistic history of “bodhi” and “buddha” in Sanskrit sources, or of “enlighten-
ment” and “awakening” in English. What dimension of enlightenment, then, is its
focus? Enlightenment is “the very basis on which the whole superstructure of
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Buddhist developments has been raised,” in the words of David Snellgrove, a
historian of India and Tibet whose insights I have long valued.3 This is a study of
the ground beneath Snellgrove’s architectural metaphor. What kind of bedrock
does enlightenment provide for so-called “Buddhist developments”? It does cer-
tainly require a solid substratum for tantric antinomianism (e.g., “You should slay
living beings; you should speak lying words; you should take what is not given;
you should frequent others’ wives”) to stand steadily next to Pali moralism (e.g.,
“The fool who does not perform good actions but commits many sins is reborn in
hell after he dies”).4 Enlightenment is that ground. Enlightenment enables dis-
parate and sometimes diametrically opposed doctrines, practices, mythologies,
legitimations of power, cosmologies, ethoi, values, narratives, ways of life, and
soteriologies to all be called “Buddhist.” A discursive analysis of enlightenment
brings one to the basis of Buddhism itself.
I was inspired to go to the Bodhi Tree Bookstore, to compare the usage of
“enlightenment” and “awakening,” after reading one of Jean Calvin’s letters in
which the theologian declared, “It is God alone who enlightens our minds to
perceive His truth.”5 Of course, I had met the verbal root enlighten outside a
specifically Buddhist context before. But Calvin’s words jolted me. To name god
as the sole source of enlightenment is hardly a Buddhist notion. Yet here was the
translator of Calvin, like Buddhism’s translators, using “enlighten” to mark the
connection between human knowledge and the ultimate good. Some quick recon-
naissance soon showed me that the trope of illumination or enlightenment fre-
quently serves this function in Christian literature. Martin Luther also spoke of
being enlightened by the Holy Spirit, and Matthew Tindal’s Christianity as Old as
the Creation described “a clear and distinct Light that enlightens all Men; and
which, the Moment they attend to it, makes them perceive those eternal Truths,
which are the Foundation of all our Knowledge.”6 That “enlightenment,” a word
I had long associated with Buddhism’s essence, had a prior history is unremark-
able. That I had not given this history any thought is, again, hardly noteworthy.
That no one else had done so created a nice puzzle to solve.
The results were more intriguing than I could have hoped. Early Indologists
had no consensus understanding of buddha or, still less, of bodhi. The 1801
edition of Asiatick Researches provides a nice example. One article that year saw
Mr Joinville lament that he “made every inquiry, and [had] been informed that
there is no etymology for the word Boudhou in the ancient languages of Ceylon.”7
A second writer, Captain Mahony, found better informants. His article teaches,
“The word Bhooddha, in the Palee and Singhalai languages, implies, Universal
Knowledge or Holiness.”8 Despite Joinville’s and Mahony’s inability to agree on
the etymology of buddha, let alone its spelling, a convention did develop during
the first half of the nineteenth century, in which buddha was translated as intelligent
or wise or sage.9 Bodhi, likewise, almost invariably came to be translated as
Intelligence or Supreme Intelligence.10
Occasionally, light imagery did peek through. The earliest use of the English
“enlighten” in a discussion of Buddhism belongs to the 1835 translation from
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French of an article by Charles Neumann. Neumann wrote, “Shákya, having
exhausted every species of science, received the name of Buddha, that is, the
‘sage’ or ‘enlightened.’ From hence, his followers have been termed Bauddhas, or
Buddhists.”11 Likewise the following year, Brian Hodgson rendered a Sanskrit
verse praising the primordial buddha, the adibuddha: “By reason of the ten jnánas
[i.e., ten types of gnosis], his soul is enlightened. He too is the enlightener
of the ten jnánas.” Yet in the same article, Hodgson explicitly defined the word
“buddha” as “wise.”12
We have to wait until an 1857 article in The Times for a thorough, even pointed,
explanation for why “enlightened” is the preferred English translation for “buddha”:
Buddha himself went through the school of the Brahmans. He performed
their penances, he studied their philosophy, and he at last claimed the
name of “the Buddha,” or “the Enlightened,” when he threw away the whole
ceremonial, with its sacrifices, superstitions, penances, and castes, as
worthless, and changed the complicated systems of philosophy into a
short doctrine of salvation.13
The Times published this article anonymously. In the same year, however, Max
Müller reprinted it in a short book under his own name.14 Müller’s book received
immediate attention; at least three publications from 1858 cite it. Two of these
three also called the buddha “the enlightened,” whereas the third called Müller
“incompetent” and “not equal to [Buddhism’s] severe and seemingly impossible
abstractions.”15 After this swift reception, the vogue (if it even deserves that
name) for “enlightened” apparently subsided. Then in 1867 Müller released the
first volume of his Chips from a German Workshop, a collection of previously
published articles. Chips reprinted The Times’ piece as well as a second article,
from The Edinburgh Review, that also directed readers to know the buddha as
“the enlightened.”16 By the mid-1870s, it had become commonplace to call the
buddha “enlightened.” By the end of the 1880s, the terminologies of “enlight-
ened” and “enlightenment” dominated the English-language literature on
Buddhism.
Seeing the light in Müller’s science of religion
I began my survey of nineteenth-century literature on Buddhism expecting to find
that the popularization of enlightenment was the result of a gradual, decentralized
change in usage rather than a forceful reimagination. Yet the latter is what Max
Müller seems to have given us. Granted, no subsequent scholar named Müller as
inspiring his use of “enlighten” in the same way that another referred back to
Eugène Burnouf for his translation of “bodhi” as “intelligence.”17 There is no
smoking gun here—just the publication of an influential book succeeded almost
immediately by a sea change in translation. Nevertheless, Müller’s preference for
“enlightened” is worth thinking about further, not because he was a foremost
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scholar of Buddhism, but because he dominated the fields of comparative
linguistics, comparative mythology, and comparative religion. Buddhism offered
Müller exempli gratia for his pursuit of science in these disciplines.
“Enlightened” is neither etymologically truer to the Sanskrit buddha, nor self-
evidently better English than “wise,” “supremely intelligent,” or “awakened.” But
the imagination of the buddha as enlightened fit perfectly into Müller’s science;
it seems to have captured the minds of his readers and it has since become our
own common sense.18 Indeed, although Müller now has little direct sway over the
study of religion, his indirect influence is patent. The modern study of religion,
including Buddhism, works within a conceptual space stabilized by Müller’s
lifelong project to build a complete science of thought.19
This is hardly the place for a close analysis of Müller’s life’s work, still less the
history of the study of religion post-Müller. But a quick summary of his intellec-
tual project will serve as a neat counter against which to represent my own.
As with any major thinker, Müller refined and amplified his views over the
course of his career. Here I focus upon the preface to the first volume of Chips
from a German Workshop, since this is the work that seems to have popularized
enlighten as a Buddhist terminology.
One enters Max Müller’s theory of religion by way of his theory of language.
Language is the starting point, for Müller defined humanity by its capacity for
rational thought: “Man means the thinker, and the first manifestation of thought
is speech.”20 Müller believed in essences, but essences as manifest in history. That
is to say, Müller was not simply a connoisseur of linguistic diversity. Rather,
Müller expected that a scholar who could find order in the jumble of tongues
would also be able to reach “backward from the most modern to the most ancient
strata” at which he would discover “the very elements and roots of human
speech . . . and with them the elements and roots of human thought.”21 Müller
desired to reach the common roots and universal dimensions of language (in the
singular), although he was resigned to the fact that this ideal, this pure mode of
thought, never exists in a pristine form. Particular temporal expressions would be
more or less close to the ideal. The ability to judge that degree of purity required
the comparative study of multiple languages.
What was true of language, for Müller, held for religion as well. Religion
suffused humanity’s whole history, from its contemporary forms to the most
ancient days, as “a succession of new combinations of the same radical
elements.”22 Human beings were religious by nature. Indeed, the science of religion
would be absurd unless scholars presupposed that a capacity for religion “formed
part of the original dowry of the human soul.”23 If humans could not hear
“the tongues of angels” (literally) then “religion itself would have remained an
impossibility.”24 Müller saw this elemental religiosity as providing the firm foun-
dation for every religion’s special truths. A proper science of religion, accord-
ingly, was dedicated to abstracting natural religion’s “truly religious elements”
from the “mythological crust” within which they were inevitably embedded: “the
foreign worldly elements . . . and human interests [that] mar the simplicity and
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purity.”25 Just as the science of language could deduce a fundamental logic and
order in every speech, “even the most degraded,” so the science of religion would
look to the multiplicity of religious forms because through their comparative
study the scientist could comprehend the divine purpose. As with languages,
some religions were more authentic and pristine than others. And even within the
history of a single religion there would be more or less ideally religious moments.
Thus Müller articulated a general pattern for religious history: all religions are
founded by superior men; all succumb to decay; yet all might be returned to their
original purity through a due reformation.
Without a constant return to its fountain head, every religion, even the
most perfect, nay the most perfect on account of its very perfection,
more even than others, suffers from its contact with the world, as the
purest air suffers from the mere fact of its being breathed.26
This is why Müller was at pains to argue that the science of religion’s cold,
critical gaze must be directed toward Christianity no less than toward any other
religion. The science of religion supports the ongoing reformation of Christianity,
by giving believers the ability to know how far present forms have fallen from
Jesus’ pure intentions. But crucially for Müller, the selfsame tests that separate
Christian gold from Christian dross could be used to assay Christianity’s superi-
ority over other religions. Thus his science was as much a tool for evangelism and
missionizing as for reformation. It gave missionaries a language through which to
lecture Brahmins and Buddhists, Zoroastrians and Muslims, on the present
corruption of their religions too, so divergent from their founders’ purities.
Addressed in the objective language of science, reasonable Brahmins and rea-
sonable Buddhists, reasonable Zoroastrians and reasonable Muslims, would com-
prehend that the singular source for their disparate revelations was really the one
true god. Empowered by this knowledge, “the truth seeking soul,” who must
choose “between Christ and other Masters,” would make the correct choice.27 In
this way, the science of religion would restore “to the whole history of the world,
in its unconscious progress toward Christianity, its true and sacred character.”28
Such is the scientific context within which Müller translated “buddha” as “the
enlightened.” Müller was a scholar careful about the meanings of words. And he
was not stinting in his use of metaphors of light. He would “sweep away the cob-
webs of false learning, and let in the light of real knowledge.” In his anthropology,
humans search after “light and truth.” He hoped that his science would give mis-
sionaries the ability to find “any spark of true light” in barbarous forms of faith.29
Seeing the light meant apprehending truth with intellectual clarity. Indeed, in a
later work Müller even allowed that “Buddha himself appeals only to what we
should call the inner light.”30 But Müller’s ecumenism only went so far. For if light
was truth, truth had but one single source, or so said Augustine of Hippo as
cited by Müller: “What is now called the Christian religion . . . was not absent from
the beginning of the human race . . . from which time [it was] the true religion.”31
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With the second edition of Chips, Müller added a citation from Justin Martyr to
factor this equation in still more general terms. The italics are Müller’s: “They who
have made or make the Logos or Reason the rule of their actions are Christians.”32
Müller’s use of “enlighten” made Buddhism more suitably Christian by making
it more suitably religious by making it more suitably universal. To extrapolate the
preceding discussion: In Müller’s science to call the buddha, sitting beneath the
Bodhi tree, enlightened was
 to imagine that human beings have a natural, innate capacity for religion;
 to imagine that Fakyamuni’s fulfillment of that natural capacity transformed
him into “the enlightened”;
 to imagine that Fakyamuni’s transformation belongs to a class of similar
events enjoyed by other founders of the ancient religions of the world, all of
whom were brimming with noble aspirations and yearning for truth;
 to imagine that this transformative event also holds the essence of
Buddhism’s own particular religiosity;
 to imagine that this transformative event provides an objective basis for
judging the “Buddhistic” purity of Buddhism’s historical manifestations;
 to imagine that, as is the case for other ancient religions of the world, the
truths realized in this transformative event are often measurably at odds with
the practices of those who profess to be his disciples;
 to imagine that the insights that transformed Fakyamuni into a buddha also
made him a proto-Christian;
 to imagine that, as a branch of the science of religion, the scientific study of
Buddhism would advance the world-historical project of “assign[ing] to
Christianity its right place among the religions of the world.”33
For the language of enlightenment to fulfill its discursive function in Müller’s
science, Fakyamuni had to be assimilated to Jesus as a religious founder, and
Buddhism to Christianity as a religion. For us now, however, the chief problem
with Müller’s project is not its appropriation of the ideology of scientific objectiv-
ity to assert Christian hegemony. In fact, Müller tipped his hand rather quickly. The
1870 lectures that were the basis for his Introduction to the Science of Religion
described that science as having two parts: comparative theology and theoretic the-
ology.34 To study man by looking for traces of divinity is hardly the practice of a
human science. No, the chief problem with Müller’s project now is that, leaving
aside its Christian teleology, it requires one to presuppose that the category reli-
gion possesses an integrity and function that enables it to stand apart from
Christianity and Buddhism, and thus to mediate between them. For someone who
does not accept his discourse of universal, natural religiosity, every one of the other
points implied by Müller’s calling the buddha “enlightened” is also open to ques-
tion. Indeed, I wonder about the whole enterprise of constituting religiosity as an
object for science, even within the so-called human sciences: as religiosity, so
enlightenment; and as religion, so too Buddhism. Given that enlightenment serves
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as the basis for the imagination of Buddhism as something that has an original
integrity and purity, something that can be corrupted, something that can be
reformed—must one presuppose the discourse of natural religiosity even to speak
about Buddhism as an integral historical object? Can one accept that there is any
such thing as Buddhism unless one accepts that human beings are religious; that
enlightenment is not just a word or idea but a universal human potentiality? Unless
one hears angels? Unless one accepts that there are angels to be heard?
At the heart of Müller’s science is the quest for purity. Read the following
statement: “Whenever we can trace back a religion to its first beginnings, we find
it free from many of the blemishes that offend us in its later phases.”35 Offend us?
With this strange deixis Müller reveals the political context within which enlight-
enment holds discursive power: the valorization of an impossible perfection
matched by the repudiation of every all-too noticeable imperfection. Indeed,
Buddhists describe the moment of enlightenment as the discovery of four truths,
the first of which is duhkha—pain, suffering, sorrow, in short, woeful imperfec-
tion. But what is wrong with being blemished and imperfect, with being marked
by time, with reinventions that eschew the original? Let us imagine a scholar of
religion who is not offended by impurity and thus opts out of Müller’s us. How
will that person study Buddhism beyond enlightenment?
Enlightenment does not translate Aufklärung
Max Müller served two gods. We already know of Müller’s Christian faith. We
also have his word that he fulfilled his professorial duties at Oxford, whether
teaching German literature or the Science of Language, by “preaching Kant.”36
Müller confessed this philosophical faith in his preface to a translation of
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1881 on its centenary
anniversary. The Critique had been Müller’s “constant companion” since he first
read it as a schoolboy. Although Müller did not ask his readers to become “blind
worshippers of Kant” themselves, he did name Kant as a seminal figure in the
service of that same world-historical project to which Müller himself had dedi-
cated his science of religion. Thus, to convince his English readership of the
Critique’s exceptional value, Müller cited a letter first addressed to Kant in 1789
by a prominent theologian of the day, Johann Heinrich Jung-Stilling:
You are a great, a very great instrument in the hand of God . . . . your
philosophy will work a far greater, far more general, and far more blessed
revolution than Luther’s Reform. . . . Your philosophy must therefore be
eternal and unchangeable, and its beneficent effects will bring back the reli-
gion of Jesus to its original purity, when its only purpose was—holiness.37
Who was this Kant whom Müller worshiped and Jung-Stilling placed second to
Jesus as an instrument of holiness? Could he really have been the same philosopher
whose architectonic analysis of experience gave us such phrases as “the amphiboly
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of concepts of reflection” and “the transcendental unity of apperception”? Let us
leave Müller for Kant. Using Müller, the previous section introduced Beyond
Enlightenment’s fundamental concern: the politics of natural religiosity as medi-
ated through the term “enlightenment.” What is the political context within which
enlightenment holds discursive power? Kant will lead us forward. This current
section offers some insight into the lexical meaning of “enlightenment.” The next
section will address the issue of political context directly. And the section
following that will consider enlightenment’s discursive power. That will bring us
to the midpoint of this benign introduction, after which the focus shifts to
Buddhism, India, and the chapters that follow.
In 1783, the Berlinische Monatsschrift published an article in which Johan
Friedrich Zöllner, a theologian, questioned whether nuptial ceremonies require a
religious component or whether they might be purely civil affairs. But it was a ques-
tion Zöllner posed in a footnote that captured Immanuel Kant’s interest: What is
Enlightenment (Aufklärung)?38 In the following year, the Berlinische Monatsschrift
published Kant’s reply, a short article that is now an eighteenth-century classic.
Kant’s answer to Zöllner began with a series of definitions:
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred
minority. Minority is the inability to make use of one’s own understanding
without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its
cause lies not in lack of understanding but in the lack of resolution and
courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the
courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of
Enlightenment.39
Among all the forms of self-incurred immaturity, the “most harmful,” in Kant’s
view, was a lack of courage in relation to religious matters.40 Nothing was more
unEnlightened than the unquestioning, puerile acceptance of guidance offered by
clergymen and Church.
Kant defined Enlightenment. Müller preached Kant. Müller translated “buddha”
as “the enlightened.” The chain of reasoning seems clear: by calling the buddha
enlightened, Müller was also portraying him as an Aufklärer, a man appropriate
for the modern age, which Kant himself called an Age of Enlightenment.41
Indeed, glance back to Müller’s 1857 inauguration of this usage (see page 3). Note
that the buddha received the name “enlightened” precisely when he rejected the
accepted wisdom and established rituals of Brahminism in favor of a doctrine of
salvation through self-understanding. For Müller, sapere aude! could have been
Siddhartha Gotama’s motto as well.
These coincidences noted, however, we should also beware of reading too much
into this Kantian connection. First, 1865 was the first year in which Aufklärung
was translated as Enlightenment, in the sense of the Age of Enlightenment—and
there it was used as a term of derision.42 So when Müller characterized the buddha
as enlightened in 1857 he could not have been referring back to this German
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antecedent, or to eighteenth-century philosophy in nuce.43 To make this point even
more clearly, we need only open the 1869 German translation of Müller’s Chips,
authorized by Müller himself. In every case, “the enlightened” is translated as “der
Erleuchtete,” not “der Aufklärer.”44 Our linguistic inheritance, in short, should not
be misconstrued as Müller’s linguistic prescience.
The verbs erleuchten and aufklären are not interchangeable synonyms in
German.45 Still, it is felicitous that both were translated into English as e/Enlighten.46
For European intellectual developments during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries did profoundly influence later centuries’ scholarship on India’s history.
It is difficult to say whether David Snellgrove (see page 2) would have
metaphorized enlightenment as the ground on which Buddhist developments
were built had Enlightenment thinkers not articulated an idea of natural religion,
which Müller himself called “eternal religion,” and the “rock” on which super-
natural religion must be built if it is not to collapse: “Supernatural religion with-
out natural religion is a house built on sand.”47 If scholars conceive Fakyamuni’s
enlightenment as the indispensable antecedent to Buddhist developments, then
just as surely the European Enlightenment was indispensable for the genesis of
the academic field, Buddhist Studies. For scholars, enlightenment is an
Enlightenment phenomenon. To understand what it means to go beyond enlight-
enment, accordingly, we must also consider the other shore of the Enlightenment.
What is enlightenment? Political context
Beyond spiritual attainment, the term Enlightenment denotes a period in European
intellectual history, reaching from the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries.
At its culmination, the Enlightenment might have been the first instance in which a
cohesive body of philosophers and artists represented themselves as standing at the
brink of history, aware of their own modernity, motivated as much by an ethical
imperative to build the future as by a love for the wisdom of the past. Theirs was an
ethics of earth-bound freedom, whose principles are enumerated by historian Peter
Gay: “freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech, freedom of trade, freedom
to realize one’s talents, freedom of aesthetic response, freedom, in a word, of moral
man to make his own way in the world.”48 As Gay’s exuberant description makes
clear, the Enlightenment lends itself to metanarrative clichés and yet cannot be
easily comprehended within them. The Enlightenment was international, with each
country producing unique literary forms and intellectual modalities. Its leading
figures held diverse professions; they were journalists and activists, courtiers, econ-
omists, physicians, and even philosophers seeking to change the world as well as to
understand it. All, perhaps, fancied themselves freethinkers. Thus Diderot and
d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie presents Enlightenment philosophes as men who
have dared to overthrow the sacred bounds set down by religion and have
broken the fetters that faith placed on their reason. They are proud of
having rid themselves of the prejudices concerning religion which their
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upbringing instilled in them, and they look with disdain on their fellows
as being weak men, slavish spirits and pusillanimous souls who let them-
selves be frightened by the consequences of unbelief, who dare not for
an instant to step outside the circle of established truths or follow new
paths, and whose minds are dulled by the yoke of superstition.49
Yet reason was not an end in itself. The longer essay from which this passage is
extracted stated that for a philosophe “civil society is his only god.”50 The
philosophes saw the intellect as an instrument of politics, but there was hardly a
consensus on how the mind’s light should inflame the body’s dynamic. Kant’s
answer to the question, What is Enlightenment?, concluded, “Argue as much as
you will and about whatever you will; only obey!”51 And Voltaire’s Candide
finished with its hero turning his attention from metaphysics to a grounded deter-
mination to cultivate his garden. Yet America’s and France’s revolutionaries were
Enlightenment men. The Declaration of Independence and the Déclaration des
droits de l’homme et du citoyen both crystallized Enlightenment political thought.
This is not the place for a general introduction to the Enlightenment. I would
focus, rather, on the period’s political anthropology; in particular, politics tied to
the naturalization of religion as a pre-political or apolitical mark of the human
essence. Scattered among the previous citations from Kant’s short essay, we have
glimpsed the limns of that subject. Enlightened man encounters his world with a
mature intellect that does not accept truths presented by clergy or king out of
mere deference to authority. He reasons by himself toward the universal dicta that
are the basis of moral action. He speaks his mind in public but performs his duties
without complaint. He is a verbal warrior in defense of the true, the good, and the
beautiful: equal parts philosopher, statesman, and saint.
“What is Enlightenment?” offers a cartoon of the Aufklärer. A more fully
articulated understanding requires one to open Kant’s major works, the Critique
of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason. I take my lead here from
Étienne Balibar, a philosopher who, in the course of tracing a genealogy of
political-man from the Greek classical to the premodern Christian to the modern
secularist, names Kant as the inventor of modern subjectivity.52 The threshold to
modern secularism was crossed when Enlightenment thinkers disentangled polit-
ical citizenship from theological dicta; or in Balibar’s words, “when the principle
of a secular and democratic social organization was declared” in the late eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries.53 If a citizen of Augustine’s City of God
willingly subjected himself to the soul’s commands that spoke to him from inside
his own depths, for Kant the political subject himself legislated as a citizen. It was
the fact that the law was an expression of the citizen’s own will that rendered him
obedient to its dictates. Still, as we shall see, the same political anthropology that
made the citizen a rational legislator also made him a religious believer. For Kant,
secular politics was neither areligious nor irreligious.
Before Kant, epistemologists were vexed by the need to explain how sense
faculties apprehend external objects and how the mind can judge whether its own
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inner objects, that is, ideas, truly correspond to those external things. Kant was
satisfied with Locke’s and Hume’s claims that knowledge begins with contact
between the mind and the external world. Yet their explanations of that encounter
were wholly unsatisfactory. In fact, Kant saw these empiricists as half wrong. Yes,
human knowledge does require sense experience. “But although all our cognition
commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from experi-
ence.”54 Sense experience never operates in an unmediated fashion. What seems
to be direct perception of worldly objects is, in fact, always already an amalgam
of sense impressions and intellection.
Kant spent the greater part of the Critique of Pure Reason clarifying the
preconditions for sense experience: how the human mind must be structured in
order to produce the world that it perceives. The details of that structure do not
interest us. Here, it is sufficient to recognize that Kant drew a general distinction
between phenomena and noumena. Our mental lives are oriented toward the
former: phenomena are apparential things and experiences that have been cate-
gorized or mentally constructed. Noumena, by contrast, are objects of pure under-
standing; things as they are in-themselves, before they are categorized or mentally
constructed. While, in a sense, noumena are real, Kant was careful to point out
that they are real as a “boundary concept,” delimiting the sphere of the know-
able.55 Human beings lack a mental faculty to intuit noumena directly, and thus
noumena can never be valid objects of positive knowledge. Noumena can never
be treated as facts.
This inability to cognize noumena directly would seem to create a dilemma.
For if phenomena are processed before they become objects of knowledge, then
there can be no absolute epistemic basis for distinguishing reality (valid phe-
nomena) from fantasy (skewed constructions). How can we reach consensus
about the truth or falsity of our ideas and experiences? Solipsism is, in fact, not
the norm. For Kant posited that the cognitive structures shaping personal experi-
ence are themselves universal and transpersonal. Every person necessarily con-
structs the world of experience for himself, but every rational person constructs
precisely  the same world in precisely the same way.
Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, and revised it in 1787. One
year later he published the Critique of Practical Reason, which treats morality as
an entailment of the distinction between noumena and phenomena. The first
Critique introduced noumena: transcendental objects that we cannot know directly,
but that are logically necessary for us to experience a world of external phenom-
ena. The second Critique proposed that human beings likewise have a noumenal
dimension, a subjective quiddity that also cannot be cognized through the senses.
Crucially, although Kant would not allow positive statements of fact about objec-
tive noumena, he does make a positive claim about subjective noumena. The fact
that we cannot know ourselves in-ourselves means that we must understand our-
selves to be free. As a noumenon, every individual person is transcendentally free
and unconditioned. Indeed, Kant goes so far as to call this elemental human
freedom, “the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason.”56
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Transcendental freedom, in turn, fixes the onus of moral responsibility. For Kant
considered the movement from the noumenal to the phenomenal, from human
potentiality to concrete reality, to be a matter of volition. Every goal we con-
sciously pursue, every motivated act, is predicated upon choosing a principle for
action. Morality is another name for that choice. “What is essential in every deter-
mination of the will by the moral law is that, as a free will . . . it is determined solely
by the law.”57 Morality is the intentional subjection of the individual will to uni-
versal rational principles; the elevation of objective duty over subjective happiness
in the pursuit of the highest good. A man is moral when he freely allows universal
laws derived through reason to determine how he acts. Just as an individual is an
epistemic subject insofar as he participates in a transpersonal world of coherent
experience, likewise an individual is a moral subject insofar as he engages in a
transpersonal world of rational action. Kant attributed the moral law’s objectivity
to the fact that it is obligatory “for everyone having reason and will.”58
Here we reach the crucial conjunction: Kant’s rational secular man is also
necessarily a religious man. That is, the Critique of Pure Reason stipulates that
noumenal entities, such as god and the immortal soul, can never participate in the
world of intersubjective facticity, for humans cannot intuit them unmediatedly or
experience them mediatedly as phenomena. Nevertheless, the idea of god plays a
crucial subjective role for practical, moral reason. The belief in god’s existence,
together with the existence of an immortal soul and transcendentally free will, are
necessary, rational beliefs entailed by morality defined as the rational use of the
will. “It is morally necessary to assume the existence of God,” Kant asserts.59
Why? Simply put, one cannot direct one’s will toward the highest good, that is,
act morally, unless one really accepts that such a good exists. “The postulate of
the possibility of the highest derived good . . . is likewise the postulate of the real-
ity of a highest original good, namely the existence of God.”60 This is not to say
that non-believers can be forced to avow a belief in god (soul; freedom), or be
deprived of political rights if they refuse to do so. In fact, one cannot require or
legislate that any individual hold any particular belief. To believe or not believe
must be a free act. “The human being must make or have made himself into what-
ever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters]
must be an effect of his free power of choice.”61 But an individual who does not
postulate the real existence of god, an immortal soul, and god-given freedom of
the will, cannot be a fully moral human being. Lacking these rational beliefs, an
individual cannot possibly pursue the ultimate moral aim. Thus, Kant repeated
several times, both in The Critique of Practical Reason and Religion Within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason, that “morality . . . inevitably leads to religion, and
through religion it extends itself to the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside
the human being.”62 “The moral law leads . . . to religion”; religion defined as “the
recognition of all duties as divine commands.”63
The scope for religion as described by Kant is greatly circumscribed when
compared with its place as envisioned by theologians like Augustine and Calvin.
It might appear that the rationally religious man, like his premodern Christian
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brethren, still subjugates himself before divine ordinances that exist independently
of himself. But for Kant, the moral law is treated as if divine because it is rational,
not accepted as rational because it really is divine. Religious claims can be sub-
jective and pragmatic, but never independent, objective, or true matters of fact.
Religiosity is allowed to function unimpededly within the Enlightenment’s novus
ordo saeculorum insofar as its power is directed to the private realm of con-
science, commitment, and belief. Religious institutions may succor, edify, influ-
ence decisions, and suggest answers to ultimate questions. They may not require
followers to swear any contract or oath that impedes collective progress toward
Enlightenment; they may not require the suspension of doubt or rational public
discourse. Nor may they assert control over the coercive instruments of political
government. For in the modern world, human beings actualize their humanity,
becoming Enlightened subjects, only when they have the wisdom to accept the
responsibilities of political citizenship. In return for the privatization of religios-
ity, no citizen is forced to relinquish or deny his own personal beliefs, even if con-
siderably outside the mainstream. Purely internal, this confessional diversity will
not disrupt the regular working of government. The secular state becomes a pub-
lic sphere within which antagonisms that might arise due to personal distinctions
vis-à-vis gender, ethnicity, economic status, philosophy, and of course religious
faith or dogma, are set aside in favor of a single shared identity (citizenship),
and will toward the common good. Secularism thus-conceived is actualized in
democratic citizenship, the political harmonization of a pluralistic society.
Kant’s citizen is the rational animal who becomes a moral animal who becomes
a religious animal. This might seem to be a mere vestigial trace of Christian par-
ticularism within his universal schema. In fact, universalization of the Christian-
particular is the condition of possibility for Kant’s cosmopolitical imaginary.
However minimal religion’s remaining presence may be, religion remains
absolutely necessary. For Kant, one cannot be a full-fledged secular citizen—that
is, a knower who freely enters into a cosmopolitical compact for the common
good with other knowers—unless one already postulates that an omnipotent,
omniscient, omnipresent, omnibeneficent god exists; that this god created human
beings with an immortal soul (i.e., “the existence and personality of the same
rational being continuing endlessly”), so that they could progress toward moral
perfection; and that this god granted his creatures the freedom to make that
progress of their own volition.64
When Étienne Balibar describes modern subjectivity as Kant’s invention, he
stands only a step away from the hyperbole of Max Müller and Johann Heinrich
Jung-Stilling, for whom Kant was second only to Jesus as an agent of divine truth.
One cannot attribute the complex entanglement of reason, morality, religiosity,
and politics to Kant alone, yet there can be no doubt of its power from the nine-
teenth century to the present. Nowhere is this knot more capably disentangled
than in Karl Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” (1844), a critical review of Bruno
Bauer’s Die Judenfrage. In that day Germany was an expressly Christian state;
Jews were required to obey laws born of a theology and tradition they expressly
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rejected. Bauer thus asked whether Jews deserve special release from state
regulations regarding religion. His answer: a clear no. For Bauer, all Germans
were enchained equally by the politics of religious prejudice. The important work
was not to liberate Jews from Christian laws, but to liberate all human beings
from religious prejudice—to abolish religion itself. Marx argued, in contrast, that
Bauer’s solution was superficial: religious freedom does not necessarily translate
into political freedom, and the latter is what matters. In the modern secular state
(North America being Marx’s principal example), religion is not a matter of
public regulation but a private concern of each individual. Thus, Marx observed,
The division of a human being into a public man and a private man, the
displacement of religion from the state into civil society, this is not a stage
of political emancipation but its completion; this emancipation therefore
neither abolishes the real religiousness of man, nor strives to do so.65
Pay particular attention to the fact that Marx himself emphasized the word real
(wirkliche). What does it mean for human beings to have a real religiousness that
cannot be touched by governmental power? It means that the transition from
Christian citizenship—in which the mechanisms of religious and political power
are at parity—to that of the Enlightenment ideal—in which the secular public is
discontinuous with the religious private—required a reimagination of human
interiority. In the modern age, religion is not produced by a transcendent god
speaking discipline and truth using a human’s inner voice. Through the
Reformation, humans were supernaturally religious; with the Enlightenment they
became naturally so. Religiosity became an anthropological constant, concomi-
tant with reason, and thus an object suitable for scientific analysis. We have
already seen Max Müller’s science of religion. His contemporary, Pierre Daniel
Chantepie de la Saussaye, described that science’s element with great concision:
“religion is the specific and common property of mankind.”66 There is no place
for a human being outside and apart from a system of religious classification.
Thus a contemporary sociologist, Peter Berger, proposes that “an agnostic or even
an atheist philosopher may well agree” that the statement, “ ‘the religious
impulse . . . has been a perennial feature of humanity’ . . . is not a theological state-
ment but an anthropological one.”67 Berger uses nice rhetoric: his “may well”
softly whispers away any dissent from his position.
In short, Marx’s statement that political emancipation does not abolish man’s
“real religiousness” alerts us to the fact that in the Enlightenment humanity itself
became a new species, Homo religiosus. Enlightened citizenship—secular
citizenship—requires that human beings possess an elemental faculty of religios-
ity closely tied to their faculty of rationality. And since the postulation of god is
a necessary precondition for legitimate participation in the political arena, that
belief must itself be pre-political or apolitical. God, properly conceived, is not a
political subject/object — this is an unequivocally politicized articulation of
divinity. Indeed, when Marx used the positive statement “real religiousness” to
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characterize the thing preserved in political emancipation, was he not witness to
the fact that innate religiosity has become a political form throughly mystified in
Enlightenment thought? What irony that even an antireligious thinker would
idealize religiosity as apolitical, and hypothesize a politics within which that ideal
is actualized?
This is a real problem: the logic whereby real religiousness is idealized as
pre-political or apolitical. Now even an atheist must be an inner Christian to be a
legitimate citizen of a secular state. Apropos, The New Yorker published this short
poem of Czeslaw Milosz in tribute upon the writer’s death:
If there is no God,
Not everything is permitted to man.
He is still his brother’s keeper
And he is not permitted to sadden his brother,
By saying that there is no God.68
How has the denial of god’s existence become a singularly inhumane act, a sin
against humanity?
The Enlightenment provides the political context for understanding Buddhist
enlightenment, with its theorization of a natural religiosity that has the unsettling
political status of being a human characteristic that lies beyond the political. This
idea of a generic religiosity that is natural to humanity and is constitutively apo-
litical is the transcendental condition for a secularism in which religion appears
to be analytically separable from politics, and politics appears to be functionally
separable from religion. Enlightenment is the simultaneous, coequal, perfection
of rationality, of religiosity, of morality, of humanity—beyond politics. This per-
ceived apoliticality is the political context within which the word “enlightenment”
holds discursive power.
What is enlightenment? Discursive power
It is a felicitous accident that although words derived from aufklären and
erleuchten are not synonymous in German they were translated into English with
the same verbal root. For the English speaker this makes e/Enlightenment a
tremendously rich word. Enlightenment’s semantic field includes several
Sanskritic valences (intellection, wisdom, liberation), other values associated
with the Protestant Reformation (anti-clericalism, guiding providence, divine
inspiration, salvation), and still others that evoke the European Enlightenment
(modernity, rationalism, science, secular emancipation). It would seem that
e/Enlightenment is crammed full of significance. In semiological terms, enlight-
enment is a polyvalent symbol. However, this semantic surfeit allows us to treat
it under another rubric, one from the field of poststructuralist discourse theory
that I find rather more useful. The word “enlightenment” also functions as what
Ernesto Laclau calls an empty signifier, “a signifier without a signified.”69 If the
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previous section explored the matter of enlightenment’s political context, it still
remains to consider what it would mean for this word to have discursive power.
This latter entails understanding enlightenment as an empty signifier.
The theorization of empty signifiers is central to the work of Ernesto Laclau,
who, over the past two decades, has refined how we think about hegemony. For
Laclau hegemony “is more than a useful concept: it defines the very terrain in
which a political relation is actually constituted.”70 As such it is a matter worth
careful attention. What would it mean for enlightenment to be a signifier without
a signified? And how might such an odd misconfiguration provide the very
groundwork of a political terrain? How does enlightenment establish hegemonic
relations? Cognate questions fill Laclau’s corpus of writings. But let us take an
answer from his short essay, “Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics?”71
The essay begins with Laclau’s oblique definition of the empty signifier,
followed by his protestation that empty signifiers ought not be confused with the
more commonly encountered polyvalent symbols, which might be merely equiv-
ocal or ambiguous. Polyvalence can be exemplified by a snippet of conversation
overheard in a restaurant: “There is a profound connection between enlighten-
ment and freedom.” Is this a statement about Zen doctrine, or European history,
or the touch of the Holy Spirit? The signified is indefinite here, not because the
words enlightenment and freedom lack referents, but because the listener lacks a
context within which to be precise in the identification of those referents.
Ambiguity in this case is easily remedied: when listening to private conversations
at adjoining tables, pay better attention.
When one considers enlightenment as an empty signifier, by contrast, the
sound 7.n'lit7nm7nt will still call the listener’s ear to the possibility of meaning, but
there will be no particular object to which that meaning can be attached. How
does this work? Laclau reminds his readers of elementary structural linguistics as
articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure taught that a word’s significance
is not determined solely by its correspondence to an object “out there,” but by its
place within a system of linguistic difference. Linguistic value is relational. One
tangible example comes from the game of chess.72 If a rook is lost from a chess
set, another object can be substituted. Any arbitrary thing can be a rook as long
as the players agree on the substitution, and as long as this new rook is distin-
guishable from pawns, kings, and so on. The rook-piece does not possess intrin-
sically rookish qualities, but is a rook by virtue of its differentiation from other
pieces. Thus there is an arbitrary relationship between the signifieds (pieces’
functions) and the signifiers (pieces).
The arbitrariness of the signifier–signified relationship is offset, however, by
the relative stability of external relationships among signs as elements in a
system. In Laclau’s words, “the totality of language is involved in each act of sig-
nification.”73 This external or systemic relationship, in turn, has two properties.
First it is totalizing. Were there no totality, no game of chess, then it would be
meaningless to identify this or that piece of plastic as a chessman. Were there no
totality, no language, then the identification of this or that sound as an English
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word (for instance) would be absurd. Second, the rules and conventions that
create a systemic totality also limit arbitrariness. Although any object can serve
as a rook, rookitude itself is precise because chess’ rules are precise. The rook-
piece cannot move any which way. To slide a rook on the diagonal is to play a
game other than chess. Indeed, every legitimate move must be defined before the
white pawn can make the first move, for it is only in relation to that totality of
possible moves that we can determine whether any particular move is legal vis-à-vis
the game. Again Laclau, “the totality is essentially required—if the differences
did not constitute a system, no signification at all would be possible.”74 Or again,
“the systematicity of the system is a direct result of the exclusionary limit.”75 And
this brings us, finally, to the empty signifier: the signifier that functions as an
exclusionary limit because it signifies systemic totality rather than any particular
meaning.
God, dharma, freedom, rationality, truth, enlightenment—all function as empty
signifiers insofar as they seem to be bursting with significance while simultane-
ously seeming to be irreducible to temporally determinate meanings. Although
they have the formal properties of a Saussurian signifier, they represent no
particular signified. Rather, meaningfulness is their meaning. They have the
meta-linguistic function of marking a subject as universally significant.
Consider Voltaire’s definition of theist from his Philosophical Dictionary:76
The theist is a man firmly persuaded of the existence of a Supreme
Being, as good as He is powerful, who has formed all beings with exten-
sion, vegetating, sentient and reflecting; who perpetuates their species,
who punishes crimes without cruelty, and rewards virtuous actions with
kindness.
For Voltaire, mere belief in the existence of a good, just, and powerful deity “is
the most ancient and the most widespread” of religions. Voltaire’s theist pro-
pounds only these common notions, and nothing more. He avers no further meta-
physical knowledge concerning the supreme theos’ attributes or plans. “The theist
does not know how God punishes, how he protects, how he pardons, for he is not
reckless enough to flatter himself that he knows how God acts, but he knows that
God acts and that He is just.” And because the theist affirms god’s good existence
but advances no theories about god’s actions and plans, the theist “does not
embrace any of the sects, all of which contradict each other.” Sectarianism devel-
ops when particular, contingent dogmas become the bases for social identity. The
theist, by contrast, is “reconciled in this principle with the rest of the universe,”
because he holds only universal, necessary beliefs. Thus, the theist “speaks a
language that all peoples understand” and “counts all wise men as his brethren.”
Following Saussure, one might call the theist’s elemental religiosity a systemic
convention. Laclau would explain it as an “exclusionary limit,” a basis for artic-
ulating both equivalence and difference. This theology establishes a logic of
equivalence: the proponents of a good and powerful theos who stay within the
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bounds of Voltaire’s definition, whether ancients or moderns, whether residents of
Peking or Cayenne, all are equal as theists. “The systematicity of the system is a
direct result of the exclusionary limit.”77 The empty signifier, theist, takes on
social force only to the extent that nominal Muslims, Christians, and Hindus
willingly compromise their individuating dogmas in favor of a single shared
belief. A Muslim, a Christian, or a Vaisjava who mandates the acceptance of a
superordinate theological proposition—theos’ final revelation was spoken to
Muhammad in Arabic; theos became his own son, and freed humanity from the
taint of original sin; theos loves his every disciple as Radha, with whom he dances
in the forest on autumn evenings—is not a theist. As the condition of possibility
for the system, this exclusionary limit is the locus of hegemony, for to control this
limit is to control systemic identity.
Voltaire’s theist provides an apt example of an empty signifier, though not a
particularly charged one. So let us take another, Max Müller’s use of Christian,
which is more fraught and less neat. On the one hand, Müller willingly admits that
Christian Churches can be as corrupt as any other temporal organization. Like
Buddhism, Islam, and every other religion, institutionalized Christianity must be
reformed and purified on occasion. Yet, on the other hand, Christian is Müller’s
name for “that religion which is the root of all religions, and of which every
historical religion is but an imperfect expression.”78 Here, as if emptied of all
determinate content, “Christian” becomes a signifier for pure religious positivity.
Thus Müller found Justin Martyr’s equation of Christianity with rationality so
important that he added it to the second edition of Chips from a German
Workshop (see, page 6).79
Likewise, for much of his adult life Müller attempted to convince the leaders
of India’s Brahmo Samaj to accept the name of Christian.80 Founded by Ram
Mohun Roy in 1828, Brahmo Samaj was a movement for religious and social
reform, best remembered for its campaigns against image worship, polytheism,
casteism, sati, child marriage, and female infanticide. Roy acknowledged Jesus as
a teacher of timeless wisdom and representative of spiritual perfection, but would
not accept him as uniquely wise or uniquely perfect, the Son of the Trinity. This
rejection of Trinitarian theology was seconded by later Brahmo Samaj leaders.
Thus when Müller entreated Keshab Chandra Sen to accept Christ in 1881, Sen
answered, “I have always disclaimed the Christian name, and will not identify
myself with the Christian Church, for I have set my face completely against the
popular doctrine of Christ’s divinity.” To which Müller replied, “If you had lived
in the first century, you would have been a disciple of Christ.”81 Or again, Müller
lectured Sen’s successor, Pratap Majumdar, “If you accept His teachings as they
are recorded, you are a Christian.”82 This, despite the fact that Majumdar
expressed his personal distaste for the name of Christian. For Müller these two
statements were correlative: “There never was a false god, nor was there ever a
false religion,” and simultaneously, “The whole history of the world” is an
“unconscious progress towards Christianity, its true and sacred character.”83 The
pure Christianity of Christ, in addition to being sacred and true, is also the place
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of logos and the Infinite. As an empty signifier, Christian delimits and
concretizes Müller’s values, but in so doing it also excludes. Müller thus framed
his once and future pure Christianity in discursive opposition to those phenomena
he would keep out: dogmatism, mythology, vain symbols, and ceremonies, as well
as other particular religions. This pattern of inclusions and exclusions “fills”
Müller’s empty signifier. Per Laclau, “to hegemonize something is exactly to
carry out this filling function. . . . The strategies of this filling is what politics
is about.”84
The underlying point is simple enough: a game, a religion, a society, a system
will have an identity to the extent that a barrier delimits the inside from outside.
The barrier itself is hardly as simple. It provides an identity only insofar as it cre-
ates an equivalence among everything on the inside, but excludes, devalues, and
thus makes a potential antagonist of everything that does not participate in that
order. Thus abstract bases for identity, like theist, Christian, and enlightened mark
intrinsic claims of normativity.
This structure helps to clarify the normalization of the modern secular subject
as a religious subject, discussed in the previous section. A principle of internal
religiosity, be it called faith or spirituality or enlightenment, is presented as natu-
ral to all reasonable human beings. Indeed, even a principled atheism must be a
crypto-theology. As “rules” for being human, enlightenment and spirituality are
totalizing. Any specific delimitation of their significance by reference to a posi-
tive content will forestall that infinitude. Thus for an abstraction to limit, exclude,
and yet identify, it must serve solely, in Laclau’s words, as a “simple principle of
positivity—pure being.”85 Recall the god of Voltaire’s theist: good, just, existent,
and nothing more because that is sufficient. As a principle of pure positivity,
Voltaire’s god can subsume other gods without number into its circle of equiva-
lence. For a theist, Allah and buddha are two names among the theos’ infinite
names. Muslims and Buddhists are brothers as theists insofar as they are willing
to empty their divinities of overt, specific, and historically determined character-
istics. Max Müller locates all other religions within the pure positivity of Jesus’
simple Christian truths in precisely the same way. And yet, of course, theist and
Christian always already are specific and historically delimited—they remain
signifiers, even when treated as empty. So too enlightenment.
Thus the pernicious politics of hegemony: We call those people zealots who
mistake the logic of infinitude for necessity, and then act on that imagined neces-
sity as a moral imperative: Everybody who can be brought into the order, must be!
For their own good! This is why Laclau has proposed that hegemony “defines the
very terrain in which a political relation is actually constrained.”86
The term hegemony is most closely associated with the lexicon of Antonio
Gramsci, who, over long hours in prison, turned his attention to the question of
why international socialism had failed. Marx had predicted that working men and
women would recognize that their common interests oppose those of their employ-
ers, understand that they are a numerical majority, and unite in revolution. Why did
they not rise up, and what lessons could be taken from this failure? The logic of
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hegemony was the key. Hegemony names the pivot-point of subordination/
domination, whereby the politically weak accept the values and goals of their
dominators as their own. If the proletariat did not revolt, it was not because their
passions were quelled by a fear of bullets, but because they did not think of them-
selves as less than free. They did not feel, and perhaps could not even imagine, a
division between their bosses’ welfare and their own. In Gramsci’s words, hege-
mony is seen where “the great masses of the population” give their “ ‘sponta-
neous’ consent . . . to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant
fundamental group.”87 Spontaneous, here, is metonymic with natural, common-
sensical, and legitimate—the fact that Gramsci ironizes it between quotes is
crucial. In a sense, Beyond Enlightenment is an extended meditation on those
quotation marks.
As a category of analysis, hegemony highlights the mutuality of epistemology,
social identity, and power. The systematic totality of intellectual forces that func-
tion to create and enforce the consensual acceptance of a particular status quo
itself creates a group of people who conceive of themselves as members of a uni-
fied community or class because they share that consensus. The category of hege-
mony thus subverts the expectation that there are natural classes of people, whose
individual members all naturally share identity and goals by virtue of shared cus-
tom, nationality, history, tradition, belief, biology, or socioeconomic status.
Identity is an effect, not a cause, of politics. This needs to be remembered every
time we think that black Republican and gay Mormon are oxymorons, like college
girls who disdain “feminazis” even as they expect that the corporate world offers
equal pay for equal work.
The empty signifiers discussed so far have appeared relatively benign vis-à-vis
twenty-first century North America. But let us be clear: Christianity as “filled”
by Tom DeLay is structurally equivalent to Voltaire’s theism and Müller’s
Christianity. Indeed, in all world history there may be no example of hegemonic
filling to rival a speech made on April 12, 2002 by DeLay (at the time, the third
ranking Republican member of the United States House of Representatives):
Christianity offers the only viable, reasonable, definitive answer to the
questions of “Where did I come from?” “Why am I here?” “Where am I
going?” “Does life have any meaningful purpose?” . . . Only Christianity
offers a comprehensive worldview that covers all areas of life and
thought, every aspect of creation. Only Christianity offers a way to live in
response to the realities that we find in this world—only Christianity.88
DeLay would fill all the world with Christianity and nought else. Elsewhere in this
speech, DeLay explains why he actively crusaded to impeach President William
Jefferson Clinton in the 1990s. Namely, Clinton “was undermining everything that
I believe in and everything that I have been working for. And he was standing for
the wrong worldview.” DeLay’s speech was given at “Worldview Weekend,” a rally
convened to encourage evangelical Christians “to get involved in politics and not
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to segregate their religious worldview from their daily lives.”89 DeLay himself
complained that “[believers] are told, ‘You can go in the church . . . and stay in it,
but if you stick your head out and you say anything that reflects your worldview,
we’re gonna knock your head off.’ ”90 Strangely, DeLay’s neck still ends at his head
though he exercises “secular” political power openly to advance the hegemony of
“a biblical worldview.”
Here is the quintessence of hegemony: “A class or group is considered to
be hegemonic when it . . . presents itself as realizing the broader aims either of
emancipating or ensuring order for wider masses of the population.”91
Hegemonic relations are those in which universals, whose content is the terrain
for ideological antagonisms, have their significance fixed, with acceptance of that
resolution then providing a criterion for structuring society.
The potential for hegemonic struggle is structural to signifying systems. There
is no society without hegemonic articulations, just as there is no communication
without shared linguistic conventions. Limits are necessary. Limits order
through exclusion. And exclusion is always a potential source of antagonism. It
is not a fault unique to religious hegemonies that they posit a transcendental
origin for their exclusions, thereby denying the historicity of their universalized
particulars as well as of the process of universalization itself; nor it is a unique
fault that religious hegemonies devalue the differences that make up the panoply
of humanity in favor of a single, arbitrary principle of unification, treated as
necessary; or that they sacrifice human diversity on the altar of transhuman
unity and posit this sacrifice as the price of salvation. But there is a fault when
those who would oppose religious hegemonies imagine that they can accomplish
this aim through a strategy of deferential containment. What do we learn from
Congressman DeLay? In the USA (at least) only secularists talk seriously
about the separation of politics from religion because only secularists have blind
faith in the ideal of a religiosity that is constitutively pre-political and therefore
functionally apolitical.
No one who watched the World Trade Center fall on September 11 can ever
simply believe in belief. No amount of respect can validate the believer’s claim
that his or her religious institutions, as institutions, exist only and essentially to
promote peace. No public apology can be accepted that makes a blanket distinc-
tion between the “good” faithful and the “bad,” with the further excuse that the
strident evangelism or fanaticism of the “bad” renders them marginal, corrupt
representatives for religion as a whole. Indeed, it is the fatuousness of words like
peace, liberty, faith, heart, and home, that renders them such effective markers of
ultimate value: it is possible to kill for these words since one can fill each with
exactly the set of values for which one is willing to die. Seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers had hoped to make the world safe
from religious sectarian strife. But some were led by a strategic pragmatism,
others by faith, to expect that religiosity in a highly personalized form, segregated
from public power, could nevertheless foster the collective good. The terrible
irony is that the lingering force of their analyses now only mystifies the public
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imagination and fosters apologetic discourse by those very people who should be
most committed to criticism. This is the discursive power of enlightenment.
The social construction of enlightenment
This benign introduction to the politics of enlightenment has reached the midway
point. Now let us transit from the foregoing broad inquiry towards the particular
substance of the book. My concerns require tempering and greater specification.
I have exploded a diffuse nebula of theories. To what end? The answer requires
several steps. The first enters into a consideration of enlightenment as the
contingent condition of possibility for Buddhism. That leads to the second step,
where Buddhism is presented as a nominal phenomenon whose identity belongs
to the context of nineteenth-century colonialism. The third step then approaches
India’s Ajanta caves, a fifth-century CE monastic site that seems to preserve sta-
ble evidence for the organic interdependence of enlightenment and Buddhism.
My reasons for italicizing “contingent,” “nominal,” and “stable” should become
evident shortly.
Ian Hacking’s The Social Construction of What? presents a lucid critique of the
kind of poststructuralist discourse analysis I have employed in the foregoing
pages. In Hacking’s view, poststructuralists use the phrase “social construction”
too often and too loosely. His book begins with a mocking list of recent mono-
graphs: The Social Construction of Authorship, The Social Construction of
Emotions, Constructing Quarks, The Social Construction of Serial Homicide,
The Construction of Zulu Nationalism.92 What kind of analytic value can social-
construction language possess if it is applied willy-nilly to subjects ranging from
authors to Zulus? Presumably, one might add religiosity, enlightenment, and
Buddhism to the list. In Hacking’s view, this is a mess. To fix it, he proposes
strictly limiting the set of subjects construed as socially constructed. Properly,
the phrase should be applied only to those phenomena that are conceived—
incorrectly conceived—as being natural or inevitable, and therefore as not
historically determinate, not socially constructed. In Hacking’s words,
Social construction work is critical of the status quo. Social construc-
tionists about X tend to hold that: X need not have existed, or need not
be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature
of things; it is not inevitable.93
Accordingly, if a given X is not generally viewed as natural or inevitable, then
there is no reason to explicitly denominate X as socially constructed.
As a critic (albeit, a congenial one) of poststructuralist discourse, Hacking pays
particular attention to points of linguistic usage that provide “the basis of genuine
and fundamental disagreement” between constructionists and their foes.94 He
counts three such “sticking points.” When a constructionist proposes, X need not
exist, he is attributing three values to X. The first sticking point is contingency.
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A contingent X is produced through social and/or environmental forces within a
natural history that is not guided by the hand of providence, by another divine
power, or by strict dictates of logic. The second sticking point is nominalism. A
nominal X is constituted through the act of naming; its facticity belongs to acts of
observation and representation rather than to an intrinsic nature, structure, or reality.
The third sticking point is stabilizing factors. To the degree that X is perceived as
having a stable identity, the constructionist attributes that stability to factors
external (rather than internal) to X. In sum, X is not an autonomous phenomenon.
As a crude example, the speed of light is 299,792,458 meters/second. For the
strong constructionist this is a fact, not because light really moves at that speed
(an internal factor), but for complex human reasons: because scientists developed
the technological means for measuring light’s speed; because they needed tangi-
ble results in order to justify the cost of developing that technology; because they
hoped to win personal satisfaction and professional prestige; because they had the
curiosity to know. The speed of light, on this view, is contingent on technology;
nominal in the sense that it is identified only after deliberate acts of observation;
and stabilized by the external politics of big science.
Indeed, it is clear why Saussurian structuralism, which builds its system of
meanings out of the tension between interior and exterior, the arbitrary and the nat-
ural, gave rise to social-construction discourse. At ground zero, the link between a
signifier and signified is contingent, nominal, and internally unstable. Why do
chess sets have a piece that represents a castle? Why does the castle-piece move
only in a straight line, horizontally and vertically? There can be no imaginable
extra-social reason. For this reason, Hacking would argue that no book should ever
be entitled, The Social Construction of Chess. Nevertheless, when the rules for
moving rooks are considered in relation to the total system of possible rules, the
diachronic conditions that arbitrarily produced its conventions are irrelevant and
forgotten. In synchrony, those conventions are treated as de facto natural.
The study of social construction begins with the recognition that there is often
a slippage of value, whereby the de facto naturalness of a signified is displaced
onto the total sign. Social-construction language reminds us that the precise and
invariant rules that define “rookitude” are also arbitrary. Hacking is doubtless cor-
rect when he indicts scholars for being overzealous, and sometimes imprecise, in
their thought about this slippage. Yet, Hacking also observes, and we must remem-
ber, that constructionists themselves are often less concerned with the precision of
their metaphor than with the anti-hegemonic agenda the metaphor encodes.
This now brings us to enlightenment and Buddhism. Let us consider, for
instance, The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Introduction (BR), a popular text-
book first published in 1970, now in its fourth edition. The introduction to this
edition begins with a definition of Buddhism:
Buddhism—as a term to denote the vast array of social and cultural
phenomena that have clustered in the course of time around the teaching
of a figure called the Buddha, the Awakened One—is a recent invention.
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It comes from the thinkers of the eighteenth century European
Enlightenment and their quest to subsume religion under comparative
sociology and secular history. Only recently have Asian Buddhists come
to adopt the term and the concept behind it.95
In light of Hacking’s analysis, BR’s constructionism is patent. Let X  Buddhism.
Buddhism need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. Buddhism is not
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. Rather, Buddhism is con-
tingent upon the eighteenth-century European Enlightenment as well as Asian
societies and cultures. Buddhism is also nominal. The word “Buddhism” is not
merely a new English word for a phenomenon that existed prior to the eighteenth
century. Rather, Buddhism is a recent invention, created when the term, as a
signifier for the concept behind it, was created.
Finally, there is the issue of stability. Buddhism seems to be relatively stable. This
is not to say that Buddhism is unvarying. Obviously it is not, given the diversity of
national Buddhisms. But BR elsewhere clearly describes Buddhism as the sort of
thing that can change in form without changing substance; that can move from India
to China; that can be greatly influenced by Confucianism and Daoism, but not be
transformed thereby into something other than Buddhism. Is this stability attributable
to factors outside of Buddhism, or internal to it? Will Buddhism exist for only as long
as people subsume religion under the intellectual practices of comparative sociology
and secular history? Or, rather, is it stabilized by some sort of internal constituent?
The answer turns on the citation’s second word, as, in the phrase “Buddhism—
as a term to denote.” In fact, BR validates both forms of stability. The specifica-
tion as allows that Buddhism is contingent and nominal, but only within a
well-defined discursive context, namely the context in which the concept behind
the term is meaningful. In other words, were people to no longer think about
Buddhism as one religion in a panoply of world religions, then that concept, that
is, Buddhism as explained by scholars, would disappear. In this way, Buddhism’s
stability may be attributed to external factors.
But this is not the end of the as. With the specification as BR hints that the term
“Buddhism” might also have a significance altogether different than the one
given to it by post-Enlightenment scholars. There might be a second Buddhism;
one that is not a term to denote a vast array of social and cultural phenomena.
Like the first Buddhism, this second one might be contingent and even nominal.
But unlike the first, its stability will be attributable to a factor intrinsic to
Buddhism itself.
BR’s introduction tells us, “Buddhism . . . is a recent invention.” That is one
Buddhism. Later, in the first chapter, BR describes the second Buddhism:
Buddhism began with the Awakening of the Buddha . . . an event that
took place in the fifth or sixth century BCE at Bodhgaya, in the Ganges
River plain of northeastern India. For Buddhists, the truths to which the
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Buddha awakened transcend the conditions of space and time; however
there is no denying that the social and cultural context in which he lived
influenced the way he expressed his teachings and the way his contem-
poraries understood him.96
Here the origin of Buddhism shifts from the eighteenth century CE to the fifth or
sixth BCE. The site of that origin shifts from Europe to India. And the wellspring
of that origin shifts from social scientific analysis to an “event” called awakening.
(Although BR uses the etymologically correct awakening, for the sake of consis-
tency I will substitute enlightenment.) Buddhism, here, is no mere concept
stabilized by a word. Now it is a determinate thing that began at a specific event
in the life of a unique individual. Here an experiential event is Buddhism’s real
source—enlightenment provides a factor internal to Buddhism that serves as a
stabilizing factor. Indeed, pay attention to that “however” at the crux of the second
sentence. If it is however the case that expressions of enlightened truth are medi-
ate and contingent, do we not infer that the enlightenment event, as the condition
of possibility for those mediated expressions, may have been actually immediate
and unconditioned?
BR has no qualms about describing the signifier—expressions of truth—
as socially and culturally conditioned. But the passage’s prose occults the
signified’s—truths realized in an enlightenment event—equal contingency and
constructedness. Let X  enlightenment. Can BR allow that X need not have
existed; X is not inevitable? Not just for Fakyamuni, for anybody? The idea of
Buddhism produced by post-Enlightenment social scientists might well be con-
tingent, nominal, and externally stabilized. But BR suggests that the religion of
Buddhism produced in the enlightenment event might be just the opposite.
By representing enlightenment as an event—not contingent, not nominal,
internally stable—BR naturalizes as fact that a man conceived certain truths in
the fifth or sixth century BCE at Bodh Gaya, and that he taught what he (rightly or
wrongly) considered to be timeless truth, albeit in historically conditioned forms.
Here we observe the displacement of internal stability from signified to sign,
from enlightenment to Buddhism, and from generic natural religiosity to religion
in history. BR leaves no scope for rumormongers and conspiracy theorists to
allege, however unpleasantly, that the enlightenment was a sham; Fakyamuni,
a charlatan; and his contemporaries, patsies. Rather, BR offers a scholarly
apologetic for Buddhism that doubles as a crypto-apologetic for religion in
general. By designating enlightenment as a category definitive of the Other—thus
distancing it—while at the same time treating it, unironically, as if it has a real
historical efficacy—thus making it exemplary of a class of similar “religious”
experiences—BR makes Buddhism into a taxonomic object that can be narrated
as part of a history of error, while it simultaneously resists any attempt to make it
part of an anthropology of deception.97 BR thus recapitulates a paradigm of
natural religiosity that can be traced right to Max Müller, and before.98
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The social construction of Buddhism
BR provides one example of the kind of discursive use of enlightenment
against which this book is working. There are two Buddhisms: one began in
Europe as a recent invention; one began in India with an enlightenment event.
I would like to consider these two Buddhisms further, in a second example that
will also conduct us towards a discussion of the later chapters. In this case, let us
look at a point of contention between two scholars, Philip Almond—author of
The British Discovery of Buddhism—and Jonathan Silk—author of a substantial
critique of Almond’s work.99 I will consider Almond’s project before turning
to Silk.
The British Discovery of Buddhism takes up the Saidean challenge to investigate
Orientalism as a factor in the construction of European sensibilities about,
and representations of, Asia. Philip Almond’s thesis: Buddhism was created by
scholars in the first half of nineteenth century. The title’s use of Discovery is
somewhat misleading, for Almond proposes a strong constructionism, not a mere
nominalism. Almond does not want, in his words, to give “the impression that
Buddhism existed prior to the end of the eighteenth century: that it was waiting
in the wings . . . to be discovered; that it was floating in some aethereal Oriental
limbo expecting its objective embodiment.”100 To the contrary,
it was the Victorians who developed the discourse within which
Buddhism was circumscribed, who deemed it a worthy focus of Western
attention; it was they who brought forth the network of texts within
which Buddhism was located. And it was they who determined the
framework in which Buddhism was imaginatively constructed, not only
for themselves, but also in the final analysis for the East itself.101
In short, Almond treats Buddhism as a “discursive object” in Foucault’s now-classical
sense of the phrase. Prior to the nineteenth century, neither Europeans nor Asians
themselves had a conceptual category equivalent to the neologism Buddhism.
Why was this category invented, Almond asks, and with what social ramifica-
tions? Once a culture was classified as Buddhist, how was that denomination
“presented by the West, in the West, and primarily for the West”?102
This invented artifact, Buddhism, served Europeans in a variety of ways. As a
basis for defining, delimiting, and classifying cultural artifacts from all of Asia,
Buddhism provided a pan-Asian Other against which Europeans could view,
imagine, and articulate their own superiority. Moreover, Almond proposes that
“Buddhist scholarship was not only the cause but also the effect of that which it
brought into being—Buddhism.”103 Scholars found in Buddhism a fresh arena
within which to pursue a Christian polemic. Thus some lauded Fakyamuni
Buddha as an Indian Luther, and Buddhism as a sober retort to the Catholic
exuberance of Hindu iconophilia. Others used Buddhism to justify vigorous
colonialism. They found proof in the doctrine of nirvaja that Buddhists are
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languid, exhausted people, weak from the tropics’ long heat. Philip Almond is not
a classicist, reading back and forth between the ancient sources and contemporary
interpretations. He does not ask whether Orientalist representations of Asian
cultures were accurate or fair. It does not matter to him whether Fakyamuni really
did play a role in Indian history comparable to that of Luther in Europe, or
whether the British really were more industrious than the Sri Lankans. Whatever
values were attached to this entity, Buddhism, whatever the use to which it
was put, according to Almond: “Victorian interpretations of Buddhism, whether
of its founder, its doctrines, its ethics, its social practices, or its truth and value,
in constructing Buddhism, reveal the world in which such constructing took
place.”104
Almond’s work is superb when it delineates the political contexts within which
Victorians mobilized the category Buddhism. But his constructionism remains
only half-articulated. As a historian, Almond looks only at British values and
British agendas. With few exceptions, his sources are in English, dating to the
eighteenth, and especially the nineteenth, centuries. Asian beliefs and practices do
not interest him, except as products of Orientalist representation. The question, if
Buddhism did not exist then what did?, has no currency for him. Where BR gives
us two Buddhisms with two origins—one modern, one ancient—Almond gives us
only one. He denies the existence of the second, but offers no positive proof of its
non-existence. In short, the “discovery” of Buddhism provides a context within
which to analyze the articulation of British power, but considerations of hermeneu-
tics and historicism, requiring attention to cognitive and temporal difference,
remain outside Almond’s purview.
On its own terms, this is not necessarily a problem. Still, Almond’s redescription
of Buddhism as a modern artifact is both radical in its claim and far-reaching in
its implications. This alone makes it a ready target for criticism. The fact that the
thesis is only half-articulated makes it vulnerable as well. And the fact that
Almond’s prose is not always adequate to his thesis does not help matters. Claims
to the contrary, Almond often writes as if Buddhism was something there in Asia,
waiting for the British to find and name, rather than a discursive object deter-
mined by the orderings, correlations, positions, functionings, and transformations
of nineteenth-century Orientalism. The book’s title, Discovery, suggests prior
objective existence—King Tut’s tomb and E  mc2 are conventional objects of
discovery—while his chapters prefer words like construction, creation, and
imagination. Or again, the status of Buddhism in a sentence cited above—
“Victorian interpretations of Buddhism, whether of its founder, it doctrines, its
ethics, its social practices, or its truth and value, in constructing Buddhism, reveal
the world in which such constructing took place”—is unclear. In the first clause,
Buddhism seems to have an ontic reality, in the second, it is epistemic.
Like Almond, I think it problematic to posit the autonomous existence of a
singular Buddhism or even multiple Buddhisms prior to the nineteenth century.
Given this agreement, I choose to overlook Almond’s textual infelicities as
artifacts of long linguistic habit, reminding myself of Nietzsche’s questions in
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Beyond Good and Evil (#34):
Shouldn’t philosophers be permitted to rise above faith in grammar? All
due respect to governesses—but hasn’t the time come for philosophy to
renounce the faith of governesses?
Not all readers are thus inclined. Consider, for instance, Jonathan Silk’s critique,
or rather one of his many critical notes. Silk is especially perturbed by the fact
that Almond’s examination of Buddhism as an object of discourse does not
consider the objective truth-value of that discourse. As Silk writes, “there must be
a Buddhism which some people and some works of scholarship are able to reflect
more accurately, honestly and directly than are others.”105 By denying this must,
Almond threatens to undercut the disciplinary basis for Silk’s own field, Buddhist
Studies. If Buddhist Studies traffics in hyperreal signs of signs, if Buddhism
appears to be a coherent object of analysis only because scholars have disciplined
themselves into a pseudo-systematicity of representation, then Buddhist Studies’
pretension to being a legitimate branch of the human sciences is largely invalid.
Buddhist Studies would be a bootstrap operation, pure discourse.
With so much at stake, inconsistencies in Almond’s language provide a ready
platform from which to attack his category-politics. Silk reads inconsistent
statements as signs of a fatal flaw in Almond’s scholarly program. He wonders,
“Is it really so that Buddhist scholarship ‘brought [Buddhism] into being?’ ” And
for an answer, Silk presents a long quote from Almond’s book, to which he then
responds. First, Almond,
I, like [Edward] Said, am concerned with the internal logic, the structure
of views about Buddhism apart from the question of how Buddhism
‘really’ was. That is to say, I am not concerned with the extent to which
Victorian interpretations of Buddhism correctly or incorrectly perceived,
selected, reflected on, and interpreted the congeries of texts, persons,
events and phenomena in various cultures that it classified as Buddhist.106
Then Silk,
There is a subtle fallacy here that may reveal something of the theoretical
underpinnings of Almond’s discussions. Almond claims not to be inter-
ested in the relationship between the objective truth of Buddhism’s
existence and situation and the Victorian interpretation of that existence.
He is interested in how the texts, persons and so forth in Buddhist
cultures were presented, in other words interpreted in the West. Unless
I have missed something, this does not make sense.107
In the movement from quote to critique one finds that Silk did miss something:
namely, his own blanching of Almond’s constructionism. Almond does not assert
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an interest in “Buddhist cultures,” how they were presented or how they were
interpreted. Silk’s “Buddhist cultures” is a reductive transposition of Almond’s
phrase, “cultures classified as Buddhist.” The excision of this act of initial classifi-
cation is itself the objective basis for the academic discipline of Buddhist Studies.
Silk has a point, though to make it he reproduces the very writing-out against
which Almond writes. Silk demonstrates that for Buddhism to appear to be an
independent object for scholarship, marked with an ancient provenance, its schol-
ars must forget that the act of classification has an perlocutionary force, like other
knowledge-creating operations. Buddhist Studies as field of knowledge exists
(in part) to bridge the temporal and psychic distance between ancient Asians and
modern communities of interest. Silk’s maneuver exemplifies how its practition-
ers structure that distance in the first place. Almond’s analysis calls attention to
the hegemonic implication of this discursive operation, but that is not enough.
Silk is correct: a thoroughgoing redescription of Buddhism must also inquire into
“how Buddhism ‘really’ was,” the question that Almond eschews. Hermeneutics
and historicism, as well as hegemony, are implied by the discursive creation of
Buddhism. How else might we determine all the ways in which the academic study
of phenomena identified as ancient Buddhism serves contemporary interests?
Granted, I would hesitate to posit an autonomous entity, Buddhism (or
Buddhisms), as existing before the nineteenth century. This fact need not obviate
other, seemingly competing, givens. To wit, there is no reason to doubt that the
man we call Fakyamuni Buddha lived in the fourth or fifth century BCE; that he
had followers in his own day; that after his death, people still paid attention to suf-
fering just as texts attributed to him said they should; that others sought happi-
ness for themselves, again following the putative teachings of this deceased
buddha; that still others fantasized about freedom, or pledged not to steal or tell
lies, or sought to assuage guilt and express love toward a parent, or laid claim to
political power and justified the use of force, all by appeal to the words of the
buddha, or to an agent whose authority was based in some way upon the buddha.
In short, long before Christian mariners plied gentoo seas, Asian peoples revered
Fakyamuni Buddha as a figure of authority. They bowed before his image; mem-
orized his recollected sayings; left their wives, sons, and parents just as he was
supposed to have; and gave material support to such renunciants. When speaking
of our contemporaries, we would not hesitate to call such people Buddhists.
Buddhist is now a fully attested index of identity. Why not use this same name for
their premodern brethren? What is gained by investing, intellectually and emo-
tionally, in the term Buddhism? Why should Almond, or I, want to prevent the
growth of that intellectual and emotional capital? Reading cultures across history,
we misuse and mistranslate foreign concepts all the time; anachronisms are
common. Why pay such attention to the anachronistic currency of Buddhism?
If this book is the long answer, then here is the brief one: Strong constructionism
threatens more than the sinecure of a few dozen scholars in a marginal academic
discipline. The deconstruction of Buddhism raises doubts about the value and
values of the taxonomic structure that houses it. Is religion any less constructed than
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Buddhism? Religion too is a byproduct of observation and classification at the
edges of intercultural contact. Religion too has become so deeply woven into the
institutional fabric of the contemporary world that its facticity now seems beyond
question. Indeed, religion more so than Buddhism, since religiosity has become
stereotyped as a universally human trait—even definitive of humanity—while
membership in a specific religion is only ever an accident of time and place.
Were religion a neutral construction it might not warrant such attention. But
as a construction, religion is charged, and charged with a positive polarity.
The Dalai Lama was speaking mere common sense when he told an audience in
1996: “there is every reason to appreciate and respect all forms of spiritual
practice” since “the purpose of religion . . . is to cultivate positive human qualities
such as tolerance, generosity, and love.”108 Yes, the Dalai Lama is well-respected
beyond his native constituency. That does not make his hegemonic discourse, pro
religion, any less disturbing than Tom DeLay’s pro-Christian words. No one asks
us to appreciate and respect all forms of intellectual practice, economic practice,
sexual practice, or political practice. How can we reasonably privilege religion
over other social institutions, if we lack objective, systematic criteria for distin-
guishing the “purpose of religion” and “spiritual practices” from the purposes or
practices of science, aesthetics, erotics, commerce, and politics?
In our modernity, the fool is the person who says that religion and/or spirituality
are not essentially good; that they are not necessarily desirable presences in the
world; that their beliefs, practices, and institutions deserve no special privilege
beyond those accorded to other beliefs, practices, and institutions. This is why it
is important to pay attention to the anachronistic currency of Buddhism.
Buddhism would seem to be a simple thing, but, as a modern artifact, it is not. Its
complex epistemological status makes it a valuable point from which to upset the
easy quiddity granted to enlightened religiosity in the contemporary world.
Ajanta, a place that’s good to think
Ian Hacking’s critique of poststructuralism organizes its discourse around three
sticking points. We have seen how enlightenment provides one such point, divid-
ing those who would characterize it as a contingent experience (at the extreme,
there was no such event, just an incredibly successful charlatan) from those who
hold that it derives from the direct nonconceptual intuition of reality as it is, of
dharma (with the admission that expressions thereof are contingent). And we
have seen that Philip Almond’s nominalism vis-à-vis Buddhism is a sticking point
that separates him from Jonathan Silk, whom I treated as a representative for the
field of Buddhist Studies. In Hacking’s scheme, stabilizing factors provide the
third sticking point. More than contingency, more than nominalism—this last is a
central focus of Beyond Enlightenment. How do we use artifacts from the past to
stabilize, naturalize, and hegemonize the present and future?
Buddhism-in-general and Western imaginings about pan-Asian phenomena are
not the issues here. For its primary evidence, Beyond Enlightenment focuses upon
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India or, rather more narrowly, upon the discursive production of Buddhism at
Ajanta. Ajanta is a western Indian archaeological site almost universally
described as Buddhist in scholarly and popular literature since the nineteenth
century. There are more than 30 man-made caves at Ajanta, first carved into a
sheer 250-foot high wall of rock between the first century BCE and the sixth
century CE. In addition to their excavated architectures, these caves contain a rich
archive of artifacts, including inscriptions, paintings, and sculptures.
Ajanta provides a well-circumscribed set of objects about which to theorize; so
well-circumscribed, in fact, that the art historian Walter Spink has called Ajanta
“by all counts, the most minutely, as well as the most totally, analyzable site . . . in
the world.”109 Spink alludes here to his own project of interweaving in situ
epigraphs with an analysis of the site’s motifs to reconstruct the social and polit-
ical history of the place. Spink’s highflown phrases are not unique. Writers almost
stumble in their rush to aestheticize what Spink elsewhere suggests “may well be
mankind’s most remarkable creative achievement.”110 These others revel in obser-
vations, such as, “It is the Faërie which, ultimately, lingers in memory after a visit
to the Ajajta caves,” and “The heart discovers [at Ajanta] its strength, its unfathomed
powers. It dares stand free and unashamed.”111
Certainly Ajanta is beautiful. Perhaps the best preserved site from ancient
India, Ajanta hints at treasures sadly lost. But as should be clear, my approach to
Ajanta’s archive is neither that of a traditional microhistorian focused on the
curiosities of a unique ancient place; nor that of an intellectual historian who
unpacks local ideologies in relation to translocal norms; nor even that of an aes-
thete whose heart is freed from shame. One might categorize Beyond
Enlightenment as a postmodern microhistory. Ajanta provides a body of evidence
that allows me to place contemporary processes and predicates of identity cre-
ation, constructing Buddhism, in sharp relief. As a place made of stone and paint,
shaped by the natural environment as well as human intentionality and careless-
ness, Ajanta’s objective existence is not a matter for dispute. This materiality
allows me to take the necessary step beyond Almond, who explicitly denies that
Buddhism had a prior objective existence (like a piece of stone waiting to be
discovered) but whose prose is fuzzy on the lines separating discovery from
invention from interpretation. Caves are not at all like cultures or religions in this
regard. With caves, the distinction between discovery and interpretation can be
clearly, if not absolutely, delimited. As a material construction, Ajanta doubles for
Indian Buddhism, an ideological construction. In turn, the uncritical ease with
which one apprehends Ajanta as Buddhist might correlate with the uncritical ease
with which one accepts religiosity as a fixture in the human world.
Ajanta is good to think for a variety of reasons, the most important of which
is chronological. The preponderance of Ajanta’s excavations, paintings, and
sculptures were paid for by wealthy donors during India’s so-called classical age.
This premodern patronage had two phases, the first from approximately 100 BCE
to 100 CE, the second, circa 462 to 480 CE. Following the fifth century, major
excavatory and decorative work stopped, suggesting that the caves were no longer
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actively used, either as monastic homes or as shrines for pilgrimage.112 This is
why Ajanta is so much better preserved than all other contemporaneous
sites. Remote from major population centers, Ajanta was abandoned and
neglected almost immediately after it was created. Still, Ajanta was not forgotten.
The seventh-century Chinese explorer Xuanzang discusses the site in his
Journey to the West, and he may even have visited it. But Xuanzang says noth-
ing that suggests Ajanta was a functioning monastery in his day.113 Other
travelers from the seventh and eighth centuries left graffiti, after which no
humans made their mark on Ajanta for more than one millennium. Then on April
28, 1819, a British officer named John Smith scratched his name over a painted
image, initiating a new era of interest by conservators, scholars, tourists, and
tradesmen.114
Ajanta was all but abandoned in the fifth century and reoccupied, albeit as an
object for study and tourism, in the nineteenth. This 1,400-year caesura makes
Ajanta a material double for that contested institution, Indian Buddhism. For even
those who look upon Indian Buddhism as a promontory in the social terrain of
premodern India acknowledge that it was razed and forgotten. Indian Buddhism
differs from other forms of Buddhism, let alone other religious systems, in at least
this one significant regard. Even the first time a sixteenth-century Christian ship
weighed anchor in a foreign harbor, local Hindus or Muslims, Theravada
bhikkhus or Zen bonzes, were there to act as native informants and subjects of
ethnographic observation. By contrast, the phenomenon classified as Buddhism
had no living representatives in India after the fourteenth century. No native
Indian Buddhist ever greeted a European missionary, merchant, or scholar in
colonial Calcutta or Bombay.115 Like Ajanta, the phenomenon classified as Indian
Buddhism has a constitutive temporal discontinuity between its premodernity and
its modernity, a gap spanned by scholarly constructions. One can agree with
Almond and claim that this scholarly bridge is precarious, since it has only one
solid footing, on the near edge of modernity. Or one can agree with Silk and
argue that the bridge connects solid ground in both eras. Either way, the gap is
there. Either way, for Ajanta to have been categorized as Buddhist in the
nineteenth century required a synthesis, conjoining ancient Indian material
remains with the abstraction of data gained from contemporary informants
(albeit, native to Sri Lanka, Nepal, Thailand, China, etc.), with a scholarly praxis
influenced by religious, colonial, and mercantile agendas, as well as
Enlightenment epistemologies and ideals. Ajanta’s artifacts are thus intertexts
within two radically separate, yet interdependent, discursive fields. Its images and
discursive records can be interpreted within the fullness of the codes available to
ancient patrons and inhabitants; and they can be read in relation to the corpus of
post-Enlightenment representations of India, of Buddhism, and of religion. At
Ajanta we might see how “taking the buddha as an authority” in premodern India
was not equivalent—intellectually, institutionally, politically, or indeed,




If Ajanta was not a Buddhist site, then what was it?
Walter Spink tells us that after 480 “not a painting, not a piece of sculpture, not a
cave, or a cell, or a cistern, nor a single donative inscription” was added to
Ajanta.116 If the people who abandoned Ajanta in that year were not Buddhists,
by what name might they be designated? As I noted earlier, my answer will
nuance Almond’s redescription of Buddhism as a product of the Victorian imagi-
nation. For the denial of Indian Buddhism’s premodern existence must neverthe-
less take account of Fakyamuni Buddha’s wide-ranging social and cultural
currency in fifth-century India. In lieu of Buddhist and Buddhism, this book will
characterize Ajanta (the place as well as its affiliated community) with the terms
Fakya and bauddha. I will use these two terms interchangeably. Fifth-century
Ajanta was a bauddha/Fakya place populated by bauddha/Fakyas.
My reasons for using the term Fakya are patent. Ajanta boasts a total of
ninety-seven inscriptions, painted and incised.117 Of these, sixty record informa-
tion on fifth-century donors; unfortunately twenty-one of the donative inscrip-
tions are damaged beyond use, leaving thirty-nine as a basis for information about
the local community. If we describe a “ratio” of epigraphic material to elapsed
time within which that material was created as a measure of “social density,” then
Ajanta is among the socially densest sites for data on early medieval India. It is a
place at which a statistical sampling can yield meaningful results. Of thirty-nine
complete donative inscriptions from the fifth century, twenty-eight identify
their donor using an epithet that begins with the name Fakya. Most of these
twenty-eight are Fakyabhiksus (renunciant Fakyas); some are Fakya-upasakas
(lay-devotee Fakyas). If we know anything distinctive about the people who made
donations at Ajanta, we know that nearly 3 of every 4 identified himself as a
Fakya. Elsewhere I have proposed that these Fakya epithets at Ajanta were
informed by a socio-spiritual polemic, in which donors adopted Fakyamuni
Buddha’s family name to assert their legitimacy as his heirs, both institutionally
and ideologically.118 To take the name of Fakya was to define oneself by one’s
affiliation with the buddha, somewhat like calling oneself a Buddhist today.119
The other term I will use to characterize Ajanta is bauddha, a secondary
derivative of buddha, in which the vowel’s lengthening indicates connection or
relation. Things that are bauddha pertain to the buddha, just as things-Faiva relate
to Fiva and things-Vaisjava belong to Visju. One can read a Faiva text, visit
a Faiva temple, or take tea in a Faiva home. Likewise, bauddha can be both
adjectival and nominal; it can be used for doctrines spoken by the buddha, objects
enjoyed by him, texts attributed to him, as well as individuals, communities, and
societies that offer him reverence or accept ideologies certified through his name.
Strictly speaking, Fakya is preferable to bauddha since the latter is not attested
at Ajanta. In fact, as a collective noun, bauddha is an outsider’s term. The baud-
dha did not call themselves this in India, though they sometimes did use the
word adjectivally (e.g., as a possessive, the buddha’s).120 Despite the lack of a
fifth-century precedent for applying bauddha to Ajanta, I will do so for several
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reasons. First, bauddha means much the same thing as Fakya. Both terms
represent this social group as followers of the “same” man, one by reference to
his family name, the other by reference to his spiritual title. Second, having
another alternative for Buddhist will help forestall the monotony of prose that
repeats one single word too often. Finally, bauddha not only sounds like Buddhist,
but is sometimes used as such in modern scholarship, as when James Burgess
published his Notes on the Bauddha Rock-Temples of Ajanta.121 Indeed, by a
happy coincidence, the first description of buddha as “the enlightened” in English
(1835) notes, it is because the buddha was enlightened that “his followers
have been termed Bauddhas, or Buddhists.”122 The dissonance created by the
questions—Why were the rock-temples of Ajanta bauddha but not Buddhist?
How was bauddha ideology not Buddhist doctrine?—would seem less dissonant
if posed in terms of Fakya.
We require these alternates for the words Buddhist and Buddhism, not because
Buddhism is a construction of the nineteenth-century West, but because, as Silk’s
critique of Almond demonstrates, we must pay as much attention to the materials
out of which Buddhism was fabricated, as we do to the builder’s plans, their tech-
niques, and the finished edifice. In the fifth century, Ajanta really was a Fakya
place populated by bauddha. How were those bauddha unlike the people now
called Buddhists? And why does that difference matter so? The answers bring us
back to the matter of religion, and the fact that this book assumes a series of sub-
stitutions, whereby the search for Buddhism at Ajanta is a surrogate for the search




A PLACE OF EXCEPTIONAL
UNIVERSAL VALUE
A world heritage monument
AJANTA CAVES have been inscribed on the World Heritage List of the
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage. Inscription on this List confirms the exceptional universal
value of a cultural or natural site which deserves protection for the
benefit of all humanity (Figure 2.1).
Most tourists come to Ajanta for only a day. Their mornings begin in Aurangabad,
100 kilometers south on Maharashtra State Highway No. 8, or at the Jalgaon
railhead, 50 kilometers to the north. The two roads are so different that the longer
drive sometimes makes for the quicker trip. But no matter whether tourists arrive
at Ajanta in air-conditioned calm or sore from constant potholes, upon arrival
all are greeted by a swarm of boys hawking geodes and beads and crystals and
postcards and color-guides and refreshingly cold drinks, electricity permitting.
Having first gone to Ajanta in December 1982, and spent the better part of a
year there in 1992, I returned in July 2000 to interview tourists and workers. Their
unpremeditated words describe an Ajanta that sates and frustrates, coexisting
uneasily with the humans that impinge upon it. Bill, a 25 year old lawyer from
Australia, traveled to Ajanta on the recommendation that it was “something more
special . . . I suppose in terms of a cultural site rather than just a physical landscape
or a cityscape.” But his experience was mixed. Regulations on tourist flow at the
site, barriers and queues, made it “like Disney World,” though they also kept
“hawkers away from the entrances of every cave.” Bill’s awkward ambivalence
about Ajanta was shared by Trin—a 19-year-old Tibetan living in southern
India—but with a difference. Trin found Ajanta “quite dirty.” He hypothesized, “If
Buddhists lived here they would make it clean, and peaceful. They would make it
much cleaner than it is now. (laughing) I think Buddhists should live here.” By
contrast, Suresh from Calcutta found Ajanta “very beautiful” and “of historical
importance . . . because thousands of years ago Indian civilization was here.” This
pride of place was shared by Venketeshwar, who was visiting for the first time as
an adult, though he had made many school trips when a boy. B.C. Dhaky, from
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Golegaon, about twenty kilometers away, had still different reasons for being a
frequent visitor: “We like to come here often because it is beautiful in this season,
and we have a good time climbing the mountain and swimming under the water-
fall.” Doubtless because of daytrippers like Mr Dhaky, the Lonely Planet guide
warns travelers to “avoid, if at all possible, coming here at weekends or on
public holidays. On those days, Ajanta seems to attract half the population of
India and it’s bedlam. The Calcutta rush hour has nothing on this place at those
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Figure 2.1 Plaque at the entrance to Ajanta. Photo by author.
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times—hardly the contemplative atmosphere which the monks and builders had
in mind!”1
Where is Ajanta? Does it exist in the intentions of those monks and builders?
In the romantic ! of the Lonely Planet’s imagined contemplative past? In the hills
comprised of “horizontally bedded alternate flows of massive and amygdular
lava” located at Latitude 20  32 North and Longitude 75  45 East?2 In the lungs
of the man who ran into one cave, shouted OÅ Namo Fivaya, and then ran on to
the next? In the picnic baskets toted by the Venketeshwar and Dhaky families, or
their children’s kohl-traced eyes? In the cultural traces analyzed by scholars and
appreciated by antiquarians? In the prostrations of Tibetan refugee monks? In the
processions of Japanese pilgrims, with their drums and their priests and their
flowers? In the words of its builders and inhabitants, preserved in the many
inscriptions, painted and incised? In the authority of the scholar who reports on
all this? In the labor of the Archaeological Survey of India’s Chemical Branch
workers, and Physical Branch workers, and guards? In the bus drivers and taxi
drivers, hotel workers and food vendors, who serve half the population of India
on any given Saturday? In the brass plate next to the site’s entrance, on which is
inscribed the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s
certainty: Ajanta possesses exceptional universal value; Ajanta contributes to the
good of all humanity?
UNESCO has a longtime partner in ICOMOS, the International Council on
Monuments and Sites, whose publications include a handbook for the managers of
World Heritage cultural sites. Readers of the ICOMOS manual would find noth-
ing remarkable about the range of interests I encountered at Ajanta in 2000. The
handbook advises site managers to anticipate the needs of many types of visitors,
from the scholar to the student, from the general pleasure-seeker to the reluctant
package-tourist, who is “often more interested in the amenities—where to get
something to drink, where the toilets are, where to sit down and where the gift shop
is,” than in the site itself.3 ICOMOS recommends that World Heritage site
managers envision the tourist’s itinerary as a trail of needs, in which comfort
(or lack thereof ) pulls against curiosity, and prestige competes with cost.
As for cost, Ajanta is a case in point. In 1982, everybody paid 2 rupees to enter.
One decade later the fee had been raised to Rs 5. But after the Archaeological
Survey of India (ASI) recognized the value of the World Heritage brand it initi-
ated a sliding scale, keying the rate for foreigners to United States’ currency
($5 or Rs 250), and doubling the Indian rate to Rs 10. After the place became a
matter of concern for all humanity the cost of entry became a marker of difference,
for the ASI understood that money functions to objectify an otherwise ambiguous
hierarchy of desires—aesthetic, symbolic, intellectual. Heritage sites possessing
exceptional universal value satisfy higher desires than do other historic or cultural
sites, and thus, objectively, they command a higher entry fee. Indeed, one might
calculate an individual’s or community’s inherent value by counting tourist flow:
How many Rajasthani farmers on pilgrimage through Maharashtra, traveling from
Ganesh temple to Ganesh temple, stop at Ajanta, even though Rs 10 represents a
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significant expense? How many Germans, Italians, Canadians, Sri Lankans, and
so on, drop Ajanta from their itinerary when they learn of the exceptional demand
the ASI places on their foreign wallets?
Money provides an autonomous field within which to gauge the transvaluation
of the archaic and bygone, the outmoded and defunct, the dead and gone, into
contemporary social and cultural capital. But this chapter is not about money. The
ASI introduced its dual fee structure only after UNESCO had transvalued Ajanta,
from an interesting place to an exceptional place, from an Indian place to a global
place. That transvaluation is the focus here. What had to be done to transvalue this
place, ignored for more than a millennium, into a locus of exceptional universal
value whose protection benefits all humanity?
To address this question, the chapter begins by laying out the basis for
UNESCO’s rhetoric within Enlightenment humanism. Namely, all good men in
all ages share a set of core values; these universal values are logically prior to
ethnic and national interests; these universal values express the essence of what it
is to be human. By naming Ajanta a World Heritage monument, UNESCO offers
it as a place at which to encounter humanity at its essential best.
Ostensibly World Heritage status is oriented toward one pragmatic end: the
conservation of exceptional places. The instructional literature addressed to site
managers, however, sounds a second theme. In the act of valorizing World
Heritage monuments, this literature just as strongly emphasizes the value of the
World Heritage designation itself as an exceptional brand. In line with this dual
message, the chapter will also shift focus, from the value of objects to the value
of branding objects. Branding is crucial for the smooth operation of a market
economy: brands add value to objects, giving them stable identities that mark the
objects as reliable and safe. Why is the World Heritage brand so powerful and
so eagerly consumed? The chapter ends by questioning the representation of
Enlightenment as the consummation of desire. For a brand to be successful it
must identify itself with liberation in some way, with a vision of a future in which
consumers are freer and happier for having bought the brand. Freedom, the
Enlightenment’s ultimate goal, is branding’s horizon as well.
An Enlightened view of Ajanta
The plaque outside the ticket booth was made possible in 1983, the year in which
the seventh UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage placed Ajanta on its World Heritage List. This
UNESCO Convention itself was established in 1972 with a mandate to “provide
for the protection of those cultural and natural properties deemed to be of out-
standing universal value.”4 The Convention’s List was not intended as a novelty, a
roster of sanctioned tourist venues, or a modern reworking of the Seven Wonders.
Rather, this designation was expressly aimed at one pragmatic end: conservation.
The ICOMOS handbook asserts with pride: “The Convention provides, for
the first time, a permanent legal, administrative, and financial framework for
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international cooperation in safeguarding humankind’s cultural and natural
heritage. It introduces the specific concept of a ‘world heritage’ whose impor-
tance transcends all political and geographic boundaries.”5 While a gamut of
perils, from earthquakes and fires to war to urban sprawl to corrosive carbon
emissions to the dirt of tourism itself, threaten every cultural artifact, UNESCO
has made a hard choice. It has articulated a set of criteria for determining which
artifacts deserve every human being’s protection. These World Heritage monu-
ments serve, variously, as destinations for international tourism, symbols of
national identity, and fragile archives of scholarly data. They are prized resources
that demand rational administration. Thus a site manager’s primary responsibility
is to identify the particular “values of the site” basic to its global import, and then
to protect those values through “the development and implementation of a
management philosophy.”6
Even though the List has grown long—as of July 2005, 137 countries
supported 628 cultural sites—according to the Convention’s operational guide-
lines, “it is not intended to provide for the protection of all properties of great
interest, importance or value, but only for a select list of the most outstanding of
these from an international viewpoint.”7 From this viewpoint, Ajanta had much to
recommend it. In order to distinguish places possessing exceptional universal
significance from ho-hum pufferies of local color, UNESCO articulated seven
criteria, only one of which was required for nomination. Thus in 1983, the Taj
Mahal, India’s premier symbolic monument, entered the list solely on the basis of
its being “a masterpiece of human creative genius.” Ajanta, also a masterpiece of
human creative genius, satisfied three further UNESCO benchmarks. Ajanta:
 exhibit[s] an important interchange of human values, over a span of time
or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or
technology, monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design;
 [bears] a unique or at least exceptional testimony to a cultural tradition or to
a civilization which is living or which has disappeared; . . .
 [is] directly or tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas,
or with beliefs, with artistic and literary works of outstanding universal
significance (the Committee considers that this criterion should justify
inclusion in the List only in exceptional circumstances and in conjunction
with other criteria cultural or natural).8
As a World Heritage monument, Ajanta is thus a bona fide repository of value and
values, the universally human, culture, civilization, tradition, belief, art, meaning,
and genius. Its importance transcends all political boundaries. In a word, Ajanta
is Enlightened. The World Heritage Convention articulates how to recognize the
Enlightenment embedded in such places and how to protect it for the future.
Before we investigate just how Ajanta fulfills these many roles, let us look
closer at the underpinnings of the World Heritage Convention, its conceptual
genesis in a European Enlightenment humanism. The eighteenth-century’s
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philosophical anthropology began with twin assumptions. First, human nature is
singular and uniform: the essential characteristics of Homo sapiens vary neither
with time nor place, neither economic status nor nationality. In David Hume’s
classic formulation:
It is universally acknowledged that there is a great uniformity among the
actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature remains
still the same, in its principles and operations. The same motives always
produce the same actions: the same events follow from the same causes.9
Lacking such regularity, the science of humanity would fail, just as physics would
fail if apples fell up to the clouds in China and down from the clouds in Japan.
Indeed biology, physics, even mathematics, had a stake in this human uniformity,
for Hume took the science of man to be “the only solid foundation for the other
sciences.”10 If human beings’ sensory and mental faculties were not predictably
uniform then we could know nothing about nature’s own regularities, since natural
laws are mere inductions from empirical observation.
Enlightenment anthropology’s second assumption held that human beings are
objects that possess universal value, and simultaneously are subjects whose
actions can express universal values. In this regard, the Declaration of
Independence presents an easy example, where self-evident rights are the natural
corollary of humanity’s uniform equality. Still more notable is the conclusion to
the Critique of Practical Reason, where Immanuel Kant wrote: “Two things fill
the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often
and more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens above me and the
moral law within me.”11 As Kant saw it, the outer and the inner worlds both
exhibit lawful behavior; both are unbounded in scope. But while Kant felt per-
sonally dwarfed before the cosmological infinite, the moral law “infinitely raises
my worth.”12 Innate rationality granted Kant, as it does all humans, the capacity
for moral perfection “independent of all animality.” It should be said that while
the conception of a uniform nature, and the concern for the moral quality of that
nature, were typical of the Enlightenment, not all Kant’s contemporaries shared
his optimism. Claude-Adrien Helvétius’ diatribe against a doctrine of innate
goodness—“the child kills flies, beats his dog, and strangles his sparrow”—found
its precursor in Augustine of Hippo’s earlier observation that, “if babies are
innocent, it is not for lack of will to do harm, but for lack of strength.”13
Conceived thus, Enlightenment humanism remained continuous with Christian
anthropology. For Christianity a moral imperative placed human beings above the
world of dumb nature. Created by god for Adam’s sake, the cattle, birds, and all
the beasts were not caught in humanity’s double bind, where the expectation of
moral perfection was rendered unattainable by the weight of Adam’s disobedi-
ence. Jesus’ sacrifice provided the only possible resolution of this dilemma;
saintly martyrs, both of flesh and spirit, showed the way. But Kant, like his
Enlightenment brethren, held that although “morals began with the noblest
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property of human nature . . . it ended—in enthusiasm or in superstition,” sectarian
Christianity.14 In this, Enlightenment humanists were responding (no less than
Reformation preachers) to existential hierarchies of the kind outlined by the
fourteenth-century natural philosopher, Henry of Langenstein: “Just as the Lord
gave human beings dominion and care over the animals, so he placed superior and
more perfect people above the inferior and more imperfect people.”15 For these
later thinkers, human nature was one; the Company of the Saints was just so much
mythology; Jesus Christ was neither Alpha nor Omega. Instead, Thomas Paine
would describe Jesus’ “real character” thus: “a virtuous and amiable man . . . of the
most benevolent kind.”16 To the extent that Paine or Voltaire invoked Jesus’ name
it was to represent him as preaching Enlightened values, worthy, not because they
were divine writ, but because they increased human happiness and freedom. Jesus
belonged to that company of “good men in all ages” who preach “similar systems
of morality.”17
The World Heritage Convention proceeds from the same moral phenomenology.
Its documents assume the existence of a set of core values shared by good men in
all ages. These values are logically prior to every particularity of nation, ethnos,
or culture. They close all temporal and geographical distance. They are binding
on humanity in general. Moreover, the Convention holds that since these values
are the common property of the human psychic self, cultural productions that rep-
resent them in ways that transcend borders and local passions are the common
property of the human social self. Certainly UNESCO is not unique in its
embrace of these principles. They are norms for the relatively new academic field
of Cultural Resource Management as well, as we read in this statement from
William Lipe’s influential article, “Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources”:
To the extent that we can travel in the past, we can escape the bounds of
competing nations and interest groups as no present-day traveller can.
We must then view the evidence of the past as a record of human, rather
than national, accomplishment. Hence, if we wish to foster an awareness
of the degree to which the fortunes of all human groups are intertwined,
and to gain a broad and even dispassionate perspective of the various
ethnocentric and nationalist claims of today, there can be no better road
to recommend than one that leads back in time.18
For what purpose have the Ajanta caves been transvalued from ignored relics of
ancient provenance into a locus of exceptional universal value? Ajanta provides a
place at which to imagine the fulfillment of an Enlightenment fantasy, in which
present political multiplicities (sometimes divisive) resolve into a future apolitical
unity (always harmonious).
Lipe’s recommendations have not been fully adopted by UNESCO, or by the
ASI. They cannot have been. For although World Heritage sites belong to all
people de jure, de facto they are controlled by particular states. The Convention
asserts, “Inclusion of a property on the World Heritage List requires the consent
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of the State concerned.”19 And this too plays back into Enlightenment debates,
which reveal a delicate tension between the idealization of the autonomous, agen-
tive individual and the conviction that humankind will, as a collective whole,
progress toward “true perfection.”20 For the Marquis de Condorcet, this balance
was met through the expectation that the abolition of inequalities—among people
and among nations—will be followed by a correlative increase in equality. He
imagines that once “a close accord had been established between all [E]nlight-
ened men, from then onwards all will be the friends of humanity, all will work
together for its perfection and happiness.”21 Surely Lipe can be imagined a mem-
ber of Condorcet’s fraternity. But Adam Smith offers quite a different model for
this progress, with his famous prediction that so-called Enlightened self-interest
will have a welcome outcome: If every man works to produce what is for himself
“the greatest value,” seeking selfishly “only his own gain,” he will be “led by an
invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of his intention,” namely the
common good.22
The UNESCO document falls within the penumbra cast by Condorcet and
Smith. Every state signatory to the Convention agrees “to ensure that effective
and active measures are taken for the protection, conservation, and presentation
of the cultural . . . heritage situated on its territory” through a “comprehensive
planning programme” that includes “an appropriate staff . . . scientific and technical
studies and research . . . the appropriate legal, scientific, technical administrative
and financial measures.”23 As a dividend for participation in the Convention,
every state is then assured “collective assistance” in case it suffers from “insuffi-
cient economic, scientific, and technological resources” of its own.24 Economic
inequalities give way to mutual support in these united nations’ mutual self-
interested dedication to conserving extraordinary material evidence of universal
human values.
The heroic present
I began with the question of how Ajanta, as a World Heritage monument, might
provide a repository of value and values, culture, civilization, tradition, belief, art,
meaning, and genius. What does it mean, in a word, for Ajanta to be an
Enlightened monument in our global age? At least the rudiments of an answer are
now in place, though of course they raise new problems, the most important being
that of time. The Enlightenment’s philosophical anthropology harbors a theory of
time, presupposing a correlation between positive value and transtemporality.
That theory is evident in the earlier citation from William Lipe, in which the road
to future harmony “leads back in time.” For Lipe, the past is a place in which the
contemporary strife of competing nations and interest groups has no place; the
preferred present is one not like now. So too the plated brass inscription at
Ajanta’s entrance presses the site’s past into the service of humanity’s future. The
very fact that Ajanta’s presence can be displaced from the present without loss of
value is what allows it to be a World Heritage monument. Still, what of the
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present? Is there an Enlightened present? Might a place like Ajanta exist, not for
time, but in time? The World Heritage Convention articulates criteria for recogniz-
ing Enlightenment embedded in such places and offers a means through which to
preserve it for the future. How do present actions accomplish that Enlightened aim?
This shift from the question of values and universalism to that of time is
inspired by Michel Foucault, whose essay, “What is Enlightenment?,” gives us a
way to think through temporality as implied by the World Heritage Convention’s
protocols.25 Foucault wrote this piece for a conference to be held at Berkeley in
1984, the bicentennial anniversary of Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung? (The conference
was canceled on account of Foucault’s death and the article was published posthu-
mously.) Foucault finds novelty in Kant’s own “little text” insofar as it presents
the philosopher’s task as a temporal task because it is a moral task.26 That is,
Kant’s Was ist Aufklärung? does not pose the philosopher’s questions—“what can
be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped for”—as abstract matters
for epistemology and ethics.27 It shows, to the contrary, “how, at this very
moment, each individual is responsible in a certain way for that overall process”
of Enlightenment. Enlightenment is a puzzle of the present. Where presentness is
often marked by the perception of an essential cohesive property (thus we are told
this is the Information Age), or by its place in an eschatological or teleological
framework (as evidenced by Lipe and the World Heritage Convention), Foucault
finds in Kant the chrysalis of a novel approach to an Enlightened present: namely,
as a process “defined by a modification of the preexisting relation linking will,
authority, and the use of reason.”28 Enlightenment is a matter of living one’s life
now in a critical engagement with the past, whenever one’s now so happens to be.
Accordingly, although Foucault’s article begins with Kant, it quickly shifts focus
to modernity as an existential mode. The question, What is Enlightenment?,
becomes, How is one modern? Foucault is noteworthy here, not only because he
is the preeminent critic of Enlightenment universalism, but for my purposes
because representations of Ajanta at all levels of interest—international, national,
state, and regional—manifest what Foucault calls the ethos of modernity, a “will
to ‘heroize’ the present.”29 What might this mean?
As a concrete point of departure, consider an advertisement from a campaign
produced in 2001 by the Ogilvy and Mather agency for the Maharashtra Tourist
Development Corporation (MTDC). These ads were featured in Indian travel
magazines and hung as posters in the nation’s airports. The one that interests me
in particular begins with the headline—“A century ago, you could get much better
souvenirs at Ajanta”—and ends with the tag—The Ajanta Experience
(Figure 2.2). In between, the text reads,
After Ajanta was rediscovered in the 19th century, a certain Narayan
Ekenath was appointed the curator of the caves. Ekenath’s specialty was
obliging tourists with actual pieces of Ajanta art as souvenirs. Amongst
these was a group of five male heads which were auctioned at Sotheby’s
of London in 1922. They now reside in the Boston Museum of Fine Arts.
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Tourists today have to settle for far less valuable souvenirs. But they can
come back with the satisfaction of knowing that their children, and their
children’s children, will be able to enjoy the wonders of Ajanta as well.
Foucault describes modernity as an attitude, a choice, a way of acting and behaving,
a task, all of which add up to a single word: “heroization.”30 The MTDC’s poster,
likewise, sells Ajanta as a place at which to play hero. Capitalizing upon the short-
sighted greed of yesteryear, The Ajanta Experience promises the twenty-first
century tourist still greater satisfaction if he fashions himself as an Enlightened
hero, whose understanding of the long-term costs of vandalism fosters moral
restraint redounding to his own private benefit and the public good.
At first, this might look a page out of Rousseau’s Social Contract: “The
strongest man is never strong enough to always be master, unless he transforms
his power into right, and obedience into duty.”31 But the poster’s reference to pub-
lic corruption is unremarkable. Its implicit premise: things have not changed so
far from the nineteenth century of Ekenath Narayan. Public office in contempo-
rary India remains a badge of power, but not of trust. One should, again citing
Rousseau, “obey the powers that be” (or at least consider doing so).32 Yet, we
know how often those powers do not respect their own oaths of office. When
that happens, only personal responsibility matched by personal self-discipline
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Figure 2.2 Advertisement from the MTDC campaign, “The Ajanta Experience.” Image
graciously supplied by Ogilvy and Mather, Mumbai.
provides a reliable guide for action. It is this jaundice about the limits of public
trust that transfigures this MTDC poster’s audience from being Rousseau’s heirs,
“forced to be free,” to being Foucault’s modernist heroes, who make a “voluntary
choice” to invent themselves in contradistinction to the many Narayan Ekenaths
who still populate their world.33
The heroism of the MTDC’s Ajanta experience is a banal heroism, to be sure.
But that fact alone should not deprive it of highflown hermeneutics. To explain
his conception of modernity Foucault looks to Charles Baudelaire, whose
“consciousness of modernity is widely recognized as one of the most acute in the
nineteenth century.”34 Baudelaire, in turn, named the painter Constantin Guys as
a paragon of modernity, for Guys’ paintings “transfigure[d] the world.”35 This is
not to say that Guys somehow negated his present reality, or sought an eternal
reality behind or beyond the present moment. Such transcendentalism is anath-
ema to the modernist. Quite the contrary, Guys’ acts of transfiguration multiplied
realities. Guys made “natural” things “more than natural” and made “beautiful”
things “more than beautiful.” Modernity, for Baudelaire and thus for Foucault,
was an accretive exercise, a way of living, in which one was at liberty to choose
one’s desired reality; in which one mindfully produced that reality, all the while,
paradoxically, maintaining an “extreme attention to what is real.”
The tourist’s heroics, like that of Constantin Guys, lies in negotiating this
“difficult interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of
freedom.”36 Here is the truth of what is real. The MTDC advertisement makes
reference to a group of five male heads auctioned at Sotheby’s in 1922. Sotheby’s
received £1000 for this fragment.37 Here again is the real truth: in 2002 the
per capita income in Maharashtra was approximately Rs 24,000.38 Now let us
translate these two truths into 2002 US dollars. The fragment from Ajanta
earned $21,500 at auction (doubtless this would have been a significantly higher
figure had it really gone to auction in 2002), while Maharashtrians earn about
$500 per year on average. In 2002, there was no electronic security at Ajanta; no
network of cameras watched the caves. Guards are more or less vigilant in the
popular caves, but at 3:00 pm in the hot month of May, really, anything goes. On
a whim, or with preplanned stealth, another fragment could easily be stolen for a
wealthy collector.
Modernity, Foucault notes, is not just a relationship with time. It is not just the
ability to envision one’s children and grandchildren visiting this ancient place,
and thus to prefer preservation over quick profit. Modernity is also a mode of
relationship with oneself. The willingness to forgo such “souvenirs” exemplifies
an inner asceticism that Foucault describes as “indispensable” to “the deliberate
attitude of modernity.”39 Driving to Ajanta, paying custom at the ticket booth,
remaining on the concrete walkways, waiting patiently in lines, neither spitting
nor shitting in the less popular caves even though the nearest bathroom is one-
third of a mile away, not stealing paintings or carving names into them, in short
reconciling one’s desires to the authority of governmental reason, are the ritual
acts of modernity that transfigure individuals into heroic citizens and respectful
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tourists, transfigure an experience of Ajanta into The Ajanta Experience,
transfigure a place into a viable World Heritage monument, and transfigure a
nation into a valued participant in an international Convention.
Ajanta then
The MTDC’s tourist hero is a thoroughly modern Manu who, in obeying posted
rules and uniformed guards, obeys himself as well. In Kantian terms, he is a
moral being insofar as he freely submits his will to reason’s dictates, expecting no
satisfaction or reward for his obedience. And yet Kant recognizes that moral per-
fection is unattainable. As embodied beings we are never free of irrational drives
and desires. No man can follow the moral law gladly, no matter what privations
it demands.40 Thus we should not judge the MTDC’s tourist hero too harshly if he
buys The Ajanta Experience, in part, because it promises that doing his duty will
yield still greater satisfactions.
The tourist’s heroic modernity emerges within a universe of collective
possibilities and impossibilities, liberties accepted and liberties rejected. The
Enlightened rejection of unEnlightened freedoms, in turn, plays upon a prurient
interest in those older, now-shunned freedoms that the site’s earliest visitors
enjoyed. The former curator, Ekenath Narayan, is an object of scorn, but also of
fascination. That prurience allows The Ajanta Experience’s bourgeois heroism to
play a “compensatory function” akin to that described in Janice Radway’s ethno-
graphic study of women who read romance novels. Avid readers of “bodice
rippers” tend to be women unfulfilled by the “routinized, regimented, and minimally
challenging” roles of suburban America housewifery—chauffeur, maid, cook—
and alienated from husbands who regard such domestic chores as little more than
structured indolence.41 These women find a missing satisfaction and reason for
optimism in romance novels. For our purposes the noteworthy point is that these
women also feel abashed at this personal indulgence, which seems to them “hedo-
nistic.” Romances are a guilty pleasure, forcing these women to “work out a
complex rationalization . . . that not only asserts their equal right to pleasure but
also legitimates the books by linking them with values more widely approved
within American culture.”42 So too The Ajanta Experience poster electrifies the site
with a dirty charge through its evocation of Ajanta’s wild past, while disavowing
that pleasure in favor of other enjoyments marked as suitably modern.
To better grasp Ajanta’s modernity—as an ideal present chosen in conscious
tension with both an imagined past as well as an actual present—we need to know
more about Ajanta’s re-creation over the past two centuries. Let us consider the
era of Ekenath Narayan, seeking those now-forbidden freedoms for which The
Ajanta Experience compensates. The following section will then turn to twentieth-
century labors that have transfigured Ajanta into a World Heritage site proper.
For rough romance, there is no leading-man to surpass Lieutenant James
Edward Alexander, Sixteenth Lancers, of the Order of the Lion and Sun. In
February 1824, Alexander was traveling through Maharashtra’s countryside when
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he decided to investigate the little-known caves near the Ajanta pass.43 The danger
was palpable as Alexander arrayed himself in Muselmani costume, and strapped
on sabres, pistols, and hunting spears before leaving the caravanserai at Ajanta
village. When he passed through the town gate, a native soldier warned: “ ‘La
illah illilah! (There is but one God) you will never return: for if you escape the
tigers, these stony-hearted robbers, the Bheels, will destroy you.’ ” Indeed, a
nearby cairn marked “where unfortunate travellers had been destroyed by tigers.”
But Alexander remained undaunted, winding along the course of the Waghora
River, ever deeper into a glen “remarkable for its picturesque beauty,” secreted in
the “wild and romantic” hills.
What did Lieutenant Alexander find in the heart of that glen? As an able
naturalist, he noted neem trees, mimosas, and ficus religiosa lining the way. But
then he reached a 250-foot high wall of rock, hanging sheerly above the Waghora’s
torrent bed, sweeping around in a semicircle, and terminating in a series of water-
falls. The caves loomed high, ranging between 50 and 100 feet above the stream.
Alexander ascended. Clambering into the first, and then several others, he found: a
fetid smell, arising from numerous bats . . . the remains of a recent
fire . . . the entire skeleton of a man . . . prints of the feet of tigers, jackals,
bears, monkies, peacocks, &c. . . . impressed upon the dust, formed by
the plaster of the fresco paintings which had fallen from the ceilings.44
But Alexander also discovered a nice spot to smoke a chilum, and in the end he
broke out in Horace’s ode, “Quae non imber edax non aquilo impotens . . . ,”
before returning to town.45 (Figures 2.3 and 2.4.)
If early visitors made a pilgrimage to Ajanta to behold “imperishable monuments
of antiquity,” as Alexander described it, they did so no less than for the wild adven-
ture.46 After coming by cart or foot along the riverbed, they would then pick their
ways up the rock face, or scramble along ancient stairs, to reach the caves, each sus-
pended in the reaches of the sheer wall; some caves remained inaccessible except
by rope. Even in 1828 one complained, “these caves are becoming daily more dif-
ficult of access. You pass along narrow goat paths with a chasm of 50 or 80 feet
below, the footing not nine inches broad, with scarce any thing to cling to.”47
From the 1820s to the 1920s, visitors braved many hazards, not to mention the
random effects of water, time, and humanity. Lieutenant Blake, who visited in
1839, described the caves as “daily suffering from lying choked in mud,” and the
Europeans as suffering from the cupidity of the local headman, “a rude jungly
individual.”48 Blake also mentioned wasps and bats, which can still strike fear
today. Other early tourists loved to complain about the Bhils, the local aborigines.
In 1824, Alexander observed that, had his party lacked firearms, the Bhils would
have slain them to a man. Within a decade, the Bhils were deprived of their deadly
bows, but retained the power to confute European sensibilities. The Bhils believed
that the gods had created Ajanta and that a number of divine beings—some
tribal, some Hindu—continued to live therein. These caves were homes for
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Figure 2.3 General plan of the Caves of Ajanta. After James Burgess, Report on the
Buddhist Cave Temples, plate XIV.
Figure 2.4 A view of Ajanta, from Cave Sixteen to Cave Twenty Six (from left to right).
Photo by author.
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Fiva, Parvati, and Indra, as well as Gattu Darj, Jagarnath, Kokan Nath, and
Jelandar Nath, among others.49 The Bhils named individual caves for their
indwelling divinities. This confused the Europeans, not least because even the
Bhils themselves held no consensus as to which god inhabited which cave. In the
1840s, James Fergusson brought solid scientific order to the site by numbering
each cave, 1 to 29 from East to West. The old Bhil names are now not used and
almost wholly forgotten.
Still other visitors, well before Narayan Ekenath, sought souvenirs but received
censure. The MTDC advertisement notwithstanding, one century ago you could
not get much better souvenirs at Ajanta than you can now, simply because most
would disintegrate upon removal. The painted fragment mentioned in that adver-
tisement is the only known surviving plunder.50 The friable nature of these arti-
facts was obvious. In 1828 several adventurers found themselves at Ajanta
simultaneously, including one Mr Ralph and one Dr Bird. A transcript of the
encounter between these two tells us that Dr Bird sought to bring a bit of Ajanta
back to Bombay with him. Mr Ralph warned, “as for carrying away the paintings,
you can do so in powder. I have ascertained that they will not quit the wall in lam-
inae, but crumble under touch.”51 The reporter of this conversation described
Dr Bird as “an intelligent young Medical man from Bombay.” But we might have
reason to question that judgment. For “notwithstanding protestations about defac-
ing monuments, this visitor [Dr Bird] contrived to peel off four painted figures.”52
Those four figures crumbled into powder.
Ajanta now
That is not the last we hear of Dr James Bird. In 1847 he published Historical
Researches on the Origin and Principles of the Bauddha and Jain Religions, cap-
italizing upon on his visit to Ajanta two decades earlier. Twenty years had brought
about a notable change of heart. For whereas the James Bird of 1828 defaced
Ajanta notwithstanding protest, his own book spoke of “the duty imposed on us,
as a nation, to preserve these relics of ancient art.”53 Bird was not concerned
solely with the caves as memorials to India’s past. Rather, presaging the World
Heritage Convention’s criterion that its monuments must possess exceptional uni-
versal value, Bird imagined India’s cave temples to be synecdoches for its popu-
lace’s state of grace. “It is scarcely comprehensible,” he scolded at the beginning
of his preface, “how our government could have so long neglected monuments of
such historical importance, associated as they are with the former state of India,
and with the moral and religious condition of its people.”54 He completed his
thought at the preface’s end: “Those anxious for the welfare and happiness of a
heathen people” would find in his book evidence that “Brahmanical prejudices
and Hindu customs are not of that unchangeable character so long and erro-
neously ascribed to them.”55 Attention paid to the reconstruction of historical
monuments anticipated a more profound reconstruction, rebuilding India on the
foundation of “true religion.”56
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Bird’s changed attitude concerning archaeological practice might be tied to a
plea made four years before his book’s publication by James Fergusson, the lead-
ing archaeologist of the day, who indicted Bird in full hearing of the Royal Asiatic
Society of Great Britain and Ireland:
It is sad to think that after standing so many years and exposure to so
destructive a climate, after escaping the bigotry of the Moslem and the
rough usage of the robber Bheel, they [Ajanta’s paintings] should be fast
perishing from the meddling curiosity of the Europeans who now visit
them. But such is unfortunately the case; for few come away without
picking off one or two of the heads he thinks most beautiful or interest-
ing, and as most of them are reduced to powder before they reach their
destination, they are lost to the world for ever. The only instance of this
I can refer to in print is . . . where it is stated, that Dr. Bird peeled four
figures off the Zodiac in cave No. 17.57
Inspired by Fergusson, the Royal Asiatic Society issued a Memorial to the East
India Company, soliciting “their interposition to preserve the Caves from all such
causes of injury and decay as may be obviated by means within the authority of
our Indian government,” and requesting that it employ accomplished artists to
copy the Ajanta’s paintings, “before it was too late.”58 Within a year, the colonial
government authorized money for repairs, and hired Captain Robert Gill of the
Madras Army, “who was at that period probably one of the best artists in India.”59
The modern history of Ajanta is a tale of fighting time and losing. Captain Gill
arrived at Ajanta in 1844 with fanfare, bodyguards, and his own elephant. For
more than twenty years he carefully copied the paintings, sending his reproduc-
tions by bullock cart to Bombay, and thence to London. In 1866, all but five of
his canvases were placed on display at the Crystal Palace Exhibition, not long
before a fire swept through the exhibition in December, destroying twenty-years’
work. Six years later John Griffiths, Principal of the Bombay School of Arts,
began annual excursions with his students to pick up after Gill’s loss. Read the
hope in this description of Griffiths’ project, published in 1884:
Mr. Griffiths and his staff have been at work for five or six seasons, and
the results of their labours are sent to England as soon as completed, and
placed in the India Museum. A good deal yet remains to be done, but there
is every reason to believe that, before long, copies of the whole of the
fragments . . . of these truly wonderful frescoes will have been executed.60
On June 12, 1885 the majority of Griffiths’ 125 paintings, each canvas between
20 and 30 feet square, were lost to a noon-time fire that swept through the
museum’s storage area.
These mishaps were followed, naturally, by more. John Cumming’s history of
archaeological conservation in India tells us that Griffiths and his students, joined
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by other well-intentioned artists, slathered cheap varnish on the paintings to bring
out the colors. Not long thereafter, the temporary fix “not only made the brush-
work more indistinct, but in some cases where the dirt had not been removed
beforehand from the fresco, converted the entire painting into a dingy patch.”61 In
the early 1920s, the Nizam of Hyderabad, in whose territory Ajanta lay until inde-
pendence, appointed two Italian experts in art restoration, at the royal sum of
£400 per month, plus expenses, to resolve this solution and preserve the art. At
the time, the Nizam’s Director of Archaeology said of Professor Lorenzo Cecconi
and Count Orsini’s labors that “the repairs to the caves and the cleaning and con-
servation of the frescoes have been carried out on such sound principles and in
such a scientific manner that these matchless monuments have found a fresh lease
of life for at least a couple of centuries.”62 As the decades have passed, the return
on the Nizam’s investment in the future has been less than anticipated.
Nevertheless, the Nizam was the man most responsible for transforming
Ajanta, from the difficult preserve of committed and intrepid travelers to a desti-
nation ready for tourists. He built roads and bridges, enabling cars to drive
directly to the caves. He built a rest house for the weary in easy walking distance
of the site. He cut a walkway into the hillside, making it possible for visitors to
walk from one cave to the next without having to descend to the torrent bed. In
short, the Nizam was the initial architect of what the MTDC later advertised as
The Ajanta Experience.
This experience is becoming increasingly regularized and (re)constructed.
Local workers, whose great-grandparents served early visitors by carrying packs
and lanterns, scaring away swarms of bees and bats, or clearing the caves of mud
and debris, are now watched by overseers brought from Nepal, who have no local
ties and for that reason are presumed to be free of the small kindnesses that lead
to petty corruption. Now the ASI rebuilds crumbled walls and patches icons so
that a casual glance does not perceive the decay brought about by centuries of
rain, mud, bees, and parrots. Now the ASI cleans paintings. But in the act of wip-
ing away the soot that covers and protects Ajanta’s paintings, restorers also
remove the color washes and fine lines that define their subtle grace. Indeed, this
last fact has led the art historian Walter Spink to publically campaign against the
ASI’s efforts. For Spink, the ASI’s chemical branch might well be second only to
Ekenath Narayan as a named agent of permanent damage.63 Still work progresses
apace.
There is even a plan to build a museum near the site. As a repository for
artifacts found near the caves it will be like any other archaeological site museum.
But at Ajanta there will also be a special section, recreating Caves Sixteen,
Seventeen, and Twenty One.64 This last addition is said to be in response to
tourists’ complaints that, because they are now permitted in the caves for only
fifteen minutes at a stretch, they lack sufficient time “to soak in the beauty of the
frescoes.” For this reason, the “artificial caves will be created, lighting them
brightly and projecting photographic images on the walls to enable art aficionados
and scholars to study the paintings at leisure.”65
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From values to value
My purpose for reproducing this brief, already out-of-date timeline for Ajanta’s
modern production is not to mock early visitors, the Nizam, or the ASI, which
now administers the site. Rather, my purpose is to destabilize the equation
between contemporary valuation of Ajanta as an exceptional and universal place,
on the one hand, and contemporary expectations that it is a locus of authenticity,
on the other. To continue that destabilization, the chapter now takes a major turn.
We have a sense of the Enlightenment universalism implicit in UNESCO’s nam-
ing a site to the World Heritage List; and a sense of Ajanta’s exceptional place-
ment within a range of physical, social, and imaginal landscapes. That is to say,
we have a sense of World Heritage values. Now it is time to talk about World
Heritage’s value.
To begin, let us take an insight from Dean MacCannell’s The Tourist, a work
foundational to the field of Tourism Studies. MacCannell places tourism at the
cusp of the secular and the religious, the modern and the primitive. It is an
“inescapable conclusion,” he writes, “that tourist attractions . . . provide direct
access to the modern consciousness or ‘world view,’ that tourist attractions are
precisely analogous to the religious symbolism of primitive people.”66 There is
much to criticize in these words, from MacCannell’s pairing of “primitive” and
“modern” as antipodes, to his predication of modernity as a time in which the reli-
gious is sublated into the secular. Still, let us pursue the analogy: tourist travel is
the secular equivalent for religious pilgrimage. Why? What links the two? In a
word, authenticity. Like the literal-minded Christian or Jew who travels to the
Holy Land to see what Jesus saw and tread where Moses trod, tourists traverse the
globe in search of an authenticity their own lives lack. Whereas the religious per-
son unselfconsciously inhabits his authentic self, the modern secular person
inhabits his workaday life as a charade of shifting values and incomplete selves,
inauthentic, detached from deep wellsprings of heritage and meaning. To recap-
ture the substance of reality, the tourist looks for authenticity in “the souvenirs of
destroyed cultures and dead epochs.”67 The tourist actively seeks out other nows,
untouched by his own everyday today.
MacCannell’s model of tourism has obvious resonances in Foucault, for whom
modernity is a relationship of self-fashioning, in which one enacts a reality of
one’s choice while paying exquisite attention to the real. Given MacCannell’s reli-
gious metaphors, however, Jonathan Z. Smith’s treatment of ritual provides a still
better fit. For Smith, ritual too is a means for negotiating temporal existence.
Where MacCannell’s tourist is “condemned to look elsewhere, everywhere, for
his authenticity,” Smith’s ritual “represents the creation of a controlled environ-
ment where the variables (accidents) of ordinary life may be displaced precisely
because they are felt to be so overwhelmingly present and powerful. . . . Ritual
gains force where incongruity is perceived and thought about.”68 Where
MacCannell’s middle American travels in order to escape a daily routine that has
“turned [him] against himself, fundamentally dividing his existence,” Smith’s
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ritual creates “a relationship of difference between ‘nows’ ” in which participants
perform “the way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are.”69
Smith’s ritualism, like Foucault’s modernity, recreates the world while leaving
the world intact. Dean MacCannell’s theorization of tourism fits this pattern,
albeit with at least one crucial difference. Unlike Foucault’s modernist and
Smith’s ritualist, MacCannell’s tourist always fails to bridge the gap between the
actualized and the actual. Seeking authenticity, tourists only ever find “staged
authenticity.”
A mere experience may be mystified, but a touristic experience is always
mystified. The lie contained in the touristic experience, moreover, pres-
ents itself as a truthful revelation, as the vehicle that carries the onlooker
behind false fronts into reality. The idea here is that a false back is more
insidious and dangerous than a false front, or an inauthentic demystifi-
cation of social life is not merely a lie but a superlie, the kind that drips
with sincerity.70
When one goes to Ajanta today one stands sincerely in slow-moving queues and
stares sincerely at retouched paintings behind glass. These authentic experiences
share little with Lieutenant Alexander’s wild and romantic Ajanta, or the wholly
unstaged truth revealed to Dr Bird, who carefully lifted paintings off the wall only
to see them become dust. But if Ajanta is now a stage, the staging—the creation
of what McCannell calls a “false back”—is itself an acknowledged dimension
of the “real front.” At a World Heritage monument like Ajanta, staging is an
authentic experience in its own right. One goes to Ajanta to enjoy one’s own
Enlightenment, apart from the Alexanders, Birds, and Ekenath Narayans of yes-
teryear. Indeed, the World Heritage Convention’s raison d’etre is to promote and
facilitate staging in the name of conservation; to take Ajanta out of the temporal
flow, making it a modern place at which the past becomes a resource for the
future.
The Mahabodhi Temple (the site of the buddha’s enlightenment) in Bodh Gaya
provides cognate example of “staging.” This temple’s nomination to World
Heritage status in 2002 came with a proviso: UNESCO demanded the creation of
a “buffer zone.” All buildings located within one kilometer of the temple had to
be razed—all shops, hotels, offices, even Buddhist monasteries.71 To be an
authentic bearer of exceptional universal value, Bodh Gaya’s temple has to be
segregated from everything that might stigmatize it by association with the
contemporary world. Consumer culture, global capitalism, and transnational
movements of peoples and goods thrive on the commodification of certain civi-
lizational remains as possessing World Heritage value. Local economies and
political structures at all levels benefit from that commodification, though the
hoteliers and shopkeepers in Bodh Gaya who lose their livelihood might disagree.
As scholars of cultural resource management never cease repeating, in this
economy the past is a precious resource.
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Given the cliché of religion as a source for answers to life’s unknowns, it makes
sense for MacCannell to pair tourism with religious pilgrimage. Both involve a
journey beyond the seeker’s own well-trodden world in search of a pure ground,
a spectacle of ultimacy. In both cases, proponents would deny that they are
principally oriented toward the consumption of manufactured goods (material,
experiential, even spiritual). And yet despite that disclaimer, both are patent
instances of consumerism: futile, for their authenticities are ever only “staged.”
We pity someone who imagines that package-tour villages and rebuilt caves, let
alone museum pieces, show him mother India as she really is/was; who does not
recognize authentic staging as local reality; who does not understand his own
modernity enough to see that although nostalgia for the premodern seems to be a
form of esteem, it is in fact just the opposite: staged authenticity valorizes neither
the past nor tradition, but the modern’s dominion over both.
The postmodern winks at ersatz realities and enjoys the game of seeing through
games. That attitude is not in evidence at UNESCO, or in the ASI’s stagings at
Ajanta. Operational guidelines for implementing the World Heritage Convention
require a “test of authenticity” to ensure that nothing present at a site is inconsis-
tent with the World Heritage value of that site.72 Passing this test is a necessary
condition for World Heritage status. The guidelines do not detail the test’s exact
parameters, yet authenticity is so serious an archaeological value that UNESCO
requires even the means for adjudging authenticity be “authentic.” In this spirit,
consider the following statement from Myra Shackley’s textbook, Visitor
Management: Case Studies from World Heritage Sites. This book’s introduction
begins with the usual platitudes—every World Heritage site is unique; all are
humanity’s common inheritance—leading to Shackley’s observation: “World
Heritage is a fragile non-renewable resource which has to be safeguarded both to
maintain its authenticity and to preserve it for future generations.”73 Note,
“resource” does not refer to sites or their artifacts. Here, without irony, Shackley
names the World Heritage designation itself as that pearl of great price.
What can it mean for World Heritage to be authentic or a non-renewable
resource? We can readily understand how Ajanta’s paintings are non-renewable,
whether their irrevocable loss is at the hand of an expert restorer or a stealthy
thief. But World Heritage is not a physical object, the remains of a defunct culture
transvalued through advertisements, transportation networks, and history books.
World Heritage is a contemporary phenomenon, a modern consensus about the
past. As an object, the World Heritage designation belongs in the company of the
Rolls Royce badge, the yellow label on a bottle of Veuve Clicquot, or Chanel’s
linked c’s. It is a luxury brand whose coveted trademark guarantees the presence
of exceptional universal value. If “A Diamond Is Forever,” so should be a World
Heritage monument. But while De Beers markets eternal love through the
strength of carbon’s covalent bonds, UNESCO sells its universal value as a rarity
preserved in the oxymoron of evanescent stone.
Lasting love need cost only three months’ salary, but the price of universal
value is the present itself. For World Heritage is a non-renewable resource whose
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universal value can now be consumed only at monuments bearing the UNESCO
mark. To build brand equity, the Convention devalues the present. Its criteria stip-
ulate that tangible association with a living tradition is not a basis for inclusion
on the World Heritage List, except in a few extraordinary cases.74 Shackley’s
textbook, likewise, can be read for its marketing potential:
The List contains universally recognized sites, like the Pyramids or the
Great Wall of China, but it also includes smaller, less well-known proper-
ties and monuments whose significance is universal and which transcend
existing cultural values.75
“. . . and which transcend existing cultural values.” Why is Shackley condescending
toward the cultural, insinuating synonyms such as small-scale, parochial, narrow,
self-interested, and of course, insignificant? Does she understand that her
characterization of those lesser cultural values as existing distributes opprobrium
to the people who live by them now?
Myra Shackley commits a classic parapraxis when she names World Heritage
as a non-renewable resource in need of protection: out slips UNESCO’s fantasy.
However, the wish expressed here is not the Enlightenment’s overt desire for all
humans to unite within a single great moral project (in this case, to preserve the
human past). Rather, the wish is latent: All people should buy World Heritage as
a definitive source of Enlightenment in the modern world. The appearance of
authenticity must be preserved at Ajanta, for Enlightenment is nothing other than
that appearance sold as something universally valuable to all human beings.
Strategic brand management
One does not have to be a semiotician to evaluate the broad significance of brands in
the contemporary world, nor be a sibyl to augur that branding is a key to the heritage
industry. Package tours find their direct ancestor in package goods. As a cure for mon-
umental woes, the World Heritage designation is an avatar of patent medicine.
Thomas Hine has traced the modern practices of packaging and labeling to
seventeenth-century London, where Mr Stoughton manufactured Drops,
Mr Turlington packaged the Original Balsam, and Mr Daffy sold an Elixir. One can
count many reasons that such consumables began to circulate at this time, including
cheap glass production, burgeoning literacy, the Reformation’s granting of sover-
eignty to the individual conscience, and even the fact that the abstemious could find
a legitimate high within a patent medicine’s liquors.76 But while these factors all con-
tributed to the genesis of our consumer economy, marketing experts point more gen-
erally to the personalization of market goods as the solution for the dark spot at the
core of a market economy. The market is a risky place, requiring consumers to trans-
act business without adequate information. We do not know who makes the things we
buy, or when the things were made, or where, or under what conditions. Commodities
are risky. Packing, and later branding, are the market solutions to that risk.
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Given that commercial transactions transpire at a great social, temporal, and
geographical remove from their objects’ place of manufacture, the circumstances
of the transaction itself must erase any doubt that an object will serve its intended
purpose without unforseen consequences. To encourage widespread distribution,
manufacturers placed patent medicines in uniquely shaped packages bearing per-
sonal names as a guarantee of safety and consistency. The package created a
trusted identity with which a buyer could have a relationship, what we now call a
brand. As Hine puts it, “even those medicine sellers who were honest and who
believed their product benefitted mankind recognized that it was more important
to sell an idea, a feeling, a reassuring package, than it was to sell the contents.”77
If this nostrum for consumer anxiety was formulated by eighteenth-century
hucksters, it took until the 1980s for Madison Avenue to guess the secret ingredi-
ent. Indeed, although Dr Brown, and Uncle Ben, and Aunt Jemima sold their
goods beginning in the last century, it was only in this latter decade that a
“Copernican revolution” occurred in how brands were conceived and valued.78
Jean-Noël Kapferer describes this revolution:
Prior to 1980, companies wished to buy a producer of chocolate or pasta:
after 1980, they wanted to buy KitKat or Buitoni. . . . The vision has
changed from one where only tangible assets had value to one where
companies now believe that their most important asset is their brands,
which are intangible and immaterial.79
One can scare up any number of academic bugaboos to analyze this transfor-
mation—the culture industry, manufactured consent, commodity fetishism, late
capitalism, hyperreality—but that is not necessary. For critical theory has met its
match in the business press, which not only recognizes the phenomenon, but also,
at least in the case of marketing guru Tom Peters, exclaims the point with great
force if little subtlety: “Brand! Brand!! Brand!!!”80 Lacking context, who could
know that, “Just say no to COMMODITY. Say yes to WOW!” does not protest a
World Trade Organization cabal, but flings the shit of a white-collar revolution.81
Yet who now could fail to anticipate that this same writer sells WOW! as a com-
modity?82 We inhabit a time when marketing, not manufacturing, is the CEO’s
priority; when companies compete, ostensibly, not for the consumer’s dollar, but
for his mind; when a company’s brand might be valued at a much higher multiple
than its tangible assets; when the statement, “everything and everyone is capable
of becoming a brand,” is not a lament but an eager promise;83 when branding can
have Twenty Two Immutable Laws and Ten Commandments; and when an
uncanny parallelism exists between branding’s Tenth Commandment—“The
purpose of a brand is to be a vehicle for transferring both value and values”84—and
the agenda of an Enlightened convention on World Heritage.
In sum, marketers have theorized that the most successful capitalists will be
those who emphasize the second clause, not the first, in Brillat-Savarin’s, “tell me
what you eat, and I’ll tell you what you are.” You are what you buy. Creating
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meanings and forming identities, commodity consumption is now how we are
human. Brands, which began as a means for alleviating worries due to the distant
origin of consumer goods, and then became a way to distinguish between
otherwise identical commodities, now combine these functions. Brands allow
people to be secure in their individual identities.
World Heritage fits the bill. Shackley’s textbook speaks plainly: “The term
‘World Heritage Site’ is instantly recognized as designating something very spe-
cial, in tourism terms a definite ‘must see.’ ”85 One can easily guess at a range of
explanations for this must-see attitude, from fascination with the exotic through
the raising of social capital by consuming special, rare goods. Dean MacCannell
would add at least one more explanation: No matter where tourists go, no matter
how rare or special the place, they seek authenticity. UNESCO’s own stipulation
of authenticity as an attribute of all World Heritage sites would confirm
MacCannell’s insight. Yet reflection on the work of branding suggests that even if
MacCannell is correct about the tourist’s tragedy—the authenticity he finds is
staged—MacCannell is also wrong. The World Heritage brand guarantees that by
visiting World Heritage sites, tourists are themselves authenticated. By concern-
ing themselves with monuments of exceptional universal value, tourists find their
own values to be exceptional and universal. By acting to preserve the world’s her-
itage, they themselves become worthy of all humanity’s protection. If the World
Heritage Convention has its conceptual genesis in Enlightenment humanism, then
consumers of listed sites may consider themselves Enlightened. Enlightenment is
nothing other than the ability to recognize, and act appropriately in relation
to, sources of exceptional universal value. One can just imagine Tom Peters’
incitement to Enlightened action: Buy! Buy!! Buy!!!
On utility and appearance
This chapter began by inquiring how caves created in the first half of the first
millennium CE, then ignored for close to 1,500 years, have been transvalued into
objects possessing the highest possible worth. In exploring this question, I took a cue
from William Lipe’s introduction to resource management, a field that studies cul-
tural artifacts’ “use and benefit—in the present and future.”86 Thus, the chapter has
explored several uses to which Ajanta has been put. In the nineteenth century, the site
offered colonial explorers an object of fascination: its exotic location—remote even
for India—so strikingly at odds with the high culture found in its frescoes. Those
paintings’ preservation, in turn, presented the British with an opportunity to expand
their colonization from the military sphere to the cultural, as well as to adjudicate
personal animosities, as we see in James Fergusson’s public indictment of James
Bird. Likewise, when the aboriginal Bhils worked for the British as guides, they used
the occasion to offer a meek resistance through subtle mockery. During the twentieth
century, the Nizam of Hyderabad built roads, making the caves easier of access and
speeding their deterioration. Simultaneously he began a process of museumification
in the name of preservation. After independence, the Nizam’s stewardship was
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replaced by that of the ASI. More recently, the MTDC has initiated plans to complete
the Nizam’s work by making Ajanta fully a museum. It will build a duplicate Ajanta
controlled by its own organization: a new Ajanta at which visitors are not
discomfited by having to climb a steep slope or swelter in the open sun. On the
museum’s walls, all might view projected slides to their hearts’ content.
Finally, the chapter explored a complex of ideological uses for these caves.
Their preservation makes India a valued member in the family of nations. People
who act to foster their preservation are valued as citizens and as human beings.
The caves are thus useful as a place at which to observe the pageant of modernity
unfold. This is a ritual function in Jonathan Z. Smith’s terms, because it permits
one to conceive multiple nows, and to act in such a way as to produce the desired
then. To expand the metaphor: By granting or withholding World Heritage status,
UNESCO plays the role of high priest; a charismatic institution, its mysteries
transubstantiate once-mere stone into an extraordinary source of universal value.
UNESCO’s transforming utterances know no divinity, just the Enlightenment’s
sacred optimism that when human beings (re)discover their nature in full they will
produce a society of unbroken peace and unfettered freedom.
For resource managers, a society’s forward progress can be judged by how it
uses the past, how it cares. But even Kant recognized that human beings are inca-
pable of full dedication to present morality unless they receive some hope of
future recompense. Duty too requires marketing. Hence, for Kant, morality
requires religion, which repackages the imperative toward the highest good as a
divine command, branding it Salvation. Duty—appropriate utility—can be repre-
sented as a source of transcendental value, but only by being sold as something
other than utility, by appearing to be more than merely useful.
The relationship between appearance and utility can be explained with greater
precision through the Marxian distinction between the use-value of a commod-
ity—its power to fulfill natural needs—and the exchange-value—its power to
command a price in the marketplace. Writing on commodity aesthetics, Wolfgang
Haug aligns these two dimensions of value with the two parties in a commercial
transaction. Buyers are anxious about use-value; sellers about exchange-value.
Successful sellers thus ensure that their goods appear useful to buyers.
In all commodity production a double reality is produced: first the use-
value; second, and more importantly, the appearance of use-value. For,
until the sale is completed (and the exchange-value has been realized),
use-value figures only in as much as the buyer promises him- or herself
the use-value of the commodity. From the seller’s (i.e., exchange-value)
position, until the sale is effected, the commodity’s promise of use-value
is all that counts. Right from the start, therefore, because of its economic
function, the emphasis is on what the use-value appears to be . . . . The
commodity’s aesthetic promise of use-value thus becomes an instrument
in accumulating money . . . . Whoever controls the product’s appearance
can control the fascinated public by appealing to them sensually.87
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This is why you pay more for Gold Medal Flour than the no-name generic. Both
make the same cookies, but you expect Gold Medal to be diligent about keeping
rat feces out of its product, and do not expect the same level of care from a generic
mill. Your fears are Gold Medal’s bounty.
World Heritage sites would seem to differ from flour in at least one respect.
Namely, these places do not need to manage the appearance of utility. The reason
is simple: World Heritage sites have no exchange-value since, possessed of excep-
tional universal value, they always already belong to all humanity. They can never
become objects for exchange in a marketplace. Who has the right to sell them?
Who could afford to buy one? So, if World Heritage sites appear useful, it must
be because they really are authentically useful.
Is this correct? Are World Heritage sites essentially uncommodifiable? In light
of the previous section’s analysis of branding, one is rightfully suspicious of that
conceit. It may be the case, rather, that the characterization of World Heritage
sites as bearers of pure use-value is pure ideology. Per Haug, in capitalist
systems—this holds as true for social or cultural economies, as for monetary—
use-value enciphers exchange-value. The appearance of utility makes an object
worthy of exchange. The greater the glamour attached to that appearance of use,
the greater the potential price. What is more attractive, more useful, more worthy,
than something having universal worth? And what is more in need of encoding
within the cryptogram of universality than an object that, while being perfectly
useless, must be accepted as perfectly useful: an object like a painting, like a
musical score, like an ancient neglected cave, or (to recall Kant) like religion?
Perhaps the value added to World Heritage sites is the perception that they
belong to all, that they deserve every rupee they receive, and that a will toward
the preservation of their ancient authenticity makes one truly modern.
In this way, World Heritage sites might be sold in much the same way that Sprite
soft-drink has been sold. In the late 1990s Sprite ran a series of commercials that
capitalized upon the unreality of the standard soft-drink fantasies. By drinking
Sprite, the boys in these ads did not become he-man hunks, or suave Romeos, or
skillful athletes. The boys did not change at all, and the ads admitted that Sprite
offers nothing to consumers who expect to enhance their social standing through
consumption. The commercials ended with a series of slogans: Image is Nothing.
Thirst is Everything. Obey Your Thirst. Thus, these commercials artfully disclosed
the common ploys for enhancing a commodity’s exchange-value—the extra charge
that makes this thing more desirable than that—while valorizing, in turn, the
salience of genuine utility. These commercials presented Sprite as an honest solu-
tion to the problem of a universal, innate, transcultural, transtemporal, human
need—thirst—completely untainted by commercial ideology. But who was fooled?
Sprite’s no-image was itself an image; the appearance of mere utility added value.
The earlier, pre-1990s, ideal of branding was a posteriori universality. This was
achieved by personal items like Kleenex, Band-Aid, and Q-Tips when their names
became synonymous with entire categories of products. Sprite’s engagement with
thirst went deeper. Had its advertisements been fully successful, the thought, “I’m
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thirsty,” would no longer be formed, only, “I need Sprite,” even as one reached for
water. It is not that “water” would have become a form of Sprite, but that the need-
for-Sprite would have named a biological need. In that advertisement, the image in
“image is nothing” was synecdochic for all desires manufactured in a sociocultural
matrix. By subordinating the sociocultural to the biological, the ad naturalized its
message as an element of will: Obey Your Thirst strove to be the voice of conscience.
To my knowledge, Sprite did not achieve that success in its gambit for a priori
universality. Nor has Nike appropriated élan vital with the phrase, Just Do It; nor
has Home Box Office become the new standard for calendrical time with its words,
Sunday is HBO. Douglas Holt and Juliet Schor describe these slogans’ objective:
Marketing learned . . . people must experience consumption as a volitional
site of personal development, achievement, and self-creation, not as a
place in which they are simply mapping their lives on some advertiser’s
template. . . . Thus, monopolizing the public channels of meaning creation
is becoming more important than monopolizing particular meanings.88
In this light, the complex of symbolic gestures through which UNESCO naturalizes
its hegemony over international tourism, indeed over planetary geography, is
patent, brilliant, and at the cutting edge of commercial representation. What more
effective way to monopolize the creation of meaning than to control channels of
access to legitimate sources of meaningfulness? This is what the World Heritage
designation seeks to accomplish. UNESCO’s jurisdiction over judgments of
transnational and transtemporal value places it at the juncture of time, space, cre-
ativity, and human nature. The far edge of this monopolization is demarcated by
Myra Shackley’s statement in page 54: “World Heritage is a fragile non-renewable
resource which has to be safeguarded both to maintain its authenticity and to pre-
serve it for future generations.”89 Here, all material, psycho-social, and symbolic
values and fears attached to human locales—the Taj, the Great Wall, Machu
Picchu, Ajanta—are transferred to the UNESCO Convention. Places that had
once been forgotten, defunct, or simply of local interest are transvalued into
places at which to enjoy extraordinary spectacles of the authentic and universally
human. Their unlimited worth becomes that of UNESCO itself.
Cutting through spiritual materialism
Why the sarcasm? Why condemn UNESCO? Do you want to see the
Coliseum corrode or the stupa of Barabudur collapse down upon itself?
Maybe UNESCO does mobilize an Enlightenment ideology of universal
humanity in order to naturalize its own political authority and power.
Always everywhere institutions have done the same. At least in this case
the benefits are indisputable: conservation and preservation. As ciphers
for authenticity and universality, World Heritage and Obey Your Thirst
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materialize a kindred spirit. So what? Even if the representations of these
things as merely useful does hide the fact that consumers are being sold
upon appearances? We do need to drink liquids. We do need to know
where to go on vacation.
Finally, unable to restrain himself any longer, James Twitchell chimes in,
“Commercialism is our better judgement. Not only are we willing to consume,
and not only does consuming make us happy, ‘getting and spending’ is what gives
our lives order and purpose.”90
Such dissenting voices remind us how easy it is for targeted critique to slip over
into carping when a deception, even one with a seemingly benign outcome, fills
one’s vision. This is the case in this present instance, especially insofar as the crit-
icism of UNESCO belongs to a broader critical tradition aimed at capitalism’s
depredations. Where should we look for the genesis of that tradition if not in
Marx’s depiction of the bourgeois everyman in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts: a moralistic rant about a human being so besotted by “inhuman,
sophisticated, unnatural and imaginary appetites” that he willingly signs a
Mephistophelian pact, selling his own life-force (in the alienated form of money)
for the satiation of “depraved fancies” and “morbid appetites.”91 Disgust at bour-
geois humanity continues to the present day though, of course, critics now have
no necessary allegiance to Marx. Even Tom Peters, the best selling business-
author of all time, calls commoditization a blight, and clamors for Revolution.92
Clearly, Marxist politics has lost the power of its native tongue. Still, there is no
shortage of critics to point out that the language of consumerism includes only
empty signs. Unalloyed consumerism has been blamed for effects as varied as
cultural fragmentation, the decline of participation in public life, the abomina-
tions of shoppertainment and entertailing, the failure of the nuclear family, spiri-
tual malaise, conformity, bad taste, boredom, and a surfeit of beige.93 We might
wonder whether these same critics would be openly skeptical about the way in
which UNESCO sells the world on itself by selling Enlightenment in the place of
World Heritage monuments. Is the valorization of exceptional universal value a
symptom of this same social disease? And how might a critique of consumerism
redound to the representation of Ajanta as an authentic repository of
Enlightenment values, a locale within which to conceptualize an Enlightened
future?
Toward addressing these questions, let us consider a new form of counter
cultural expression that has arisen to liberate a society of consumers whose lives
are dominated by market forces. This group, the culture jammers, is an urban
street movement in which people alter public billboards or posters to subvert their
messages and highlight the disjunction between corporations’ and consumers’
interests. According to Kalle Lasn, a semi-spokesman for culture jamming’s
“very diverse tribe,” such activism is crucial, for “a continuous product message
has woven itself into the very fabric of our existence. . . . We ourselves have been
branded.”94 If advertisers monopolize the public channels of meaning creation,
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then this species of resistance may be the most effective way to create new and
revolutionary meanings. Two academics with evident sympathy for the culture
jammers, Douglas Holt and Juliet Schor, add to Lasn’s lament: “Little remains
sacred, and separate from the world of the commodity. As a result people become
ever more desperate to sacralize the profane consumer world around them, wor-
shiping celebrities, collections, and brand logos.”95 Though the arch-conservative
jurist, Robert Bork, belongs at the other edge of the political spectrum, he
expresses a similar view: “Affluence brings with it boredom. Of itself, it offers
little but the ability to consume, and a life centered on consumption will appear,
and be, devoid of meaning.”96
Beneath these positions, both Left and Right, both anti- and pro- materialist,
we find a common ground for all parties: the valorization of meaningfulness.
Rampant materialism plays a “liberating role” in Twitchell’s world, while it makes
Lasn’s (and Bork’s) a “horror of disconnection and anomie.”97 Despite their diver-
gent evaluations, however, Twitchell and Lasn share a common field of discourse.
Both speak in abstract about meaningfulness, even if their meanings are at
antipodes. They struggle to hegemonize authenticity as the source and ground of
meaningfulness. In this case, as in the UNESCO Convention, authenticity finds
its conceptual genesis in the Enlightenment’s philosophical anthropology: the
conception of human nature, uniform and invariable, as the subject of a grand nar-
rative of progress toward perfection. Kant’s 1784 answer to the question, “What
is Enlightenment?” speaks of human nature as having an “original vocation” that
lies in its movement toward a state in which each human being individually, and
humanity collectively, dares to think for itself.98 Twitchell and Lasn share this
vision of Enlightenment, even if they bitterly disagree over what the Enlightened
think about. For Twitchell, people like to think about material objects—this is an
authentic act that gives life meaning—while Lasn holds that people cannot think
freely as long as media and cultural networks force them to be preoccupied with
mere stuff—materialism is indexical of an inauthentic life, that is, one that lacks
meaning.
The matter of existential meaning, of course, is not easily extricated from that
of religion. As we saw near the beginning of this chapter, Enlightenment human-
ism is suspended in a Christian semiotic solution. Indeed, although the
Enlightenment is famed for its trenchant critique of sectarianism, and known for
its few “out” atheists, this was also a creative period for constructive theology.
Writing in 1624, Edward Herbert expresses the basic predicate of the
Enlightenment’s religious humanism: “religion is the ultimate difference of
man.”99 To be human is to be religious; the capacity for religion makes one
human. As part of this same discussion, Herbert mentions a traveler’s report about
an obscure tribe without religious practices; he rejects this report outright, and
says of the purported atheists, “in reality they are not atheists.” But Herbert is
only a father to the age of reason. Enlightenment thinkers in general (Hume being
a noted exception) considered humanity’s uniform and invariable nature to be
intrinsically religious. Indeed, natural religiosity was the x-factor that guaranteed
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uniformity and invariability. And humanity’s natural religiosity found its most
providential expression in the exercise of reason. From Voltaire’s Philosophical
Dictionary we learn, “This is the character of truth; it is of all time; it is for all
men; it has only to show itself to be recognized; one cannot argue against it.”100
Likewise, Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason teaches that
“there is only one (true) religion; but there can be several kinds of faith.”101 Lately
the terms have changed somewhat: now a singular haze of universal spirituality
contrasts with the doctrinaire distinctions between religions. But contemporary
oxymorons like the science-of-spirituality and Buddhism-without-beliefs can be
traced to this Enlightenment troika: religiosity, human nature, and reason. During
the Enlightenment, religiosity came to be represented as a pure use-value within
the economy of a universal human nature—it gives meaning. Of course we should
be suspicious that this pure value has only the appearance of use—meaning is not
really worth it.
The legacy of the Enlightenment’s religious humanism is immediately obvious
when we look deeper into the writings of Twitchell and Lasn. Both resort to reli-
gious terminologies at crucial points in their arguments. Both use religion to
express the high stakes: the very definition of humanity. Both are overtly inter-
ested in salvation. In this, James Twitchell’s title, Lead Us Into Temptation, could
not be clearer. The full Biblical verse reads, of course, “lead us not into tempta-
tion, but deliver us from evil” (Matthew 6:13). With his inversion, Twitchell
recasts the world of human desires as a new Jerusalem in the making. If Adam’s
sinful consumption caused the Fall, then paying a glutton’s heed to the injunction,
Obey Your Thirst, will usher in the millennium. Nobody who looks at the book’s
cover-art could miss the point. Based on Jan Brueghel the Elder and Peter Paul
Rubens’ “The Garden of Eden with the Fall of Man” (1615), the cover shows us
Adam and Eve tempted by the serpent. But where Genesis’ Adam and Eve were
lured by a luscious fruit, here the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is
fecund with watches and furniture and appliances and all the stuff of modern liv-
ing. Behold the exaltation of the consumer’s post-Lapsarian Eden of stuff! Thus
Twitchell posits that the language of things is the language of meaning. If “we
have always been desirous of things” then no act is more authentic than buying.102
In facilitating this universal human value, advertising and religion are “part of the
same meaning-making process. They attempt to breach the gap between us and
objects by providing a systematic order and a promise of salvation.”103 The chime
of a cash register is as much an indicator of angelic translation in this wonderful
life as the ringing bell of a Christmas tree.
While Douglas Holt and Juliet Schor also frame consumerism in religious
terms, their outlook is quite different. Holt and Schor include religion and spiri-
tuality within a list of the “deepest connections that are increasingly dominated
by market transactions,” alongside motherhood, DNA patterns, and sexuality.104
Indeed, they would agree with Twitchell that celebrity spokesmen are our new
saints, and brand logos are contemporary icons on the altar of commerce. But
Holt and Schor see this as a merely strategic sacralization of “the profane
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consumer world.” They use the categories sacred and profane as if these bespeak
objective essences—the commodity being essentially and unambiguously pro-
fane. Thus they interpret consumers’ metaphorical sacralization of commodities
as a “desperate” attempt to find authentic, even spiritual, meaning within a world
in which “little remains sacred, and separate from the world of the commodity.”105
Culture jammer Kalle Lasn’s work is also replete with metaphors that capitalize
upon a rhetoric of religious essentialism. Sometimes he borrows from
Christianity, as when he portrays himself as working toward a “millennial
moment of truth” or alludes to cognitively jarring experiences after which “things
can never be the same again.”106 Lasn has a lucky buddha on his keyring, how-
ever, so it is no surprise that his metaphors of choice derive from Zen Buddhism.
Lasn compares the impulse to engage in culture jamming to the ascetic regimen
required of Zen monks; he likens the culture jammer’s desired result to the end
sought by a Zen master, when he “may suddenly throw you a wildly cryptic, inap-
propriate, even obscene answer to your harmless query”; and he advises culture
jammers to look to the buddha’s life for lessons.107 To describe his overall proj-
ect, Lasn brings together terminologies borrowed from both Christianity’s and
Zen’s lexicons: “Only a chain of spontaneous acts will lead to salvation.”108 Lasn
has a clear conception of salvation: the ability to act authentically, spontaneously,
and freely, unburdened by the manipulations of commercial culture.
Lasn might not be aware, however, that insofar as Zen Buddhism informs
his value-system, he has himself become a consumer “manipulated in the most
insidious way.”109 Since the early 1990s, academic historians have literally 
re-presented Zen-spontaneity, redescribing it as a rhetoric of spontaneity, an ideol-
ogy of spontaneity, serving nativist, nationalist, militarist, and sectarian purposes.110
Indeed, Lasn (no more than Twitchell) seems not to recognize religion’s discursive
function: religiosity as a fact of language. Lasn allows his vision to be conditioned
by the lingering traces of the Enlightenment’s singular natural religion as the expres-
sion of the human core, on the one hand, and, on the other, by a received image of
Zen that one historian calls “not only conceptually incoherent but also a woeful mis-
reading of traditional Zen doctrine, altogether controverted by the lived contingen-
cies of Zen monastic practice.”111 Lasn is the unwitting tool of eighteenth-century
European intellectuals and medieval Japanese media-moguls just as certainly as the
kid who thinks that he is merely obeying his thirst when he buys a Sprite.
Zen-spontaneity is Zen ideology. I wonder whether, upon investigating the
veracity of this assertion, Lasn would continue to find Zen to be the epitome of a
pure utility, having no value beyond the spontaneity for which it calls. Is Lasn so
influenced by the Enlightenment’s religious humanism that even this deception
would not shake what he calls his “faith in the true spiritual nature of the human
being”?112 But I do not mean to pick on Lasn here. In terms of the political dif-
ferential between Lasn’s and Twichell’s positions, I lean toward the former in my
ideals and the latter in my practices, and thus, after death, am destined to be
chased by bees screaming outside the door to Hell. Indeed, it might seem obvious
that Twitchell’s celebration of consuming things is far more obnoxious than Lasn’s
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innocent and well-intentioned appropriation of a pernicious foreign rhetoric. I am
not so sure. When Lasn translates Zen ideology into transhuman fact he is con-
suming enlightenment. Holt and Schor eat the same diet, albeit strongly spiced
with a Christian pepper, when they essentialize sacrality and profanity into a world
of spirit and things. But the long-term environmental consequences of this spiri-
tual materialism, this creative consumption of the sacred, might be just as dire, if
not as obvious, as those predicted for the overconsumption of material goods.
Juliet Schor has a book, Do Americans Buy Too Much? Do Americans (and not just
Americans) buy too much into the truly spiritual nature of the human being?
If a Tibetan teacher, Chögyam Trungpa, had not devised the phrase spiritual
materialism, I might have, albeit with an almost opposite meaning. For Trungpa,
spiritual materialism is an impediment that must be “cut through” in order to
achieve authentic spirituality. The simile Trungpa uses to describe this odd mate-
rialism is timely. Spiritual seekers are like shoppers who buy many beautiful
antiques from all over the world. So many hours are devoted to buying, however,
that these people never find time to appreciate their purchases’ beauty. Collecting
the wisdom of the Sufis and the wisdom of the saints, spiritual aspirants never
realize the intrinsic spirit that makes the wisdom valuable: “Proper shopping does
not entail collecting a lot of information or beauty, but it involves appreciating
each individual object.”113 Buddhists describe the path to enlightenment as having
eight dimensions, from proper livelihood through proper understanding. Trungpa
adds a ninth: proper shopping.
This is not how I use the phrase. Rather, in my lexicon spiritual materialism is
materialism tainted by a desire for spirit. Taking the desire for “meaning” to be the
desire for the satisfaction of desires, I use spiritual materialism to describe an
approach to materiality that forecloses the possibility that material objects can be
directly “meaningful,” and thus that the true value of an object is always, somehow,
factored in its semiotic relationship to an indwelling spirit. This is the attitude that
things cannot make us happy; or if things do seem to satisfy a desire for happiness
it is only because they signify some pure essence, existing beyond their material
forms. This is spirit as the ultimate brand, for its role is to alleviate all material anx-
ieties except one, the anxiety over its own unseen presence. Spiritual materialism
in this sense comes through clearly when Holt and Schor represent the world of the
sacred and the world of things bought-and-sold as incommensurable. Given these
scholars’ presuppositions, that is, sacrality exists and commodities have no part in
it, the adulation of Princess Diana and the hunt for the perfect Jimmy Choo shoe
would naturally reflect a desperation for some greater meaning. We can also think
back to MacCannell’s tourist who, like the religious person on pilgrimage, seeks
authenticity, but unlike the religious person, finds only staged authenticity. The
World Heritage designation “sacralizes” that staging.
If, however, the sacred too is a name-brand, a quite different system of values
accrues. The sacred is “profane.” Or rather, sacred and profane no longer function
as evaluative terms for desirable and undesirable meanings. Meaningfulness itself
becomes a suspect value.
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Lasn speaks of a “deeply felt sense of betrayal” when brands, which sell
dreams, do not deliver the goods. No brand is more pernicious in this way than
America, which promises democracy and freedom, but only delivers corporate
greed.114 But to respond to this fact about America with a sense of betrayal is to
be a spiritual materialist. It is as if one only had a late epiphany that Sprite’s slo-
gan, Image is Nothing, is carefully crafted to create an image and sell soft drinks.
It is as if one expects authenticity and spontaneity to be waiting, just on the other
side of branding and commoditization. This is a species of fetishism: the imputa-
tion of spirit to matter and the subsequent adulation of that matter as an occult
dwelling for the spirit. For Chögyam Trungpa, people become spiritual material-
ists when, by constantly shopping for spiritual wisdom, they imbricate genuine
spirituality within a materialist ethos. I would say, rather, that such shopping
taints perfectly good stuff with the stain of spirit.
Kalle Lasn also describes how not to be a spiritual materialist. A revelatory
anecdote: Lasn’s local supermarket charges patrons a quarter to use its shopping
carts. One day, angry at himself for supporting this greedy corporation, Lasn
jammed a big bent coin into the slot where he would normally put his quarter,
hammering it tight with his lucky buddha. He then left the store, going instead to
a little fruit and vegetable stand down the road. Lasn ends the story, “I felt more
alive than I had in months.”115 Where did this good feeling come from? Was it the
act of armed (albeit with a buddha) resistance against sterile corporate tomatoes?
Or did Lasn feel good about shopping at the smaller, more personal store? If the
aesthetics of the shopping experience itself turned him on, then he might be
Twitchell’s man more than he would like.
Twitchell’s analysis of American materialism is useful here because he offers a
way to understand how and why, contra Trungpa, the worth of the things can be
had in the act of shopping itself: they are valuable because they can be bought.
For Twitchell, the fact that they are commodities can serve as a pure use-value,
inspiring the apothegm: “consumption has become production.”116 This inversion
may not be fully true for things like cars and beer, though these commodities
receive furious marketing. But it is fully true for spirit. And for meaning. And
for e/Enlightenment. And for the designation, World Heritage Monument, as a
promise of exceptional universal value.
One of the principal complaints that Kalle Lasn and other critics levy against
consumerism is that it manufactures desires, displacing sources of life’s meaning
away from genuine and universally human engagement with family, friendship,
spirituality, community, ongoing self-improvement, or indulging a reverence for
nature. One of the principal complaints that James Twitchell and others levy
against those critics is that in our day, in our world, consumerist desires are mean-
ingful because they genuinely express the human essence. Both, of course, are
right. Most desires are manufactured, none more so than the desire for meaning.
The list of genuine biological needs is rather short. One can satisfy them easily at
Ajanta by sleeping in the caves; drinking water from the cisterns; and eating the
locally available fruits. But insofar as “consumption is production,” the desire for
A PLACE OF EXCEPTIONAL UNIVERSAL VALUE
66
meaningfulness creates the expectation that a real meaning exists. Thus theologians
reject the possibility of genuine atheism, or characterize atheism as itself a source
of religious meaning. And thus anomie and meaninglessness are the inevitable
concomitants of religion. The perfect life as comprehended by terms such as
enlightenment, authenticity, immediacy, spontaneity, genuineness, and freedom,
is a life lived in pursuit of the ultimate brand. The only way to satisfy this desire
fully is to stop buying the brand.
Branding Ajanta, branding Enlightenment
Let us now return to Ajanta:
There is a growing awareness among the enlightened new generations of
world peoples, that the great works of art of mankind are part of human
heritage and not only of one country or another. This happy realisation
is partly the result of the faster means of communication and accessibility
of the monuments of the world. And this augurs for the emergence of
one world culture. Then men and women will begin to roam over the
globe in search of psycho-social phenomena to confirm their own feel-
ings, hunches, and revelations about the meaning of life and they may
find therein the works of great artists rendered up through the creative
imaginations of the past. Self-education of the people’s sensibilities may
become universal.117
This passage is found in a booklet produced by MTDC in the mid-1970s, several
years before Ajanta achieved World Heritage status. An expensive publication, its
cover was vibrantly colored card-stock, embossed and painted with gold; its pages
were heavy rag. Indeed, this was a suitable medium within which to express so
ambitious a vision. For here we find Ajanta at the epicenter of a golden age that
has been three centuries in the making, at least since the Marquis de Condorcet
described his vision of the “eternal chain of human destiny.”118 Through Ajanta we
can imagine a world whose transportation and communication networks are so
advanced, and its people so wealthy, that all are able to traverse the planet at will.
Peace begets peace, for these travelers discover that culture is a matter of human-
ity not of nations. Thus all respect the past and share concern for their united
future. Peace also begets harmony, for people fill their extra hours with imagina-
tive or intellectual pursuits, but harbor no jealousy at one another’s genius. Though
born in different lands with diverse tongues, all speak the language of the human
heart. They share a single spiritual vision of life’s ultimate meaning.
Smile if you will. But the pamphlet cautions against cynicism: “This is not a
Utopian dream. Already there is evidence of this emergence among the millions
of tourists who go in search of the past.”119
Smile if you will, or don’t if the spirit doesn’t move you. For the final question
raised by this true dream, as by the World Heritage Convention which shares its
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values if not its purple prose, is: How do we respond to the sales pitch? French
advertising executive Jean-Marie Dru has proposed that for a brand to be
successful it must identify itself with liberation in some way, with a vision of a
future in which people are freer and happier for having bought the brand.120 This
makes sense, for if shopping creates identity, what personal traits are more
alluring than freedom and happiness? Think what you will of consumer society,
proponents and critics alike agree that freedom, e/Enlightenment’s summum
bonum, is branding’s horizon as well.
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A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES
It depends upon what the meaning of the word “is” is.
(President William Jefferson Clinton, 
grand jury testimony, August 17, 1998)
The postcolonial past
One of the principal aims of postcolonial scholarship is to theorize a means by
which the colonized or subaltern can find himself in time, a retroactive witness to
his own exclusion. This critical intervention into history’s telling begins with the
politics of authorship. Thus a certain kind of reader might mistrust the previous
chapter’s treatment of Ajanta, given that it privileges accounts written by the
British and by anglicized Indians. Does history change depending upon whether
an author is a citizen of the United Kingdom or of India? An ethnic Bhil or caste
brahmin? A Buddhist? A historian by profession, or a licensed tour guide? Or a
young man romancing his girl by telling mock-serious stories as they stroll
among the caves? This is the question of authority writ large, suggestive of a
multiplicity of possible histories, mostly untold.
There is, however, another way of accounting for Ajanta’s temporality, more
intimate and more profound, that does not tabulate the number of alternative his-
tories but instead assays viable alternatives to history. This latter pursuit goes to
the value of academic history itself as a normative discourse through which to
represent collective memory. Both meanings of “value” are in play here: What
good is history? Is history good?
One critic to interrogate the value of academic history in these latter terms,
Ashis Nandy, answers both questions in the negative. A political psychologist,
Nandy looks beyond the pain of the colonial condition toward a postcolonial ther-
apeutic of psychological resistance. He writes on behalf of what he calls “tradi-
tional India,” an ideal India whose peoples’ sensibilities and rhythms of life
remain unalloyed by a European intellectual or economic presence. In Nandy’s
reckoning, “the Enlightenment’s concept of history” was unknown to traditional
India. Indeed, he doubts that traditional India would accept the academy’s
“objective, hard history” as “a reliable, ethical, or reasonable way of constructing
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the past.”1 Nandy frames this split in terms of both object and outcome.
Professional historians value comprehensive and unambiguous collocations of
data. They aim “at nothing less than to bare the past completely”; to leave no
memory unremembered; to banish all forgetfulness.2 The academic historian’s
primary responsibility is to the past itself, while he is secondarily responsible to
generalized principles, such as accuracy and objectivity. A concern for the
contemporary effects of his objective analyses may be tertiary at best, a nice sup-
plement to his practice as historian. By contrast, “traditional Indian constructions
of the past are primarily responsible to the present and secondarily to the future.”3
In Nandy’s terms, they care more for ethical effects than for objective truths. They
do not value the past in its own right. To the contrary, such constructions rely
upon a principled forgetfulness “that seems directed against the heart of the enter-
prise called history.”4 According to Nandy, it is “important not to remember the
past, objectively, clearly, or in its entirety.”5 Only a past that has been structured
through “principled forgetfulness and silences,” as well as memories, offers tra-
ditional India a means for “expanding human options by reconfiguring the past
and transcending it through creative improvisations.”6
The translation of Nandy’s views from the realm of theory to that of policy
would have far-ranging implications for the contemporary treatment of Ajanta.
Nandy admits as much when he volunteers that traditional India’s constructions
of the past “are meant neither for the archivist nor for the archaeologist.”7 I doubt
that Nandy’s India would have supported Ajanta’s elevation to World Heritage
status, since “hard” historical documentation was critical to that bureaucratic
process. When nominating Ajanta, the Indian government was required to submit
“on the appropriate form . . . a brief analysis of references in world literature (e.g.,
reference works such as general or specialized encyclopedias, histories of art or
architecture, records of voyages and explorations, scientific reports, guidebooks,
etc.) along with a comprehensive bibliography.”8 UNESCO demanded that the
Indian government implement Enlightenment evidentiary protocols, while
Ashis Nandy decries that obligation’s epistemological burden upon the Indians
themselves.
To borrow a word from Chapter 2, Nandy is asking why there must be only one
set of criteria for adjudicating Ajanta’s authenticity. Let traditional Indians
enjoy their own alternate, but no less authentic, Ajanta experiences. Let them pay
no heed to the wants or needs of academic historians, connoisseurs, antiquarians,
and anybody else who thinks that the past is necessarily better off being left just
as it was!
For me, the possibilities and limits of Nandy’s historiographical imperative
became clear on a warm July evening, as I ate dinner with an officer in the
Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) who had been posted to Ajanta several
years earlier. First, a matter of context: just because Ajanta is an import cultural
monument, requiring the delicate care of skilled technicians, does not mean that
Ajanta is a desirable place to work. Imagine an urbane New Yorker who somehow
finds himself posted to the deep Ozarks. My dinner companion admitted that he
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had been exiled to Ajanta as punishment for a professional misstep that he did not
care to discuss. Yet, by imagining Ajanta’s apotheosis, he found solace. Here are
his words, recollected and transcribed soon after the meal: “If one treats Ajanta
with complete devotion and complete love, it will grant every desire. This is why
I take my work so seriously, and try to do such a good job here. This is why I will
stay at Ajanta for three more years, or maybe five: whatever I ask for, I will
receive.” Later in the evening, he also referred to Ajanta as bhagavan, the name
of god.
The direct, non-symbolic, identification of a terrestrial feature as a living
divinity is not uncommon in India. The Ganges River is a goddess in her own
right, while Mount Govardhan is Krsja in the lithic flesh. But this story turns on
my surprise at hearing an archaeologist, a man with an advanced degree and
scientific training, speak of Ajanta in these same terms: calling it bhagavan and
expecting it to act with the prerogatives of divine grace. At the time, the word that
came to me unbidden was fetishism, as I had recently read a series of masterful
articles by William Pietz on the subject. Pietz shows that the category fetish arose
from the ethnographic musings of early-modern European merchants to describe
their African trading partners’ unaccountable practice of valuing trifles of “obvi-
ously” little worth. Fetishes were material objects—sticks and stones—whose
material itself was treated as if possessed of subjectivity and intrinsic value.9
When Charles de Brosses published the first theory of fetishism in 1760, the mer-
chants’ disdain for their trading partners was reformulated as a general critique of
religion: to attribute subjective intelligence or innate power to (what Europeans
considered) an inanimate object, and then to submit before that object’s imagined
will, is religion’s most primitive form, definitively unEnlightened. Thus I found
my dinner companion’s statement odd on two accounts. In general, here was a
professional scientist articulating the nonsense of fetishism. In particular, here
was a man, employed to preserve Ajanta’s past, articulating a private fantasy that
fetishized a historically Buddhist place as a Hindu bhagavan. If he was going to
infuse Ajanta with spirit, he should at least have chosen the correct spirit! To
return to Nandy’s language, this ASI officer’s job required him to think through
the alternative histories of objective data, yet in other moments the same man
exhibited a principled forgetfulness when he saw that same stuff in a manner that
had nothing to do with its hard historical past and everything to do with his own
pained present.
Upon further reflection I have decided that fetishism is the wrong term here. As
objects of desire, fetishes are structurally interesting, for they are imbricated
within multiple and competing systems of value. “The discourse of the fetish has
always been a critical discourse about the false objective values of a culture
from which the speaker is personally distanced,” in Pietz’s words.10 If a man con-
trolled by his fantasies is called a fetishist, then the analysis of the fetish begins
with the analyst’s delimitation of baseline reality. Fetishes materialize a swirling
subterranean flow of valuation, in which differentiated desires function as ciphers
for the discursive control of normality. What should you want to own: beads or
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gold? What should bring you to orgasm: feet or fucking? How should we view
Ajanta: the body of a living god or a repository of objects possessing exceptional
universal value that transcend their local culture? The category fetish mystifies
through its promise of demystification. It reveals much about the analyst while
obscuring the analysand behind a flash-powder effect that only seems to grant full
exposure.
Ashis Nandy was right to distrust the ethics of demystification, to suspect
scholarly motives and objectives. My rush to judgment that evening was doubly
dubious, given the curious overlap between the words fetish and fact. Both are
derived from the Latin root, facere, to make. “Fact” is a direct formation from the
past participle, factum, that which is made, either naturally or through human
agency. “Fetish” derives from facticius, “formed by joining the past participle
stem fact- to the adjectival suffix of condition, quality, or state, -icius.”11 In the
Roman world, Pietz observes, factitius always connoted human manufacture and
allowed for the sense of the English factitious or fraudulent.12 In short, both facts
and fetishes are constructed and therefore historical. They differ in that the human
element in the creation of a fetish allows for deception. Fetishes have an appear-
ance of use-value but they lack the substance that would make them truly useful.
They seem to have real value, but are real only as fantasies. With facts, by
contrast, what you see is what you get. That is not to say that facts are uncon-
structed: No one would deny that the formula E  mc2 is a linguistic construct,
historical. But as a fact, it is understood to possess integrity and substance inde-
pendent of the context of its “discovery” or expression. Mass–energy conversion
transpires naturally, whether or not its formula is known.
Of course, the force of poststructural analysis has been to destabilize all such
appeals to naturalness and objectivity, even in relation to the hardest of hard
science. Thus Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar’s modern classic in the sociology
of science, Laboratory Life, argues that scientific facts are neither natural nor
objective. Scientific facts are manufactured in laboratories, in which nature and
objectivity—the very preconditions for facticity—are the most crucial creations.
“ ‘Out-there-ness’ is the consequence of scientific work rather than its cause.”13
Though we naively consider office politics, economic incentives, personal
beliefs, interpersonal rivalries to be epiphenomenal to the “hard and solid world
of facts,” these social factors are intrinsic to a manufacturing process whereby
linguistic statements are made into representatives of objective reality.14 If this
manufacturing process is successful, the result should be that “the construction of
a fact . . . appears unconstructed by anyone.”15
To call the archaeologist at Ajanta a fetishist, therefore, I would also have had
to entertain the possibility that his representation of Ajanta as bhagavan was in
fact true. Instead of fetish, therefore, I have come to think of the archaeologist’s
confession as an instance of what literary critic A.K. Ramanujan calls “an Indian
way of thinking.”16 Like Nandy, Ramanujan explains the Indian through the
negation of a European caricature. In this case, European epistemologies prefer
A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES
72
context-free universals as the sources of truth and value. Ramanujan cites an easy
example, Immanuel Kant’s ethical imperative: “Act as if the maxim of your action
were to become through your will a Universal Law of Nature.”17 For Kant, one
must not lie even one time unless one desires all people to be authorized to lie
always. Even benevolent motives do not mitigate this imperative: were a man to
come to your door threatening to kill your friend hiding inside, you may not lie to
protect your friend.18 Native Indian epistemologies, by contrast, favor context-
sensitive rules and interpretations. Thus the classic brahmanical social order
described in the Laws of Manu, in Ramanujan’s words, “seems to have no clear
notion of a universal human nature” and “no unitary law of all men.”19 It is
necessary for the brahmin-human to recite the gayatri mantra every day, while
the fudra-human is proscribed from ever hearing the gayatri; the ksatriya-human
will be fully disgraced if he is caught cheating at dice, while the vaifya-human
will be shamefaced if he would go bankrupt rather than cheat his customers.
Moving from the normative to the descriptive, Ramanujan’s own reflection on
the question of an Indian way of thinking began with inconsistencies he recog-
nized in his own father, who was both an academic astronomer and a folk-wise
astrologer. Ramanujan would have found nothing amiss in the divergence
between the ASI officer’s book-knowledge that Ajanta was first created by
Buddhist devotees of the buddhas and his own affective response to it as his
Hindu bhagavan.
Ramanujan notes that “both Englishmen and ‘modern’ Indians are dismayed by
this kind of inconsistency” represented by his father and the archaeologist.20 This
chapter is an expression of dismay at that dismay, beginning, in particular, with
my own embarrassing dismay at the ASI officer’s multiplication of religious iden-
tities for Ajanta; my own initial impulse to condemn him as a fetishist; and thus
my own fetishizing of historical fact. In short, this chapter proposes that a history
of Ajanta that reconstructs the site’s religious provenance from its artifacts can
never be true. Histories based upon the assumed facticity of religious identity are
particularly vexing. We see this in the ongoing uses to which “traditional India”
puts Ajanta, whether that India is represented by nineteenth-century peasants or a
twenty-first century archaeologist. How does Ajanta exist in history as an object?
What is true of Ajanta if the statement, “Ajanta is Buddhist,” does not represent
the agreement of a historical cognition with its historical object, that is, is not a
context-free fact?21 Thus this chapter’s epigraph: sensitive to the modalities of
time, President Clinton reminds us that, here, not even the meaning of “is” should
be granted and presupposed as context-free.
A brief excursus on graffiti in Caves 
Twenty Two and Ten
Like Ashis Nandy, Dipesh Chakrabarty of the Subaltern Studies collective
also wonders about academic history’s worth and, by extension, about the careful
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treatment of artifacts privileged for conservation. Chakrabarty asks,
Why is history a compulsory part of education of the modern person in
all countries today? . . . Why should children all over the world today
have to come to terms with a subject called “history” when we know that
this compulsion is neither natural nor ancient?22
Though Chakrabarty plays at provocation, his appeal to naturalness and antiquity
as indices of value blunts his point. Nevertheless, the tension implicit in
Chakrabarty’s questions arises from what he perceives as the role historical
discourse plays in splitting human beings into two discontinuous selves. On the
one hand, there is the “interiorized private self ” whose personal stories “often
themselves bespeak an antihistorical consciousness.”23 On the other hand, there is
the public person who has “inherited” from colonizing Europe an abstract dis-
course of universal rationality, freedom, equality, and rights, against which to
measure his social self-representation. The two hands do not carry selves of
equal weight. The burden of a westernized modernity is that the public selves it
proffers—State-citizen, wage-earner, commodity-consumer—overwhelm the
interiorized private self to such a degree that people come to trivialize or even
forget their own discontinuous plurality of odd other moments. And Chakrabarty
lays the blame for this loss of playfulness, in part, on those whose job it is to
bureaucratize the past—historians.
So long as one operates within the discourse of “history” produced at the
institutional site of the university, it is not possible simply to walk out of
the deep collusion between “history” and the modernizing narrative(s)
of citizenship, bourgeois public and private, and the nation state.24
As for people, so too for caves. Ajanta also has multiple selves. There is the
public Ajanta. This is a place for historians who mold data into facts, and facts
into a cohesive story about change and context, actors and intentions. This
Ajanta’s rock cubbies and plaster walls are identified with times past, even as they
persist into the present. This Ajanta is the subject of general or specialized ency-
clopedias, histories of art or architecture, records of voyages and explorations,
scientific reports, and guidebooks, just as UNESCO requires.
There are other Ajantas. They receive little recognition. Comprehensive bibli-
ographies do not note them, for their data is disordered. They collude neither with
history as produced in academic institutions, nor with modernizing narratives. To
consider them scientifically, we might line them up along a continuum. In one
part of spectrum we find the Ajanta of soaring platitudes: Mukul Dey’s “shrine of
Religion and Art”; Richard Lannoy’s Ajanta, which “surpasses the oneiric and
reaches an authentic psychedelic intensity;” Anna Pavlova’s ballet Ajanta’s
Frescoes, staged to great acclaim in 1923 London.25 In another spectral region we
find the ASI officer’s response, whereby Ajanta becomes bhagavan. Dedicated to
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the preservation of Ajanta’s physical remains, he imaginatively transfigures the
site, leaving no outward trace of this inner art. And still elsewhere on the contin-
uum are the Ajantas of visitors who have not been so kind. Let us consider two
private Ajantas whose transfigurations have been less than delicate. What might
one say about those Ajantas?
Enter Cave Twenty Two (Figure 3.1). This tiny cave’s cells are barely roughed-
out pits. It does not have a major cult image. Its paintings offer some details of
interest to specialists in bauddha iconography, but nothing for the casual visitor.
Cave Twenty Two is also inconvenient. To reach it, tourists must climb a length of
narrow uneven steps, up from the main walkway. Yet that inconvenience gave
Cave Twenty Two a second life—as a toilet. Although the Ajanta scarp is one-
third of a mile long, there are no dedicated toilet facilities near its eastern
end. Go to Ajanta often enough and you will smell tourist urine almost every-
where. But until the door was padlocked in the 1980s, Cave Twenty Two was
special. Insignificant; ignored by its chowkidar; situated near the far end of the
scarp, where tired men, women, and children are not eager to climb more steps
for no good reason: Cave Twenty Two became the cave in which to shit, to gain
rough relief.
What mystical tie connects toilets with graffiti? For when Cave Twenty Two
was still unlocked, many who made the climb also added their names and initials
to its blank canvas. Well, almost blank: most of this graffiti was scratched in a rear
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Figure 3.1 Caves Twenty One, Twenty Two, and Twenty Three (from left to right). Photo
by author.
chamber, onto a painting of seven buddhas plus the bodhisattva Maitreya seated
in a line beneath their personal bodhi trees, symbolic of enlightenment. In addi-
tion to this human activity, water and burrowing insects have long damaged this
painting, creating gaps which the ASI then filleted with cement to prevent further
breakage. Graffiteers alight upon the cement as well (Figure 3.2).
A cultural historian might wonder about the symbolic dimension of these
appropriations through which diverse individuals present themselves to our atten-
tion. Why, for instance, did G.S.S. scratch his initials into the cement rather than
the painting? Can this be read as a sign of respect for the buddha? Or does it show
G.S.S.’s faith in the longevity of this medium? In the ritual space of Cave Twenty
Two did he thus take communion in modernity? Or, possibly, did G.S.S. score the
cement as an act of defiance against the flat featureless void of commodified
experience? Was he inspired by a hatred for all sociopolitical institutions that
would fix his own alienation within a cement of platitudes? Was he a culture jam-
ming comrade of Kalle Lasn?
How about (Vijay Sharma), whose name in Devanagari script is
scratched only on the painting itself? Was this an act of antiquarian bravado; a
vote of confidence in the sticking power of ancient plaster and a rejection of
modernity’s matrix? Or did have a sectarian agenda: to express his
personal disrespect for the buddha? A verse painted beneath these buddhas dur-
ing the fifth century reads, “Someone who commissions an image of buddha will
enjoy good looks and good luck in this life.”26 Had known this, would
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leading Dhavalikar to suggest that “it would not be farfetched if we take him to
be the discoverer of Ajajta.”29 Presently, John Smith’s tale begins every guided
tour. After a group gathers at the entrance, it is instructed: Turn around. Look up
across the river bed, at the distant plateau above the hill, upon the place from
which John Smith first espied the caves while seeking tigers. Mukul Dey’s My
Pilgrimages to Ajanta & Bagh continues the tale with particular verve (published
in 1925, it does not know the British officer’s name):
In the year 1819 a British officer, retired from the Madras Army, was out
alone in the jungle close to Ajanta village, hunting round for tigers.
Unsuccessful, he wound his way on and on through the wild stony
tracks. Having pursued for some time his haphazardous course, and
imagining himself far enough from all human beings, he was surprised
to hear but a little way off a boy’s shrill voice. Hastening his steps, the
captain soon came up to a young herdsman talking to his herd of half-
wild buffaloes in the middle of the jungle.
The boy, seeing a sahib, and consequently thinking to earn a little tip
if he should show him the actual home of the tigers, led him a little way
off from where he was standing and, pointing above the trees, said:
“Look, sahib.” Following eagerly with his eyes the boy’s extended arm,
he saw through the thick green foliage a little golden-red color peering
between a few mauve carved pillars or columns.
The captain, intensely excited, feeling himself about to make an
important archaeological discovery, sent immediately to the village for
men to come with torches and drums, with axes and spears, to hew down
the tangled clusters that throttled up the entrance to the caves. Thus
a clearing was made in the jungle, and a passage forced into these long-
forgotten city temples.30
In fact, John Smith’s graffito is also the focus for a second advertisement in the
MTDC’s Ajanta Experience series. As discussed in the previous chapter, this
advertising campaign operates out of a will to represent the contemporary tourist
to himself as, like the god of Exodus, a being who consumes without destroying.
Thus, the MTDC disparages tourists from seeking the kinds of souvenirs once
sold by Narayan Ekenath, who cut painted figures from Ajanta’s walls in gross
violation of his job as caretaker. Responsible tourists are satisfied with less
“authentic” keepsakes. Similarly, this second advertisement censures Smith for
his nineteenth-century addition, but places such acts of graffiti completely in the
past. The copy reads:
Almost two centuries ago, a certain Mr. Smith defaced a painting of the
Buddha on a pillar in the tenth cave of Ajanta . . . . The only purpose Smith’s
act of vandalism served was to tell us the date when Ajanta was rediscov-
ered in the modern age. Thankfully, such acts have been totally stopped.31
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Despite the MTDC’s rebuke, its advertisement acknowledges that John Smith’s
vandalism still serves at least one legitimate purpose. By contrast, G.S.S.’s and
’s names in Cave Twenty Two would seem to offer nothing of interest
to historians or tourists (Figure 3.3).
Of course, such acts have not totally stopped. And, of course, despite the
flimsiness of my earlier semiological musings about G.S.S. and , their
names can serve a scholarly hermeneutic as well. Cave Twenty Two is not like
other toilet stalls: its graffiti is plain boring. Indeed, the fact that the graffiti in
Cave Twenty Two is so cursory, so laconic, and uncommunicative, might give
Nandy his best argument vis-à-vis the psychic drain of Enlightened modernity; or
Chakrabarty his, vis-à-vis the loss of the playful private within the bourgeois pub-
lic. No graffiteer took a stand in this cave except, perhaps, to urinate. In ancient
Rome, one could find the scurrilous, “Scummy Ready-for-Anything gives it to
her lovers all the time,” as well as the salutary, “Crap well,” scribbled along the
cloaca. We all have our favorite bathroom humor. But over the past century, Cave
Twenty Two has failed to incite even gutter jocularity, let alone libel.
If the act of scratching graffiti recreates an artwork as a palimpsest of layered
values, then Cave Twenty Two’s buddha image has been recreated in two almost
completely disjoined layers. The symbolic value of the ancient layer’s buddhas
seems to lack any power to incite contemporary visitors into exposing their own
symbolic selves. What might be read as iconoclasm seems not to be iconoclasm,
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Figure 3.3 A sign inside Cave Ten. The paintings along this cave’s aisles are probably the
most graffiti-damaged at Ajanta. Photo by author.
but disregard. What might inflame as desecration seems not to be desecration,
but disinterest. This graffiti communicates nothing except the erstwhile pres-
ence of the graffiteer. It neither possesses meaning, nor strains after meaning.
Yet is this not in keeping with the value given Ajanta by the World Heritage
Convention: an extraordinary place at which to encounter universal values,
such as Antiquity and Culture? Indeed, what place offers the contemporary
graffiteer a better chance for immortality than the surface of a protected ancient
painting? (Note that conservators have scratched several names off the concrete,
while leaving intact all names on the paint.) Cave Twenty Two’s names demon-
strate that, in our world, an ancient cultural artifact can provide a context within
which to enjoy the anticipation of meaningfulness without its having to offer any
meaning in particular. Granted, G.S.S. and left out their dates.
Nevertheless, is not the history lesson they teach at least as valuable as that
provided by John Smith?
Ajanta in history
The padlock on Cave Twenty Two opens a door onto Ajanta here and now as a
place abstracted from time: World Heritage Monument, MTDC Experience, cul-
tural patrimony, Saturday afternoon jaunt, place to make one’s mark (no longer).
The graffiti in Cave Ten, by contrast, remains a visible witness to history-proper
in the making. M.K. Dhavalikar describes John Smith as “one of the earliest vis-
itors to the caves after they fell into disuse sometime in the eighth century and
were consequently consigned to oblivion.”32 Let me fill out the details of Ajanta’s
schoolbook history, the short version.
During an efflorescence of support for bauddha renunciants in the first century
BCE, donors sponsored the excavation of several residences and shrines into the
sheer wall of a hidden ravine. Though far from cosmopolitan centers, these caves
were easily visited as a day trip by merchants, wanderers, and armies, because
they were just two miles away from a strategic pass on a well-traveled road con-
necting north and south India. After the first century CE work stopped, probably
due to the fall of the Fatavahana dynasty, which had made the region safe for
travel and trade. We have no positive knowledge about the next few centuries’
inhabitants. If Fakya monks, renunciants from other sects, highwaymen, soldiers,
or refugees did make a home there, they left no recognizable clues.
In the last half of the fifth century CE, however, this place was reborn when
courtiers of the Vakataka overlord, Hariseja, began to excavate anew. Vakataka
patrons considered theirs an exalted undertaking. One described his donation as
“almost measureless” and bragged that small men could not even imagine what
he had made; another named his cave Fri Vaijayanta, eponymous with the palace
of Indra, king of the Vedic gods.33 As a heaven on earth, this grand project was
closely associated with Hariseja’s reign. It began soon after Hariseja’s ascension
(c.460), a public display of the Vakatakas’ power, wealth, piety, and strategic
interests.
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Before Walter Spink, the dominant chronological sequence for the Vakataka
caves had been fixed by James Fergusson and James Burgess “between the years
500 and 650, with a very little margin either way before or after these dates.”34
To arrive at his considerably earlier dates and shorter span—462 to 480 CE—
Spink employed a type of motival analysis, which fathoms the site’s artistic and
architectural material in their own depths before setting them within a historical
context based upon epigraphic and textual gleanings. His own preferred metaphor
is archaeological. Spink envisions Ajanta as a “dig” that “breaks into a number of
distinct levels or strata, reflecting the way that its patronage was affected by
political, economic and other factors.”35
Levels One and Two (c.462–471). A Vakataka ruler named Hariseja inherited
his father’s throne in approximately 460. Almost immediately thereafter “a con-
sortium of the emperor’s richest and most powerful courtiers” hired architects and
artisans to realize this great project.36 These courtiers included Varahadeva, one
of Hariseja’s minsters; Buddhabhadra, a noble become monk, who tells us that he
was “bound in friendship with a minister of the mighty King of Afmaka over the
course of many lifetimes”; and an unnamed feudatory raja subordinate to
Hariseja. Further, Spink has argued that one of Ajanta’s caves was the dedication
of Hariseja himself, while another may have been patronized by a close relative,
perhaps one of the ruler’s wives.
Ajanta’s first two Vakataka levels are characterized by an exuberance of
creative activity, during which the vast majority of caves were begun and several
nearly finished. In terms of patronage, Spink’s reading of the site has each cave
funded individually by a single donor, a pattern that stands in stark contrast to the
collective patronage found at the earlier places dedicated to the buddha, such as
Sañci or Bharhut, where individuals, religious-associations, and whole towns sev-
erally donated capital to be applied toward programmatic structural elements.37
This new pattern of patronage is indeed suggested by the site’s epigraphic evi-
dence: every inscription recording the donation of a full cave presents its donor
in the singular. But something happened to the Vakataka realm, either economi-
cally or politically, for the end of this period of efflorescence is marked by rushed
and expedient work site-wide, followed by a general cessation of all activity at
Ajanta, with a few short-lived exceptions.38
Hiatus (c.472–474). Following this general interruption, the site seems to have
gone into complete remission for several years. In line with his emphasis on the
singularity of patronage and the presence of an overarching bureaucracy regulat-
ing the site, Spink observes:
Not a single image of any type whatsoever was added to any of the caves
at the site during the Hiatus. This does not so much suggest the site’s
abandonment during this period—except of course by the craftsmen,
who could find no work there—as it does its continued occupation and
preservation of the insistent exclusiveness that had characterized the
site’s patronage from the start.39
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Levels Three and Four (c.475–478). Following the hiatus, work started up again at
Ajanta in earnest. After several years, however, the site seems to have suffered
another sharp blow, for once again there is a period of rushed activity, culminating
in the abandonment of most caves in an incomplete state.
Level Five (c.479–480). Finally, after the abrupt halt of Ajanta’s programmatic
phase, there began a “period of disruption.” By then Ajanta was renowned for its
grand, palace-like excavations, which Spink identifies with the first four levels.
But the walls of numerous caves were also covered by minor iconic figures—
single buddhas or group displays of buddhas and bodhisattvas; several of the
minor icons were also inscribed with the names of donors and, sometimes, the
reasons for the act of patronage. In Spink’s reckoning, the disorderly placement
of these images bespeaks the demise of the bureaucratic structure that formerly
had protected the individual donors’ “private property” with such vigilance. Then,
abruptly, after two years, this haphazard chaos also came to an end. The site was
abandoned, inhabitants and artisans leaving for points unknown. After 480, “not
a painting, not a piece of sculpture, not a cave, or a cell, or a cistern, nor a single
donative inscription” was added to Ajanta.40
Ajanta was not completely ignored after the Vakatakas. Scattered graffiti and
a traveler’s report teach us that Ajanta’s caves remained known and were even
visited in the seventh century, though they probably did not house a stable
bauddha community.
Then all is silence until the brink of the seventeenth century, when the Mughal
author Abu al-Fazl’s A’in-I-Akbari (1598) reveals local knowledge of the site: “In
the sides of the hills twenty-four temples have been cut, each containing remark-
able idols.”41 Abu al-Fazl notwithstanding, scholars typically focus on 1819, the
year in which Ajanta was “discovered” by one or several British officers. If the
A’in-I-Akbari provides the earliest second-millennium notice of Ajanta, then John
Smith’s graffito preserves the oldest distinct evidence for humans at the site in our
era. The first reference to this site in European scholarship comes from William
Erskine, who read a paper to the Literary Society of Bombay in 1821 and
published it in 1823.42 Since then, an ever growing number of people have sought
the Ajanta experience: to behold the artifacts of an extraordinary lost classical
civilization secreted within a romantic, savage wilderness.
This linear tale punctuated with distinct periods—creation, abandonment,
creation, abandonment, forgetting, decay, rediscovery, and conservation—
receives the institutional imprimatur, history. Its narrative stream flows in easy
confluence with other stories that burble their source in Enlightenment ideals.
One such story is that told by art historian Walter Spink, whose historiographic
imagination hearkens back to Thomas Carlyle’s conception of history as the biog-
raphy of great men. For Spink, Ajanta “ranks as one of the world’s most startling
achievements, created at the very apogee of India’s Golden Age.”43 And Spink
reads this artistic magnificence as a sign of the Vakataka monarch Hariseja’s
political supremacy. How could Ajanta be Ajanta unless “Hariseja . . . was
surely the greatest king in India and possibly in all the world, at this time”?44
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This certainty about Hariseja’s personal greatness, in turn, becomes the bedrock
for Spink’s reconstructions of fifth-century Vakataka politics. Linear temporality
likewise enables Alan Moorehead, writing in the decade after Indian independ-
ence, to conceive a “beguiling dream” in which India is more than a new nation-
state—it is a civilization reborn. As inspiration for this dream, Ajanta
demonstrates “that there had once existed a composed and steady civilization in
India under native rule, with a native art of its own and a religion that was part of
everybody’s life.”45 Thus the memory of one golden age begets the promise of
another.
Most crucially for our purposes, this linear history also sustains the long-held
contention that Ajanta is a Buddhist place. Such was the 1821 hypothesis of
William Erskine, based upon hearsay evidence. Eyewitnesses in the mid-nineteenth
century confirmed Erskine’s guess. Still more recently, Hans Bakker’s political
history of the Vakataka dynasty observed that Ajanta’s
caves belong to the Buddhist, not the Hindu tradition. That this should
be so is already remarkable in itself. By all we know of Hariseja he was
a Hindu; nevertheless, the material remains of his reign that we possess
are almost all directly linked to the Buddhist faith.46
Indeed, I earned my PhD in the field of Buddhist Studies with a dissertation that
called Ajanta “a living memorial to Buddhism in India, a matrix from which that
ancient religion is excavated . . . daily.”47
Perhaps the most extended set of statements along these lines belongs to Sheila
Weiner’s Ajanta: Its Place in Buddhist Art. I cite this book, not because it has had
broad influence upon the study of Ajanta, but rather for its clear expression of a
certain common sense about the site, one that also vigorously informed my own
initial approach. This common sense begins with a recognition of Ajanta’s singu-
larity. Ajanta “occupies a unique position in the history of Indian art because it is
the only extant site of such grandeur which combines painting, sculpture, and
architecture.”48 No other body of in situ artifacts, Buddhist or Hindu, is so well
preserved from the ancient period. And because Ajanta is so comprehensive, it pro-
vides “a kind of document which visually traces the development of Buddhist
thought and evolution from early monumental inceptions through the proto-
Mahayana and Mahayana periods.”49 The investigator of Buddhism at Ajanta must
still control for ambient historical noise. That is, dynastic changes and military
events during the first five centuries CE played a role in delimiting the movements
of monks, artists, and pilgrims across the Indian social landscape; the flow of
resources; the circulation of ideas. But in the end, iconographic innovations and
stylistic changes at Ajanta can be explained by reference to Buddhist materials
alone (scriptural, architectural, artistic, and epigraphic), “irrespective of
speculation regarding the effects of political vicissitudes upon Buddhist centers.”50
Thus, the kind of surprise that Hans Bakker evinces—Hariseja, a Hindu king, is
known almost exclusively for Buddhist material remains—might be taken as
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confirmation for Weiner’s point that although fifth-century Ajanta “is referred to
as a Vakataka or Vakataka-Gupta site, these terms tend to confuse rather than clar-
ify the historical and religious position of Ajajta vis-à-vis the development of
Buddhism in India.”51 And, finally, Ajanta’s lessons about Buddhism in India have
a distinct terminus. “There is little at Ajajta to suggest the future course of
Buddhist thought and practices. As such, it is perhaps the last of the extant
Mahayana sites devoid of Esoteric influences.”52 To learn Ajanta’s lessons, a
scholar should be backward-looking. He certainly does not need to look forward
beyond the fifth century, except for a brief glance at Xuanzang in the seventh. With
Xuanzang, Ajanta’s history effectively comes to an end.
Weiner’s guiding assumption, “above all Ajajta is a Buddhist site,” repeated at
the beginning of her book and at its end, is not unique to her. Nevertheless, these
words will serve this chapter as a dictum to be resisted and sentence to be parsed.
One might ask: What is included in the “all” over which Buddhism is superordi-
nate? What is Ajanta not because it is “Buddhist”? But above all I am concerned
with the timing of Weiner’s word, “is.”
When is history?
Admiring Ajanta, Alan Moorehead imagined India’s future as an ancient civilization
reborn, while Weiner looked back to see Mahayana Buddhism still-born there.
But why do we tell Ajanta’s tale from the beginning? Something happened in this
place during the tenth century. Can that something be historical, even in its
silence? Does it merit the historian’s attention without any reference to Buddhist
thought or Vakataka politics? How about Ajanta in the seventeenth-century? Abu
al-Fazl mentions Ajanta in a gazetteer of the provinces in Akbar’s Mughal empire,
its administrative divisions, and revenues. We learn that these caves were located
in the Baitalwadi district, in the neighborhood of Batialah, “a fort of considerable
strength.”53 (The fort, now called Vetalwadi, is now in ruins.) We also learn that
this territory had two major landowners, both Rajputs, named Medni Rao and
Kamdeo, with 300 cavalrymen and 2,000 foot soldiers between them. Did Medni
Rao and Kamdeo go to the caves then to worship sadhus, who might have squat-
ted therein and painted the signs of Fiva on the walls? Did these Rajputs track the
tigers who preyed on their people to Ajanta’s lairs? In 1824, Lieutenant James
Edward Alexander, Sixteenth Lancers, of the Order of the Lion and Sun, found a
skeleton in one cave’s dark corner. Was it left there by Medni Rao or Kamdeo?
By a tiger?
Abu al-Fazl’s A’in-I-Akbari is a well-known text whose translations into English
and French numbered among the first works of eighteenth-century Oriental schol-
arship. Nevertheless, no European scholar of Ajanta has heretofore noted this
work. That may be due to ignorance of the source, or it may be due to a percep-
tion that the A’in-I-Akbari’s mention of Ajanta is insignificant since the Mughal
document said nothing about the site’s creation, abandonment, or entrance into
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modern global consciousness. The A’in-I-Akbari also named bauddha as a native
Indian doctrinal system, but did not connect that philosophy to these caves.54
Although ignored, the A’in-I-Akbari nevertheless owns a place in Ajanta’s linear
history, albeit the history of its forgetting. For a place to be legitimated as having
a history, for it to receive the discursive imprimatur of the term history, is for it
to be located within a naturalized temporal flow that is singular, comprehensive,
and regular. We expect that all events are related in time along an objective axis.
The non-reception of the A’in-I-Akbari—like the padlock on Cave Twenty Two—
reminds us that location, or rather localizability, on this axis is also synecdochic
of value. Insofar as the historian expects that “everything can be historicized,” in
Chakrabarty’s phrase, history becomes “the site where the struggle goes on to
appropriate, on behalf of the modern, these other collocations of memory.”55 If
this chapter explores a broad issue, the value of the past as a repository of the
present, then its more specific questions ask: Do the intentions of past actors—
whether founded in the niceties of Buddhist doctrine or the necessities of
Vakataka power—provide an adequate horizon against which to gauge present
identity?
Certainly one might look to Ajanta for history, but receive, Rashomon style,
perspectival shadowgraphs of reality. There will be a Buddhist history as well as
a bauddha history. And a Muslim history, albeit one of relative disinterest. And a
Hindu history too, in which the stone “buddhas” are worshiped as gods other than
buddha. A Vakataka history. A Fatavahana history. Even a European history,
whose perspective is that its account alone offers exceptional universal value
because it alone organizes all those other histories into a cohesive framework,
enabling historians to judge each, both on its own limited merits and in relation
to the totality. This hegemonic appropriation of the local and the particular for the
universal is what led Nandy to declare his disinterest in alternative histories.
Nandy asked for alternatives to Enlightenment history. How might we think about
that distinction?
Enlightenment history (EH) is ideally linear. Alternatives to Enlightenment
history (-EHs) do not idealize linearity.
EH proceeds forward as a procession of names and dates, events and causes.
-EHs are found in adventitious happenings that come to pass, occasionally, here
and now.
EH’s narrators presuppose that human beings act from conscious, presumably rea-
sonable, motives, thus allowing R.G. Collingwood’s words to become a method-
ological dictum: “The cause of [an] event, for [historians], means the thought in
the mind of the person by whose agency the event came about . . . . The historian
is looking for these processes of thought. All history is the history of thought.”56
-EHs find their norm in deviance, diversity, and dissent. Their narrators 
suspect that human beings are like unhappy families, each one human in his
own way.
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EH circulates the Enlightenment currency of universality, in which all local
systems of value and contending sources of coercive power are rationalized
into a shared morality and stable civilization.
-EHs are minted in private economies of pleasure, and have no systematic
political program. This is not to say that they are apolitical, just anarchic.
EH is expressed in terms useful for the morphological and genealogical
comparison of ideologies—terms like religion and politics, Buddhism and
Hinduism, Mahayana and Hinayana, Vakataka and Raj.
-EHs are neither articulate nor consistent. They are best known by their messes,
not their meanings.
EH’s narrators seek to reconstruct the past by decoding archaeological artifacts or
physical debris as material cryptograms of past motivations and values.
-EHs begin with the premise, stated by Nandy, that “all times exist only in present
times and can be decoded only in terms of the contemporaneous.”57 Thus their
narrators use the stuff of other material cultures to negotiate their own presents.
EH is framed in the language of authorial intent, asking: Who made Ajanta
and why?
-EHs are a matter of response. To understand them one asks: How have people
reacted to the stuff already there? Creation is already an instance of response.
Jamais vu
The mutuality of EH and -EHs can be clarified by Christopher Nolan’s film,
Memento, which earned critical acclaim in 2001.58 Memento recounts several
days in the fictional life of Leonard Shelby, an ex-insurance investigator suffer-
ing from a special form of amnesia. A blow to Leonard’s head as he attempted to
thwart his wife’s rape and murder rendered him unable to make new memories.
He remembers that cataclysmic event as well as his happy life before it. Leonard
knows that he lost everything on that night, and fills his present with fantasies of
revenge. Indeed, Leonard even knows his enemy’s name: John G. The search for
rough justice is hampered, however, by the fact that no experience or datum
remains active in Leonard’s brain for more than a few minutes. Only the system-
atic creation of physical data—notes, photographs, and for particularly important
information, tattoos—enables Leonard to maintain a semblance of temporal con-
tinuity. For our purposes the most crucial detail may be that Leonard places unwa-
vering faith in the facticity of the written word. Whether these words are inscribed
on paper or skin, he never doubts their one-to-one correspondence with the truth.
At one point Leonard complains, “[My wife’s] gone. And the present is trivia
which I scribble down as fuckin’ notes.” Yet, apart from that trivia Leonard would
have no present at all (or if there is a difference, he would have only a present).
The film’s first image is that of a left hand holding the Polaroid of a bloody
corpse—there’s been a murder—the hand shakes the photo, and its picture
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becomes duller, less distinct—Memento’s time is moving backward as ours moves
forward—we watch Leonard’s past fade before our eyes—our future is his loss of
memory, the past he no longer has. This disorientation structures the film. For
Memento works, not as a flashback that collapses the finish into the start, but by
slipping serially, scene by scene, backwards through abstract time. When Leonard
is asked what it is like to have no memory, he answers, “It’s like waking. It’s like
you just woke up.” Leonard’s life is a series of awakenings. He is constantly
“waking up” to find himself in the midst of a chase or to find a man tied up in his
closet or to find a dead body at his feet and a Polaroid in his hand. Thus the
audience too wakes up to find that human behavior is not easily generalized or
regularized or universalized.
Immanuel Kant has been called the inventor of the modern subject, an inven-
tion predicated upon an equally modern conception of time.59 For Kant’s human,
time is one and many, infinite and infinitely segmented. Time is the medium of
human experience; neither the outer world, nor the inner, can be experienced as
atemporal.60 Moreover, this experience is constrained by a logic in which tempo-
ral order is an a priori order that moves in one direction only: “B can only follow
A in apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only precede B.”61
Granted, this irreversible chain of cause-and-effect is not necessarily a truth about
the real order of noumena. Still, it is apodictic for the cognitive reception of that
noumenal order, and the fashioning of a phenomenal order of things by the human
mind. In fact Kant identifies three “Analogies of Experience”—three rules
“in accordance with which unity of experience is to arise from perceptions”—
corresponding to three modes of time.62 Insofar as time has the quality of duration,
things are perceived as having an enduring substance. Insofar as temporal moments
are successive, things are perceived as changing in a sequence of causes and effects.
Insofar as there is the simultaneity of diverse substances, things are perceived as
having reciprocal, mutual interactions. In a Kantian world, all experiences are nec-
essarily patterned as substantial, causal, and contextual. Human beings cannot
make objective judgments about temporal events within a single temporal system
unless they experience the world in just these ways. Lacking these three Analogies,
we cannot have objective, hard history. Lacking these three, valid subjectivity, the
recognition of one’s own actual place in the world, is also impossible.
This is where Memento becomes interesting. Leonard’s search for revenge goes
awry insofar as he expects that enduring substantiality, causality, and contextual-
ity condition his experience, while we in the audience see that they do not. For
Leonard causality is inverted: effects always precede their cause. He lacks the
ability to contextualize experience: the world is always just as it is. Historicity, not
history, is Leonard’s problem of high moment. This is the insight Nandy finds
lacking in European Enlightenment conceptions of history. Historians, he com-
plains, “have sought to historicize everything, but never the idea of history
itself.”63 Nandy would like this film.
Although Leonard has no ability to learn, he is nevertheless confident about his
knowledge. “You know, you know who you are, and you know kind of all about
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yourself. It’s just for day to day stuff notes are really useful.” Leonard remembers
the details of his life before his memory loss. This certainty about his own past
obviates doubts concerning his present. Unable to experience linear time,
Leonard nevertheless presumes that his identity is continuous within it. He nego-
tiates time without entering time. Indeed, the deceptions of linearity are crucial,
both for Leonard and for Memento as allegory. History, in Enlightenment terms,
involves the study of intentions in context. As matters of free volition, historically
significant actions carry a moral and juridical charge. Likewise, for Leonard’s
vendetta against John G. to be just, he must believe that his actions are contextually
appropriate gestures expressing a righteous motivation.
To ensure justice, accordingly, Leonard must take special care that the facts on
which he acts are correct and fair, for he is ever aware that his life could become
a series of inappropriate responses to mistaken incitements. Thus Leonard takes
a doctrinaire position on the relative value of physical evidence over narrative
(personal or collective):
Memory’s not perfect. It’s not even that good. Ask the police. Eyewitness
testimony is unreliable. The cops don’t capture a killer by sitting around
remembering stuff. They collect facts; they make notes; and they draw
conclusions. Facts, not memories. That’s how you investigate.
Were he unable to trust the systematic veracity of his photographs, notes, and tat-
toos, Leonard would lose access to the transcendental self that grounds his moral
certainty. To borrow a line from Nandy, Leonard has an “uncritical acceptance of
the idea of history.”64 Nandy further warns that uncritical acceptance of this sort
can result in “violence and cruelty.” Memento would agree if the definition of vio-
lence and cruelty includes the “wrong” man being killed for what are materially
established as the “right” reasons.
For the Kantian subject, truth is “the agreement of a cognition with its
object.”65 In this light, Leonard’s truths are moments of ignorance cloaked in a
verisimilitude of truth. Leonard possesses only objects; faith alone enables him to
translate those objects into sources of knowledge. However, Leonard’s faith in his
system of fact-keeping constantly leads him astray. He acts with purpose and
moral clarity because his long-term memories allow him to be certain regarding
his identity and mission. For the movie’s audience, by contrast, an inverse rela-
tionship obtains between increasing knowledge of Leonard’s activities and
decreasing approval for his motivations. Leonard’s self-conception is askew. He
has become a serial killer. His lack of awareness about who he is at present—the
fact that for him actions have no present context and no present concern; that
everything he does is evaluated only by reference to the hallowed past—enables
others to use Leonard to do their dirty work. Leonard’s world is filled with oppor-
tunists who know his infirmity and take advantage of it. A motel owner, for
instance, tricks Leonard into renting multiple rooms. Others manipulate him into
murder, by transfiguring their diverse enemies into his one personal demon.
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Leonard is certain that John G. killed his wife and destroyed his memory. His
chest bears the tattooed injunction:
But the facticity of bodily inscription is not a guarantee of fact. At the film’s
beginning (which, recall, is its historical end) we also read a tattoo on Leonard’s
leg, bearing John G.’s license plate number, SG137IU. There are many John
G.’s. The singularity of this datum, SG137IU, becomes the objective, hard fact
Leonard needs to know that he has identified the true John G. once and for all.
As the film unfolds into the past, however, what at first is received as an infalli-
ble truth transmogrifies into a fabulous lie. Leonard had this license number tat-
tooed onto his leg as an intentional act of self-deception. Another man named
John G., not the real killer, angered Leonard. Aroused by that moment of hatred,
Leonard wrote a note to himself containing the license plate number. Leonard
knew that he would forget his short-term motivation. Leonard knew that he
would “wake up” to discover that he had finally identified the true John G. Leonard
lucidly forced himself to see the wrong John G. as the actual villain filling his
eternal present.
In the end, Memento shows us time as a progression of moments of response
woven together through the agency of a dangerous self-deception: the existence
of a transcendental identity provides a fixed locus for moral authority. Stripped of
this transcendent context, each moment of response becomes discontinuous,
ambiguous, indeterminate. Linear time: maybe we cannot live without it, but cer-
tainly we ought not trust it.
A mountain’s lifetime of graffiti
Leonard’s life goes awry insofar as expects that enduring substantiality, causality,
and contextuality still condition his experience even after his trauma. Leonard
becomes a monster, not because he is an amnesiac, but because he holds onto his
faith in Enlightenment subjectivity as the normative ground of moral action even
after he is no longer biologically capable of being that subject. This is where post-
colonial critique comes in, with Nandy’s proposition that the western
Enlightenment’s hegemony over discourse on the past is unfortunate if not
unethical, and Chakrabarty’s call for “a history that deliberately makes visible,
within the structure of its own narrative forms, its own repressive strategies and
practices.”66 Both Nandy and Chakrabarty imagine a meandering ahistory in
which personal time is not devalued in favor of the totalizing constraints of
Kantian temporality.
For the purposes of this chapter, however, Memento offers more than a pop-
culture exemplum of the moral ambiguities inherent in Enlightenment theories of
time. The film also suggests a conceptual structure through which to consider the
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two narrative modes within which Ajanta figures: the EH narrative of intentions
and the -EHs narrative(s) of receptions. In Memento, Leonard’s tattoos provide
the most important data for his participation in temporal flow. He receives them
as true facts even when (from the audience’s perspective) they lie. Whenever
Leonard, shirtless, looks in the mirror, tattooed words tell him: “John G. raped
and murdered my wife. Find him and kill him.” Until a laser removes this direc-
tive from Leonard’s chest, it will delimit his identity. His present and future can
have no purpose except service to the hallowed past.
Ajanta’s inscriptions can be likened to Leonard’s tattoos in this regard. Both
species of text are uniquely, materially, located in space and time. Both rely upon
wider webs of signification for their canons, ideas, and formulae. Both offer the
cultural historian determinate points of entry into specific intertextual moments.
And like tattoos, which can be divided into multiple sub-genres, Ajanta possesses
several types of inscription: long prafastis that celebrate noble families and
patrons; donative records of varying length (some simply name the donor, others
also express a desire to share spiritual merit created by the donation with others);
painted labels that name figures painted on the walls; didactic verses from a
literary work, Arya Fura’s Jatakamala. Finally, there is graffiti.
Ajanta boasts a mountain’s lifetime of graffiti, unauthorized scratches, gouges,
and daubs. The remainder of this chapter looks to that graffiti as a source for
“other collocations of memory,” to recall Chakrabarty’s phrase. It takes little
effort to recognize the former presence of Fakyas at Ajanta, given that Cave
Sixteen’s prafasti dedicates it to the Three Jewels—buddha, dharma, and
sakgha—and Cave Twenty Six’s donor likens his patronage to the act of an
affluent and influential bodhisattva. But it does require casual inattention to miss
the Faivite tridents on Cave Eleven, or the uncaring defacement of ancient
paintings in Caves Ten and Twenty Two, or the many symbols scribbled on the
walls of One, Ten, Sixteen, Seventeen, and Twenty One. And it requires a still
deeper ideological commitment to argue, as does Sheila Weiner, that historians
who would “recognize [Ajanta] for what it is” must see it as “a Buddhist site, part
of the mainstream, in its time, of Buddhist art and thought, which existed and
prospered in an essentially Brahmanical world.”67 In its time Ajanta was part of
the Buddhist mainstream, and thus, now, it should be recognized for what it is—
Buddhist. This is Leonard-logic. How do we delimit its time? If Weiner directs
historians to “disregard the various dynastic appellations which have been
appended to Ajajta,” certainly other, more contemporary, markers of social and
cultural significance have even less claim upon the historians’ time. If Ajanta is
Buddhist, then “graffiti” denotes that which, being non-Buddhist, deserves no
place at Ajanta, and thus may be overlooked even as it exists right there before
one’s eyes.
In relation to Ajanta, at least, graffiti belongs to the intersection of the two
historical modes, EH intention and -EHs receptions. Based upon inscriptions, art,
and architectural patterns, we consider that place to have an intended meaning
as Fakya monasteries and Fakya shrines. When G.S.S. and scratched
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their names into Cave Twenty Two they violated that intention, yet their presence
and its impact cannot be denied. Graffiti appropriates culturally significant space
and time for the present. The vandalism that conservators try to stop by padlock-
ing doors simultaneously provides data for the study of contemporary reception.
Graffiti reveals how people make places their own, how they mark presence, how
they assert themselves in opposition to dominant powers. Yet, we can recognize
“graffiti” as such only insofar as we consider certain graphemes to be misplaced
in their places. Thus a consideration of graffiti points to the utility of
Enlightenment history while simultaneously denying its ultimate privilege. As a
physical presence graffiti marks temporal transition since it overwrites something
already there, yet in so doing it also forces one to notice the ideological dimen-
sion of institutional privilege given to origins and essences. A graffito abhorred
in one temporal moment can become a later moment’s prized “datum” or “arti-
fact,” even “inscription.” John Smith’s 1819 addition to Cave Ten is received with
such ambivalence. Who can say whether G.S.S.’s and ’s names will
transform, discursively, from “graffiti” to “inscription” one day?
Ajanta’s history can be told as a history of graffiti. Such a telling does not deny
the significance of intention as one force shaping the site. Rather, it attends to
what intention leaves out. Leonard was perfectly certain of his righteous
vengeance when he shot John G. at the beginning/end of Memento. He knew the
truth: so lucid was his motivation and so obvious the agreement between inner
sense and outer fact. Of course, Leonard was wrong. The corpse at Leonard’s feet
had not killed his wife. Leonard’s murder of that John G. was not a holy expres-
sion of the call to vengeance tattooed on his chest. Leonard strategized that his
own forgetful ignorance would guarantee his righteous conviction. What is
“forgotten” by those who desire to recognize Ajanta for what it is, is now in the
present—Buddhist? How can one narrate Ajanta’s history, not as a tale of causes,
events, and actions, but as one of reactions and appropriations?
Cave eleven: the Faivite years
Let us consider a set of Faivite tridents painted on the pillars and walls of Cave
Eleven. Most guidebooks ignore this cave, or like the Lonely Planet pass it off as
“not of great interest,” unaware that its verandah is a fine spot for an afternoon
snooze.68 Perhaps such anonymity has protected Cave Eleven’s Faivite graffiti
from the chemicals of well-intentioned curators. In Faivite iconography, the tri-
dent holds a variety of symbolic associations. Its most basic function as a weapon
is to destroy evil and restore cosmic order. But the icon’s three tines and flowing
banners also serve as mnemonics for diverse doctrinal trinities: three divisions of
time, three parts of the cosmic cycle, three primordial qualities, three worlds,
three chains of bondage, three states of consciousness, three aspects of con-
sciousness, among others. Presently, we have no way of knowing whether Cave
Eleven’s tridents are doctrinally elite, or merely the humble markings of an unso-
phisticated devotee. Further, unless the ASI analyzes the paint, there is little
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prospect of dating them with precision. One of the few published notices of these
tridents belongs to John Griffiths in 1896. The fact that they lie above the thick
soot that blankets Cave Eleven’s walls suggests that the tridents were painted not
too long before this date.69 The possibility of a nineteenth-century provenance is
further advanced by Griffiths’ description of witnessing the Makara Sakrant
festival at Ajanta. This mid-January celebration of the sun’s transit from the
Tropic of Cancer to the Tropic of Capricorn initiates six months of longer,
warmer days. During the festival, a Faiva renunciant would sometimes lead a pro-
cession from cave to cave at Ajanta, “jingling hawkbells to ward off wild beasts,
snakes and evil spirits . . . marking his trail by smears of red paint on the largest
boulders that lie in his path.”70 (Figure 3.4.)
We do not know the year in which Cave Eleven’s tridents were painted.
Nevertheless, when considered in the context of Makara Sakrant as described by
Griffiths and other nineteenth-century observers, they provide hard evidence that
Ajanta enjoyed a post-1819 cultural renaissance. After so many centuries’ hiatus,
Ajanta offered local villagers a place at which to gather and celebrate. Such was
not Griffiths’ interpretation, since for him the tridents belonged to an hour of
decline. We might see Griffiths as a kindred spirit to Myra Shackley, introduced in
the previous chapter. Shackley’s textbook on tourist management tells us that World
Heritage monuments “transcend existing cultural values.”71 The tridents earned
Griffiths’ contempt, in part, precisely because they expressed existing cultural val-
ues. Griffiths claimed, “To those who know modern India where Buddhism has
been dead and done for centuries, it is unnecessary to dwell on the pathetic fact that
these painted halls have now no interest for the people.”72 Of course, the tridents’
relatively new paint was evidence that people did remain interested in Ajanta’s halls:
they were the wrong people, however, having the wrong interests.
Griffiths’ distaste for the culture existing at 1890’s Ajanta becomes clear in a
set of hierarchical oppositions through which he contrasted the site’s hallowed
past with its grievous present. First he imagined Ajanta’s split temporality in
terms of the split between the sacred and the profane. “Traditions of . . . sacred
character must have long existed” in this place.73 However, now that “nothing in
the subjects or in the art of the pictures has any connection in the peasant’s mind
with any article of faith,” those sacred traditions have been supplanted by “peri-
odic pleasure fairs,” like Makara Sakrant, in which thousands of people “hold
high carnival, bathing in the river, feasting on sweetmeats, buying toys and nick-
nacks, firing guns and crackers.” Second, Griffiths contrasted the holy life of
Ajanta’s original inhabitants with the unholy lives of those who dwelt there in his
day. For the first, he approvingly cited an earlier article, which described the
caves’ authentic inhabitants as “venerated bhikshus” who “alone with
nature . . . devote[d] their time to contemplation and self-restraint.”74 Griffiths
lamented these Buddhist monks’ absence and condemned their contemporary
substitutes: matt-haired, ash-smeared devotees of “the bhang-besotted jogi-god,”
who “during their often protracted stay disfigure the pictures and sculptures with
the smoke of their cooking fires and rudely daubed red tridents in honor of Fiva.”
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The third contrast elevated the Enlightened British above everybody else.
Griffiths proudly asserted, “the preservation of monuments of ancient art is a
purely modern idea.”75 In fact, preservationist values were special to a British
modernity in particular, for in Griffiths’ view they were “scarcely yet accepted in
Europe” in 1896. Given that even the Continentals could not see antiquities’ con-
tinuing worth, Griffiths held no hope for Ajanta’s local “peasants”—one century
later, Nandy will call these same people “traditional Indians”—since preservation
was “entirely unknown in the East.” Rather, the peasants regarded Ajanta’s sculp-
tural and pictorial masterpieces “with indifference; or, at best, as mysterious and
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Figure 3.4 Two tridents painted on a pillar inside Cave Eleven. This same pillar is visible
in Figure 3.6. Photo by author.
dangerous shades, fit only for owls and bats and the unclean spirits of modern
Hindu demonology.”
Griffiths desired Ajanta to preserve changelessly a native culture proper to its
locale, as a pure reminder of Buddhism’s ancient genius. Thus he looked askance
at contemporary uses of the site, including the Faivite markings on Cave Eleven’s
walls. To recall my earlier symbology, Griffiths was an ambassador to Ajanta
from the land of EH, Enlightenment history.
How might an ambassador from the land of -EH have received those tridents?
For an answer, let us transport Memento’s Leonard back to the nineteenth century.
Leonard will become the companion of one Lieutenant Blake, who visited Ajanta
in 1839 and published an account of his trip in the Bombay Courier.76 Leonard
“wakes up” in 1839 knowing nothing of his present circumstances apart from the
horse beneath him and the military man at his side. Where am I; how did I get
here; with whom; why—such questions shoot impotently through Leonard’s head.
Yet, Leonard can observe the hubbub all around. Indeed, Lieutenant Blake and
Leonard have arrived at Ajanta on the day of the Makara Sakrant festival. The
villagers are prostrating before the monolithic sculptures and rubbing the stones
with oil. Curious, Leonard asks Blake to explain the villagers’ actions. Blake
responds by disparaging the Indians as confused in their worship. “They have no
knowledge of their own mythology: the blind adoration of the villagers
around . . . is the mere oozing out of ignorance which requires some outlet.”77 They
worship the god Jelandar Nath in this cave, while in that one they worship
Machandarnath. But these local names are incorrect. For “the whole of these
caves are undoubtedly Buddhist; the curly-headed figures, the contemplative pos-
tures, the associations, and the plans of the excavations are . . . incontestible
proofs.”78 Leonard nods politely. But he has no idea what Blake is talking about,
since Leonard is no less ignorant than the foolish natives about the “true” iden-
tity of these curly-headed figures. Leonard cannot see the transcendental value of
a past “Buddhism” because he sees no present-day “Buddhists.” Thus Leonard
also lacks the capacity to snigger knowingly when Blake tells him,
[The natives do not] suppose these caves are the work of men: they
declare that their gods dug them out one long dark night. I have heard a
native assert that their gods scratched out the stone with their hands and
then ate it! On asking him why he supposed this, he replied, that as there
was no vestige of the excavated stone in the vicinity, their gods must
have eaten it. Q.E.D.: verily, the digestion of these architects and their
credulous disciples are pretty much on par.79
The natives’ legend is certainly unpalatable, but Blake’s own tale of an ancient
group of Buddhists is not so easily swallowed either. Blake seems sure of his con-
clusions about Ajanta’s religious provenance. But they hardly satisfy Leonard’s
stomach for long-term knowledge, since there is no living morsel of “Indian
Buddhism” on which to chew. That name, Buddhism, lodges solely in Leonard’s
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short-term memory, though it takes on the fleeting appearance of being antique
fact by the fact of the stones’ own solidity.
In Memento, Leonard tattooed SG137IU on his leg, knowing that he would
soon forget: “This is not the license plate of the man who killed my wife but of a
man I want dead.” Later, Leonard murdered John G. with the facile faith that his
vengeance was just. The conceit in this little exercise has been that Leonard has
not yet willed himself to know that Ajanta is Buddhist because he does not yet
know that he should desire that knowledge. Now imagine that “Ajanta is
Buddhist” has been tattooed on Leonard’s left foot. In that case, he would cer-
tainly shake his head in ready agreement every time Blake mocked the villagers’
non-Buddhist worship. But Leonard cannot know, indeed Leonard can never
think to ask why he tattooed “Ajanta is Buddhist” on his foot in the first place.
For Leonard, his foot is tattooed thus for no better reason than because these
words remind him of a truth. Leonard will not accept that what he takes to be
incontrovertible fact also has a history; that his fact bears the traces of now-
forgotten desires; that what he takes to be the original cause of Ajanta—Buddhist
piety—may be the effect of his own contemporary interest.
This same game can be played again and again. Now Leonard “awakens” in
1896 as John Griffiths’ companion. Again, Leonard observes all sorts of activity
at Ajanta. Again, he does not conceptualize that activity in relation to Buddhism
because he sees no self-described Buddhists. Now, John Griffiths’ equivocations
make little sense. Leonard hears Griffiths disparage contemporary Hindu festi-
vals at the caves. Griffiths teaches Leonard that Ajanta is Buddhist, and “the first
essential of the saintly life of Buddhism” is “seclusion from the world and the
active business of life.”80 When Leonard inspects Ajanta’s paintings, however, he
is puzzled that so many seem to celebrate the active business of life. Griffiths has
a ready solution: Yes, Ajanta’s art shares “to the full that joy in life which is a
marked feature of early Hindu poetry.”81 And yes, “those who think of Buddhism
as the austere creed of a recluse, repressing human sympathies, and moulded on
the life of and teachings of Shakya-Muni himself, may perceive some incongruity
between the vivid humanity, and gaiety of these representations, and the ascetic
purpose of the halls they adorn.” But this perception of incongruity merely
reveals the observer’s ignorance. There is no real incongruity here, for in point of
fact “the Buddhists of Western India—nay, the Lord Buddha himself—was, after
all, a Hindu.” Sensing Leonard’s continuing confusion, Griffiths elaborates.
Perhaps the “modern spirit . . . sees a paradox in this natural development” by
which the buddha, “who came to abolish gods ended by adding more divinities to
that mighty host.” Still and all, “scholars . . . may be left to trace in these pictures
evidences of the harmony or fusion of creeds which we are in the habit of regarding
as in perpetual conflict.”
Huh? Griffiths describes Buddhism as dedicated to withdrawal from the world,
but Buddhists as full of joy in life? Buddhists make caves with an ascetic purpose,
but decorate them gaily? The buddha was an iconoclast against Hindu gods, but
he was a Hindu? Buddhists too are Hindus, but scholars consider them the
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Hindus’ enemies? In sum, Buddhists are fun-loving ascetic Hindu-hating Hindus?
Leonard has lost his time, not his mind. How is Leonard’s understanding of
Ajanta’s paintings enhanced by Griffiths’ equivocations from hard history? If
truth is found in the correspondence of cognition and object, what kind of object
must Ajanta be for the crazy people Griffiths describes to have been its creators?
How mad are we to think that we can divine which actual insanity drove them to
cut, sculpt, and paint holes in the sheer side of a ravine?
Maybe you too are dumbfounded. This much is clear: Nineteenth-century
villagers celebrated Makara Sakrant at Ajanta. Buddhas, Buddhists, and
Buddhism were nowhere visible as they worshiped the gods living at Ajanta:
Machandarnath, Yeknath, Goraknath, Raja Indar, Raja Bhat, Harri Itul Bal
Gopal Walla, and Jelandar Nath. The local people were enjoying Ajanta; they
were not Buddhists; they did not care.
A brief summary
This chapter began with Ashis Nandy, A.K. Ramanujan, and Dipesh
Chakrabarty’s critical assessments of Enlightenment universalism in relation to the
particularities of Indian life. In a sense, all three focused our attention on strate-
gies of forgetfulness. Nandy was the most explicit, with his claim that traditional
India’s engagement with time includes “a principle of principled forgetting,”
whose ethical imperative is violated by the Enlightenment will toward a totaliza-
tion of memory. Traditionally, Indians have remembered to forget. Chakrabarty
did not use these same terms, though he also located the “connection between
violence and idealism” in history understood as global progress toward a uniform
modernity.82 The politically engaged historian recollects the victims of this
violence—that is, people who do not see universalist rationality as self-evidently
reasonable—in order that the world may “once again be imagined as radically
heterogeneous.”83 Europeans often forget to remember such people. And
Ramanujan described memory in terms of an epistemological grammar:
traditional Indian mentalities never forget that all knowledge and all action is
structured within particular socio-material contexts.
The chapter first engaged with this range of critiques by introducing an officer
in the ASI an archaeologist, historian, and bureaucrat who has not allowed his
professional training to take full reign over his imagination. For him, Ajanta is a
Hindu bhagavan, whom he serves through his duties as preserver of its ancient
artifacts. Lacking the guidance of Nandy, Ramanujan, and Chakrabarty, my first
impulse was to dismiss this ASI officer as a fetishist, unable or unwilling to rec-
ognize the unliving materiality of Ajanta’s matter. With their assistance I came to
see this, not as a question of fetishism, but facticity. As a historian, I have long
treated “Ajanta is Buddhist” as a given truth, a harmony of object and cognition,
form and name. Thus, the ASI officer seemed doubly ignorant. But I read Nandy,
Ramanujan, and Chakrabarty as countering that this harmonization is problem-
atic, not because Ajanta’s objects (paintings, inscriptions, sculptures, even walls)
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actually reflect multiple ideological and institutional sources, but because I am
not even certain how many people I must ignore or belittle in order to convince
myself that my observations about Ajanta’s “actuality” are context-neutral. In the
statement, “Ajanta is Buddhist,” the copula “is” is not a mere artifact of linguis-
tic practice, but a hegemonic bid to appropriate all temporality for the universal
time of the academic historian. The fantasy of objective, universal time is itself a
fetish object. The scholar who asserts “Ajanta is Buddhist” treats its stones as if
they preserve a living, innate intelligence. He has forgotten the Enlightenment’s
first lesson: matter is dumb.
Cave Eleven: square to an English inch
Let us now return to Cave Eleven. In this case, we will look at several descriptions
of this cave written over a four decade period by James Fergusson, arguably the
most influential nineteenth-century scholar of the western Indian caves. Before
Fergusson, Ajanta’s caves were identified by a hodgepodge of local god-names,
Machandarnath, Jelandarnath, and so on. Fergusson instituted the well-ordered
system of number-names still employed today. Fergusson put the spirit of science
into the study of Indian cave architectures, but it was a poltergeist who took up
residence.
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Figure 3.5 James Fergusson’s 1863 plan of Cave Eleven. From Rock-Cut Temples of India,
page 12.
□ 
PLAN OF VIHARA NO. II. 
SCALE 50 FEET TO I INCH • . 
Consider two ground plans for Cave Eleven (Figures 3.5 and 3.6). The first
was published by James Fergusson in 1863, the second by James Burgess in 1883.
The earlier plan shows a cave that would be any architect’s pride. The angles are
right; the walls are straight and probably plumb; cells have equal sizes and are
evenly spaced; proportions are harmonious; symmetry reigns. Indeed, even the
scale fits an English inch. Twenty years later Cave Eleven is envisioned anew, in
haphazard asymmetry. Now the rear wall has four cells, one of which contains a
half-carved statue of buddha, while the right wall contains no cells at all, just a
long bench. (Cave Eleven’s right wall could not have held cells: they would have
broken through into the already-present Cave Ten.) Corners are no longer right.
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Figure 3.6 James Burgess’ 1882 plan of Cave Eleven. From Report on the Buddhist Cave
Temples, plate XXVIII, no. 2.
PI.AN OF CAW >Cl. 
All harmonies are lost. It goes without saying that the 1883 plan is more accurate.
Still, if we allow that Fergusson was a careful draftsman and honest observer,
we might wonder why he published this idealized plan in lieu of one that
disclosed Cave Eleven’s messy reality. Was it a matter of drawing from memory
due to lost notes? Was it a matter of audience: Fergusson’s plan was included in a
book of photographs aimed at a popular audience back in England, while
Burgess’ is found in a volume directed at professional scholars?
Both responses are possible, neither will do. An answer that does suffice will
begin with James Fergusson’s own place in the history of Ajanta’s historicization.
India’s rock-cut temples have been known to Europe at least since J.H. van
Linschoten’s 1579 Discours of Voyages described Elephanta, near Mumbai.
Continuing commercial and colonial transactions, the Portugese and Dutch
followed by the French and British, opened so many hundred more similar exca-
vations to European eyes that, almost three centuries later, James Fergusson was
able to address the Royal Asiatic Society with these words, “There are few objects
of antiquarian research that have attracted more attention from the learned in
Europe, than the history and purposes of Cave Temples in India.”84 However,
Fergusson saw no cause for triumph in this broad interest. His paper, beginning
on so expectant a note, soon became a lament: “the subject of Indian antiquities”
lies in a “state of hopeless neglect.”85
In fact, Fergusson’s 1843 paper stands as a watershed in the study of India’s
cave temples. These excavations had long captured the colonists’ popular
imagination. A dilettante troop of doctors, lawyers, and lieutenants devoted their
holidays to scrabbling in the rough in order to add to a genre of scholarly writing
that married descriptions of local color to archaeological description and histori-
cal conjecture. These reports still amuse. But when it came to science, Fergusson
found them to contain “so little that is satisfactory . . . and such discordant
opinions” that he considered it crucial to remake and professionalize the field.86
For this task, James Fergusson presented himself as an authority bar none:
There are few buildings or cities of importance in India which I have not
at one time or other been able to visit and examine. I had besides the
advantage, that as all my journies were undertaken for the sole purpose
of antiquarian research, I was enabled to devote my whole and undivided
attention to the subject, and all my notes and sketches were made with
only one object in view, that of ascertaining the age and object of these
hitherto mysterious structures.87
Thus Fergusson set out to articulate definite criteria for categorizing cave
temples, for comparing their significant features, for dating them individually,
and for tracking their evolution across the millennia. In the long run he expected,
as would Walter Spink more than one century later, that “the history of the times
depends upon the evidence of the caves just as much as the history of the caves
depends upon that of the times.”88
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James Fergusson is not important for us because he developed novel investigative
techniques. An architect by training, he presents himself as a skilled observer who
had the time and opportunity to survey caves and compare them to structural
remains whose dates were more certain. Rather Fergusson holds pride of place as
a historian of architectural India because he first enunciated the categories that art
historians still use to describe places like Ajanta. And crucially for us, Fergusson
grounded his taxonomy in the spread of religions. With understated exactitude,
Fergusson asserted that all India’s cave temples can be classified, first by refer-
ence to a specific religious order—Brahmanical, Buddhist, or Jain—and then
according to function. As for Buddhist caves, there are only two functions. Either
they can be monasteries (vihara) or they can be temples (caitya). Since 1843,
Fergusson’s assertion that “these two classes comprehend all the Buddhist caves
in India” has become a methodological given.89
Fergusson placed Ajanta at the head of his survey, as “the most perfect and
complete series of Buddhist caves in India . . . [and] in some respects the most
interesting.”90 Ajanta was not given the pride of place because it is the largest cave
site in South Asia. That privilege is held by Junnar, where the number of individ-
ual excavations tops 150. Nor is Ajanta the most ancient site. In the third century
BCE, two centuries before Ajanta’s putative start, a Sri Lankan princess had
already dedicated several caves “for the welfare and happiness of beings in the
boundless universe.”91 Rather, Fergusson placed Ajanta at the head of his survey
for two reasons. First, he regarded Ajanta as “without any admixture of
Brahmanism,” a “purely a Buddhist series.”92 Given his surmise that India’s reli-
gions were unique species, possessing distinct morphologies and divergent
genealogies, Ajanta served as touchstone for the classification of other cave sites,
enabling him to distinguish Buddhist from Jain from Brahmanical. Second,
Fergusson held that “almost every change in cave architecture can be traced in
them [Ajanta’s caves] during a period of about one thousand or twelve hundred
years.” Thus, Fergusson treated Ajanta as “a sort of chronometric scale” for all
India’s Buddhist excavations.93 Ajanta was Fergusson’s key.
In London, Fergusson presented himself to the Royal Asiatic Society as the
man most able to use this key, to unlock mysteries of Indian history that had been
secreted behind a wall of scholarly inconsistencies and fallacies. He asserted his
authority based, in part, upon the breadth of his first-hand knowledge of India’s
ancient architectures, and in part upon the fact that archaeology was not a sec-
ondary passion for him but his chief vocation. In this light, we can now return to
the two ground plans for Ajanta’s Cave Eleven. For clearly, the bluster of
Fergusson’s discourse is not supported by the verity of his art. The 1863 plan does
not map lithic reality. What spirit of otherworldly matter is Fergusson mapping?
Truth being the agreement of cognition with its object, Fergusson’s plan tells a
truth that has only a secondary relation to the material facts of Cave Eleven. So,
if Fergusson’s “notes and sketches were made with only one object in view, that
of ascertaining the age and object of these hitherto mysterious structures,”
then what object does correspond to the plan he published?94 If Ajanta is the key
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to the history of Indian Buddhist architecture, how precisely is Cave Eleven
Buddhist?
Here is the shortest answer: Cave Eleven’s central buddha sculpture is 
large-scale graffiti (Figure 3.7). The cave’s original authors had not planned for
this figure. Because the buddha was sculpted at a later date by a later hand,
Fergusson felt he could leave it out of his representation of the cave, and indeed
that he could restore the plan to its pristine, pre-graffiti state.
Here is a slightly longer explanation. Fergusson discusses this cave 3 times over
40 yeras, and in all 3 instances he notes the same problem. Namely, Cave Eleven’s
pillars and buddha figure belong to different times and intentions. Let us observe
how Fergusson changed his presentation of, and solution for, this perceived incon-
sistency. In 1843, Fergusson placed Cave Eleven near the beginning of the first
period of creative activity. This vihara’s antiquity was established for him by its
proximity in space and form to Cave Twelve, which he considered the site’s earli-
est. Whereas he prioritized Cave Twelve because of its plain simplicity—it is
“entirely without pillars, and there is no sanctuary or image, nor apparently, any
visible object of worship”—Cave Eleven appeared slightly more advanced because
it uses internal pillars to delimit a central pavilion.95 Furthermore, according to
the 1843 paper, the buddha shrine “seems to have been an afterthought,” but
nevertheless was roughly coeval with the remainder of the cave.96
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Figure 3.7 Cave Eleven’s central buddha. Note the tridents painted on both pillars. Photo
by author.
In 1863, twenty years later, Fergusson again placed Cave Eleven near the
beginning of Ajanta’s first period, as the second oldest vihara. Again, he corrob-
orated this chronological rank by reference to the excavation’s simple pillar forms
and small size. But unlike the earlier publication, the 1863 text did not mention
Cave Eleven’s buddha image, either to call it an afterthought or intrusion. Instead,
Fergusson made the blanket observation that, “in ancient times, no sculpture or
images were introduced into the Viharas.”97 “Ancient times,” here, means the first
period of creative activity (c.BCE 100–100 CE). Writing in 1863, Fergusson dated
all buddha figures to Ajanta’s second phase. To suit this progressive understand-
ing of Indian art history, Fergusson rendered Cave Eleven’s buddha invisible,
despite its overt presence. The 1863 ground plan showed Cave Eleven as
Fergusson imagined it “in ancient times.” His book included neither a token nor
a sign that this was not how the cave looked in 863, let alone 1863.
Recalling the previous chapter, we might guess that Fergusson used this repre-
sentation of Cave Eleven for its appearance of utility: the appearance of veracity
was what his book required. Rather than label the plan “a Buddhist vihara” or “a
typical vihara,” he specified, “Plan of Vihara No. 11,” as a prop to sustain that
appearance. The plan was rationalized and neat because unaesthetic details would
distract from that appearance. Yes, the plan was a cartoon, not altogether inap-
propriate for a picture book on a Victorian coffee table. But the plan was also an
archetype—ideology in graphic form—in support of a myth—ideology in narra-
tive form—of Indian Buddhism as a historical subject.
Of what is this plan an archetype? What myth about Indian Buddhism does it
support? The Fergusson of 1863 answered with silence. In 1880, he found the
missing words in the language of bauddha polemic:
It depends wholly on whether the age of Cave XI is to be determined
from its architecture or from its sculpture to know whether it is to be
classed among those of the first or Hinayana [sic] division, or to belong
to the second or Mahayana class of caves. Its architecture certainly looks
old . . . but there is an image of Buddha, unfinished, in the sanctuary, and
bassi relievi at either end of the verandah containing images of
Buddha . . . . The probability is that this cave . . . was remodelled [sic] at
some period long subsequent to its original excavation, and that all its
sculptures belong to a much later date than its architecture.98
No longer was it the case that India’s Buddhists carved viharas for monks and
shrines for the buddha “in ancient times,” only to do so again later, in times
slightly less ancient. In 1880, Ajanta documented a progression of Buddhist
institutions, Hinayana giving way to Mahayana. Fergusson was laconic in 1843—
the architectural forms are clearly early and the image, an “afterthought”—and
he was actively evasive in 1863. In 1880 neither discursive strategy was
necessary, for in The Cave Temples of India Fergusson made an easy analogy
between Ajanta’s artifacts and Indian Buddhism’s institutional history. A simple,
A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES
102
superficial test allowed scholars to assign cultural productions to the appropriate
yana: a cave that is “generally plain in style, and devoid of images of Buddha for
worship” must belong to Hinayana Buddhist patronage, while the “multiplica-
tions of images of Buddha . . . is most characteristic of caves of the Mahayana
sect.”99 Indeed, this yanic distinction lent further nuance to Fergusson’s original
1843 taxonomy, when he founded the history of India archaeology upon distinctions
between the Buddhist, Jain, and Brahmanical religions.
To recall the strategic “brand management” attempted by Sheila Weiner, whose
book on Ajanta was published almost one century after Cave Temples, we see
Fergusson’s continuing influence. Weiner demands that every interpretation of
Ajanta begin with the fact it is a Buddhist site. Thus she still presents Ajanta as “a
kind of document which visually traces the development of Buddhist thought.” She
still distinguishes an “early Hinayana aniconic phase” from a “Mahayana period
characterized by the introduction of cult images.” And she still finds it worthwhile
to describe a “mainstream of Buddhist thought and art” fully distinct from, albeit
resident within, “a tolerant, but nevertheless essentially Brahmanical, world.”100
Now we can solve the puzzle of the 1863 plan. Of what is it an archetype? What
myth about Indian Buddhism does it support? In Fergusson’s world, Hinayana and
Mahayana were more than mere denominations of Buddhists whose contentions
over doctrine ramified to their ritual practices and iconological sensibilities. The
Orientalists who taught Fergusson terms like Hinayana and Mahayana also
taught him that these yanas fell into a hierarchy of value fixed by their successive
dates. The later yana represented a corruption of the buddha’s original teachings
and the ruination of his religion’s formative spirit. Thus, for instance, The Cave
Temples of India’s index contains these two entries: “Hinayana, the followers of
the ‘lesser vehicle,’ the purer sect of Buddhists,” and “Mahayana, the sect of ‘the
greater vehicle,’ a later and corrupt form of Buddhism.”101 These editorial com-
ments fit a pattern that Philip Almond, writing on the “discovery” of Buddhism
in nineteenth-century Britain, describes as “the obsession throughout the middle
and latter part of the nineteenth century with the quest for origins—biologically,
geologically, and historically.”102 In this case, original, essential Buddhism
involved only “the practice of morality and a few simple ceremonial obser-
vances.”103 Analogously, the “original or Puritan Buddhists” needed only spartan
architectures; members of the Hinayana were “content to live by themselves, or
with only one or two companions in rude caves.”104 The 1863 plan showed Cave
Eleven as a Hinayana monastery restored to its ideal modesty and orderliness; it
mapped a Buddhism restored to initial purity. Indeed, Fergusson’s contempt for the
Mahayana was unabashed: “Mahayana monks congregated into large and magnif-
icent monasteries, richly adorned . . . replete with every comfort, it may almost be
said, with every luxury.”105 Is it any wonder, therefore, that they also introduced “a
whole system of idolatry . . . at total variance with the simpler form of faith that
characterized the earlier caves”? To remove the taint of the degenerate Mahayana
ethos, Fergusson had to displace its latter-day cult image. Cave Eleven became a
space within which to observe Buddhism’s decline and to correct history’s errors.
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The MacGuffin
Graffiti is ineluctably temporal. Thus it might seem that Fergusson’s 1880
strategy—that is, using native bauddha terms like Hinayana and Mahayana in
order to historicize Cave Eleven’s buddha as a kind of degenerate graffiti—is the
antithesis of his earlier unhistorical erasure of this figure. That impression would
be wrong. The 1863 plan also has a place in time, while the 1880 description also
has an ahistorical dimension. That is to say, the 1863 plan was useful for
Fergusson insofar as it appeared true to his readers. For us, it remains useful/true
as a map of Fergusson’s ideological position, if not of Ajanta’s physical space.
Likewise, terms like Buddhism, Hinayana, and Mahayana remain current, not
because they necessarily increase the accuracy of theories about fifth-century
Indian history, but because they make those theories appear more precise, and
therefore more “saleable” within an intellectual economy that prizes hard data
and objectivity. These are value-added words. Knowledge of them gives one what
seems to be a straight map to historical verities and neat plan for historical
research: Hinayana and Mahayana inform us about the history of Buddhism;
Buddhism informs us about the history of religion; religion informs us about
human social history; history informs us about how people negotiate their
present. Recall the prior chapter, where Douglas Holt and Juliet Schor said of
advertising: “monopolizing the public channels of meaning creation is becoming
more important than monopolizing particular meanings.”106 The same may be
said for scholarship. The value of Buddhism, religion, etc., inheres in the fact that
these terms foster and shape acts of scholarly communication, as much as in any
specific information they impart.
Buddhism, religion, etc., dominate the market for knowledge insofar as the
value-added qualities that these terms appear to bestow, for example, hardness
and objectivity, enjoy sanction in the modern university. It is easy to forget,
however, that such words quickly become scholars’ close intimates; professional
identities hinge on the labor exerted to delimit their meanings. Sharp insights
bring knowledge, yes, but also food on the table, personal satisfaction, and a
sense of well-being. A total institutional focus on the hardness of hard data thus
accomplishes something like an illusionist’s misdirection, forcing attention away
from the human factors in knowledge-production. This is why Memento is so res-
onant as an allegory of the historian’s craft: here we observe what happens when
a man ignores his lived present out of a single-minded fixation on hard facts
about matters long past. Of course Leonard is a caricature. He is physically unable
to form short-term memories, and therefore has no point of contact with the pres-
ent other than the past he remembers. Leonard’s obsession to find the man who
murdered his wife really is all he possesses; without it, he would have no impe-
tus to take the notes and ink the tattoos that document his present. Nevertheless,
one can still imagine Fergusson nodding in agreement as Leonard affirms the
efficacy of his investigative techniques, and their institutional sanction: “The cops
don’t capture a killer by sitting around remembering stuff. They collect facts; they
A TALE OF TWO HISTORIES
104
make notes; and they draw conclusions. Facts, not memories. That’s how you
investigate.” And one can imagine a sanctimonious parody: “Historians don’t
capture Ajanta by sitting around watching yogis paint tridents on Cave Eleven’s
pillars. They collect facts about yanas; they make notes about inscriptions; and
they draw conclusions about Buddhism.”
Although Leonard makes good methodological sense, we also know that his
fidelity to these same principles allows him, in all innocence, to live a life of wan-
ton criminality. Murder is an improbable outcome of Fergusson’s 1863 deception
regarding Cave Eleven—that is not the point. We historians are people who
negotiate the present by forming narratives about the past. How swiftly and how
completely must we forget the fictions of our truths to preserve self-respect while
doing our work? What crimes or misdemeanors might we commit because we
have forgotten that we, no less than Ashis Nandy’s traditional Indians, practice
principled forgetfulness? Fergusson’s 1843 paper began by making several points:
Before him, the study of Indian cave architectures was a haphazard mishmash of
opinions; he would be the first man to create a science of this subject; his science
was founded upon the long-attested distinction between India’s three religions,
Buddhism, Brahmanism, and Jainism. How much did Fergusson have to “forget”
about religious identity in India to be so certain of himself and his science in
1843? Is 1863 just the year in which Fergusson got sloppy, so we caught his
crime? Is 1880 the year in which he explained why the 1863 plan really was not
criminal at all, that is, the plan showed the cave in its original conception, and
therefore its higher truth?
For the historian, Leonard is interesting because Leonard does not care about the
present. He lives for the past and for the future, while absent from the present. His
present is vivid with danger, sex, money, drugs, and violence, yet he does not recog-
nize its influence. He drives a Porsche and wears a couture suit, but never wonders
how an ex-insurance investigator on disability could afford such items. The search
for the killer drives Leonard. It seems of vital importance. But it has little direct bear-
ing upon what actually happens day-to-day. It is a very busy lot of nothing. Alfred
Hitchcock has a useful term to talk about such a lot of nothing: MacGuffin. What is
a MacGuffin? When François Truffaut asked, Hitchcock replied:
It might be a Scottish name, taken from a story about two men in a train.
One man says, “What’s that package up there in the baggage rack?” And
the other answers, “Oh, that’s a MacGuffin.” The first one asks, “What’s
a MacGuffin?” “Well,” the other man says, “it’s an apparatus for trap-
ping lions in the Scottish Highlands.” The first man says, “But there are
no lions in the Scottish Highlands,” and the other one answers, “Well
then, that’s no MacGuffin!” So you see that a MacGuffin is actually
nothing at all.107
Not quite nothing. The MacGuffin provides a rationale for action, quieting
questions about intentionality. In Hitchcock’s world, to know why Janet Leigh,
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driving late into the evening, ends up at the Bates Motel, explains little or nothing
about Psycho’s cinematic power. Or Notorious: Claude Raines plays a Nazi who
smuggles uranium, of vital interest to American agents Cary Grant and Ingrid
Bergman. But for Hitchcock the uranium, the MacGuffin, is “of no importance
whatever,” since for him Notorious is a love story: “simply the story of a man in
love with a girl who, in the course of her official duties, had to go to bed with
another man and even had to marry him.”108 Notorious is no more about Nazi
uranium or the mid-1940’s fear of the bomb, than Psycho is about Janet Leigh’s
theft of $40,000 or the justice of her fate, than Memento is about a man search-
ing for his wife’s killer or the woes of anterograde memory dysfunction, than
Ajanta is about Buddhism or a sectarian polemic that severs Mahayana from
Hinayana. The three films listed here, at least, are about the vulnerable alchemy
of emotion that catalyzes when people meet in heated circumstances, not what
pushes them into the fire.
A film’s MacGuffin moves its players, but it is those players’ humanity that
holds an audience’s interest. Indeed, the MacGuffin only moves the players so far:
Cary Grant risks his life for Ingrid Bergman even after he learns about the ura-
nium; Janet Leigh resolves to return the $40,000 before she showers, and Anthony
Perkins never knows about the cash. So, if the details of a MacGuffin are of no
importance whatsoever to an audience, a film’s characters gain the viewers’ full
sympathy when they willingly abjure (or at least turn their attention away from)
the MacGuffin despite its transcendental value. Again, Memento is an exception.
For Leonard, the pursuit of his wife’s killer is all-consuming, while from the audi-
ence’s perspective it is completely pointless. Leonard is told that his quarry has
been dead for months, yet he never gives up the search. Hitchcock describes the
“purest expression” of the MacGuffin as “nothing at all!”109 What is more like
“nothing” than the desire to kill a dead man whom one has already killed? But
Leonard will not stop fashioning that nothing into something. Thus he is not Cary
Grant, nor Janet Leigh, not a hero, nor even human. He makes a fetish of a
MacGuffin and makes himself a monster: a caution to the professional historian.
The pursuit of mysteries from the past also involves MacGuffins. To see them
as such, a historian should be sensitive to the line between actor and audience.
Sometimes he will find only relative differences between the value that ancient
actors place on ideas and objects and his own system of valuation. Sometimes he
will have to judge: although ancient actors grant their presuppositions an ultimate
status those people are wrong, even self-deluding. Sometimes it is easy for a his-
torian to account for the gap that divides the emic perspective from the etic,
insider from outsider, the ancient from the modern. Sometimes it is not.
Take Ajanta, for instance. Academic protocols require modern analysts to
anchor etic interpretations of the site in a knowledge of how people at Ajanta con-
ceptualized their lives. This concedes the gap between audience and actors, but
until that gap is acknowledged it cannot be bridged. Buddhism, Buddhist and reli-
gion, of course, have no ancient Indian provenance; Hinayana and Mahayana are
native to India, but not attested at Ajanta. Nevertheless, there still might be value
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here, since all of these words can facilitate the comprehension of other words,
words that were used at the site. So, when we use these words to explain artifacts
at Ajanta, we take on a role akin to that of a film’s Director: we create MacGuffins
that sate curiosity about intentionality, enabling our own readers to enter into the
mystery of the place. But these terms are not the story. Though words like
Buddhism, religion, etc., can be exceptionally valuable, they have no necessary
place in Ajanta’s interpretation. Their place is circumscribed, and sometimes it is
reasonable just to ignore them, as when Cary Grant turns his attention away from
uranium, and Janet Leigh from the cash. It is when scholars can not relinquish the
terms of their analysis that they create monstrosities. Weiner’s dictum, “above all
Ajajta is a Buddhist site,” and Fergusson’s 1863 plan, have an ideological kinship
with Memento’s Leonard, who lies to himself in the present in order to create
a past that will be the proper precursor to a future of his liking—all of this
occurring, of course, in time out-of-time.





Life is change. How it differs from the rocks.
(Jefferson Airplane, “Crown of Creation”)
The buffalo and the cow
To put this better, let me borrow a favored word from Henry David Thoreau:
extravagance. Near the end of Walden Thoreau writes: “Extra-vagance! it depends
on how you are yarded. The migrating buffalo which seeks new pastures in
another latitude, is not extravagant like the cow which kicks over the pail, leaps
the cowyard fence, and runs after her calf, in milking time.”1 Thoreau’s -vagance!
shares its Latin root, vagus, with vagrancy and vague. These words bespeak an
indeterminacy that has no place in the field of academic history, and a wanderlust
that receives no ready welcome there either. Thoreau’s image of mad mother cow
adds yet another element—danger. Fences provide security; leaping them is
perilous in any field.
There is no doubt that Indian history prompts a certain kind of scholar to
extravagant expression. Some would stay close to the names, dates, and events that
fill their earnest ruminations. But, in truth, those fence-posts are not so high; nor
are they quite so sturdy as they seem. And beyond stretches an open vista, its hori-
zon vague. Among the fence-posts that pen the cows of history-proper apart from
their wild sisters, none have a firmer footing than the standards of religious iden-
tity. Even when personal names, regnal dates, and the details of events are tentative,
there seems to be clear certainty that the inhabitants of India can be distinguished,
one from the other, by means of religion. If one cannot specify the year in which an
event transpired, one can at least identify the religious affiliations of the actors
involved. So too for Ajanta. We can place the site within a variety of contexts by
means of historical records that require ginger attention, both to their subtleties and
their hyperboles. But however loud scholars may shout in debate over chronology
or relationships among the principal figures responsible for Ajanta’s creation, they
speak with one voice when they say that Ajanta is Buddhist. The site’s religious
provenance has long fixed the parameters of its historical possibilities.
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Of course, there have been occasional extravagances. In 1843, James Fergusson
described Ajanta as purely Buddhist, without Hindu admixture. Almost forty
years later he repeated this claim.2 Yet, while Fergusson was certain about the
purity of Ajanta’s identity, he presented Buddhism itself in rather fuzzy terms. In
Fakyamuni’s own day, Fergusson observed in 1843, Buddhism and Brahmanism
“could not have differed much . . . as we find the kings and people changing back-
wards and forwards, from one to the other, without difficulty or excitement.”3
Forty years later, Fergusson’s view had not altered: “Springing as it did from
Brahmanism, of which it might be regarded as only a modification, or one of its
many sects or schools, Buddhism did not at first separate from the older reli-
gion.”4 Fergusson seems caught between two truths. Or take his opinion that
Ajanta’s Cave Twenty Six contains “figures so comical and extravagant in design,
as prove too clearly that the religion of Sakya Muni no longer existed in its orig-
inal purity when the cave was undertaken.”5 This expectation that Fakyamuni’s
religion possessed an “original purity” does not readily coordinate with the model
of Buddhist identities as melded with Brahmanic, and Buddhism as a quasi-sect
of Brahmanism. Is it true that Buddhism as found at its source, Fakyamuni, pos-
sessed an original purity? Or is it true that the difference between Buddhism and
Brahmanism was tenuous in the beginning, and only became a fixed fact after
centuries of change? Where is that original purity from which Cave Twenty Six’s
comical and extravagant figures diverge?
For nearly forty years Fergusson held to the proposition that Ajanta is purely
Buddhist. Yet, strangely, his works also recorded the presence of non-Buddhist
elements at the site. One such anomaly was the form taken by pillar-brackets
inside Cave Twenty Six: four-armed “fat figures with judges’ wigs.”6 This multi-
plication of arms was notable, in Fergusson’s view, as “the only instance I am
aware of in these or any other Buddhist caves, of such a piece of Hinduism.” By
1863, Fergusson discovered a second instance, though once again he called it
unique in this regard. This image is located on a wall near the entrance to Cave
Nineteen (Figure 4.1):
Opposite to the Choultrie last described is an alto-relievo of a considerably
more modern date than the Chaitya to which it is attached, and probably
the only thing that can be ascribed to the Brahmans at Ajunta. It represents
Vishnu sitting under the canopy of the seven-headed snake—a very
common Brahmanical arrangement—with Sareswati by his side. On the
other side stands an attendant with a chowrie in his hand.7
For us now, Fergusson’s remarks demonstrate an unfamiliarity with common
iconography rather than an overt Brahmanical presence. Cave Twenty Six’s four-
armed brackets may be unique at Ajanta, but are not Hindu for that reason.
Similarly, The Cave Temples of India later re-identifies Vishnu and Sareswati as
a naga king and his anguine bride.8 But my question here has little to do with the
details of Fergusson’s observations, and even less to do with lacunae in his
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knowledge of iconography. The puzzle, rather, is why Fergusson made extravagant
claims about Ajanta’s singular religious provenance—claims that “kick over the
pail, [and] leap the cowyard fence” of his own determinations vis-à-vis the site’s
material remains.
Fergusson was not alone in his extravagance. Chapter 3 introduced Sheila
Weiner’s more recent demand that historians view Ajanta as a mainstream
Buddhist site in a Brahmanical world. And we can also look back to 1821, the
year in which William Erskine first brought Ajanta to public attention in his
paper, “Observations on the Remains of the Bouddhists in India.” Erskine was a
product of the Scottish Enlightenment, whose approach to history, following the
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Figure 4.1 A naga and nagini at the entrance to Cave Nineteen. Photo by author.
lead of Adam Smith and William Robertson, was decidedly “philosophical.” Jane
Rendall describes the Scots’ historiography thus: It was “concerned to apply to
the study of man and society methods of enquiry comparable to those of the nat-
ural sciences . . . involv[ing] the formulation of general laws on the basis of obser-
vation, and the available evidence about the history, economy, culture, and
political institutions of different societies.”9 Of course, while close attention to
social forms is now expected of all historical inquiry, this philosophy’s evolution-
ary model, in which civilizations progress through stages according to regular
laws, is no longer an operational norm.
The question of progress was of concern to Erskine in 1821, however, when he
addressed a regular meeting of the Literary Society of Bombay. Erskine sought to
identify the grounds of Indian civilization. Given this agenda, Erskine’s presup-
positions, the things he accepted as matters of common sense, are all the more
striking. “It is well known,” Erskine asserted near the beginning of his paper, “that
all of the countries included under the general name of India have, from very
remote times, been divided between three great religions, the Brahminical, the
Bouddhist, and the Jain.”10 Given such divisions along religious lines, he pro-
posed that “it would obviously much facilitate and extend the means of accurate
information, if some simple tests were generally known, by which certain classes
of antiquities could instantly be referred to the religion to which they belong.”11
Erskine’s grand aim was thus “to fix, if possible, some obvious criteria by which
even a transient observer may discriminate the Bouddhist from the Brahminical
temples.”12
Note Erskine’s language. He required accuracy but he also desired transparency.
Erskine expected that criteria for distinguishing monuments, Buddhist from
Hindu from Jain, could be “simple,” “obvious,” “instantaneous,” and suitable
even for “transient observers.” In a word, Erskine wanted to give casual tourists
the spontaneous ability to recognize the religious affiliation of the places they vis-
ited. Such spontaneity would be impossible without there also being fixed, even
objective, bases for religious identity. For a transient observer to immediately but
accurately distinguish Hindu from Buddhist remains, the distinction between
these two religions would have to be substantial, not contingent on perspective or
phronetic strategy. Erskine’s scientific archaeology required both Buddhism and
Hinduism to be the kinds of things that could be discovered, described, and duly
categorized. Their substantive differences would be marked by morphological
indices which, while visible on an artifact’s surface, would also reflect divergent
genealogies. And it is for this reason that Erskine concluded that archaeological
forms, properly comprehended, would enable scholars “to infer the existence of
the Bouddhist religion in situations where we do not learn from history that it ever
prevailed.”13
This is the discursive fence in which scholars of Ajanta have been “yarded,” to
recall another of Henry David Thoreau’s words. Buddhism and Brahmanism (or
Hinduism) demarcate what seem to be natural limits to our knowledge of India’s
past. Even if we acknowledge that the sources allow only imperfect reconstructions
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of that history, it is Buddhism and Hinduism that we seem to be reconstructing,
however imperfectly. To pursue Thoreau’s metaphor to its end, extravagance
requires us to attempt an escape from the yard of fixed religious identity, at least
to test how sturdy its fence really is. Richard Davis has suggested that “the
challenging, borrowing, contradicting, polemicizing, appropriating, and modify-
ing that goes on across religious boundaries, and even the constructing and sub-
verting of those boundaries, are ongoing dynamic processes that give both
form and content to the religious history of India.”14 This is a crucial insight so
far as it goes. But to give Thoreau the next-to-last word—“I fear chiefly lest my
expression may not be extra-vagant enough, may not wander far enough beyond
the narrow limits of my daily experience”15—the specified boundary of a
“religious history of India” may need to be leaped over as well.
The primacy of matter
One dilemma faced by educators in many fields, especially at the introductory
level, is choosing a textbook. A teacher will want a certain perspective on the
field and breadth of coverage, but he will also want an interpretation with which
he can agree. Compromise is inevitable. Certainly this is the case with Richard
Gombrich’s Theravada Buddhism, a textbook I excerpt when teaching introduc-
tion to Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism emphasizes social history, much to my
delight. But I still find myself struggling with the details. The work defines
Buddhists as those people who take refuge in the Three Jewels—the buddha, the
dharma, and the sangha—and then defines the Jewels as three facets of enlight-
enment. The buddha is the man who “attained [e]nlightenment by realizing the
Truth.” The dharma is the truth realized, the substance of enlightenment. The
sangha, third, “not only consists of those who have decided to devote their lives
to striving for [e]nlightenment; it also preserves the memory of the Buddha’s
Teaching,” that is, his expressions of enlightenment.16 Enlightenment thus serves
as a nodal point at which Gombrich’s scholarly analyses of Buddhism intersect
with native bauddha discourses. Things are “Buddhist” insofar as we can follow
a chain of significance back to enlightenment itself (for the bauddha), or a dis-
course thereon (for the scholar). One Ajanta inscription declares, “He is called
‘buddha’ because he attained enlightenment spontaneously.”17 In the face of such
a material association with enlightenment, it seems inconceivable not to call
Ajanta a Buddhist place.
But I chose the phrase, nodal point, with care. It is taken from The Interpretation
of Dreams, where Freud uses it to characterize an element in a dream in which
“a great number of dream-thoughts converge.”18 Freud’s premise is that every
event or element in a dream bears meaning, but invariably meanings are distorted.
To interpret a dream one must first identify the elements that are repeated in
diverse ways throughout the dreamscape. These are overdetermined nodal points
around which the dream’s meanings coalesce. That is to say, these dream-
elements have multiple (potentially) contradictory, simultaneous, determinants;
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they cannot be resolved into a single identity or meaning or truth. Because of
overdetermination, even though dreams can be interpreted, they “regularly have
more than one meaning.”19 By characterizing enlightenment as a nodal point,
I am allowing that every doctrine, practice, social form, etc. that scholars call
“Buddhist,” however diverse or mutually contradictory, can be associated with
a comprehensive structure by reference to enlightenment. This word/concept
functions to fix the range of values that scholars will impute to Buddhism. But
due to overdetermination, there is no way to reduce out the labor required for the
determination of meaning. Enlightenment does not possess a natural or objective
value that makes it the necessary and universal nexus of historical reality. Rather,
the very act of unification—the stipulation “Buddhist”—gives enlightenment its
meaningfulness after the fact. Out of this paradox, Freud’s poststructuralist inter-
preters, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, have formulated a general “logic of
overdetermination” that enables “the critique of every type of fixity, through an
affirmation of the incomplete, open and politically negotiable character of every
identity.”20 The spontaneous or commonsensical determination, in which Ajanta
is Buddhist because one can follow a chain of associations from its artifacts to
enlightenment, has a history with distinct political causes and effects.
It should be clear that when I characterize enlightenment as overdetermined,
I am not speaking of enlightenment as a matter of “religious experience.” Whether
anybody has ever been fully and perfectly enlightened as described in bauddha
doctrinal treatises is fully beside the point; likewise, the question of whether such
enlightenment is even possible. But scepticism is no more proper here than credu-
lousness. The only matter that matters is the material form in which enlightenment
forms an intersubjective object. How is enlightenment a solidly material thing—
either as a matter of fact or matter of discourse? The question of materiality is
primary. Without it, we have nothing to say about enlightenment at all.
What is more material than stone, or more solidly intersubjective than a large
mural sculpted out of stone? The next section thus begins to investigate the
materiality of enlightenment by introducing a sculpture of events related to
Fakyamuni’s enlightenment. Anybody fluent in the buddha’s life-story can simply,
obviously, and instantaneously identify the sculpture’s subject matter, just as
Erskine had hoped would be possible for Indian artifacts in general. However, that
success itself raises new concerns. For it is not equally obvious why we halt our
investigation with this clear and reasonable interpretation. Other interpretations
are possible. Why not pursue them? The answer comes in the chapter’s second
half, where I introduce an anthropological model—the scriptural human. Within
this anthropology, human beings are like scriptures, for the significance of
their actions and ideas can be determined by reference to an unknown, even
unknowable, but nevertheless real, transcendental absolute. In fashioning the
Buddhist human as a scriptural human—thereby circumventing the multiplicity
entailed in overdetermination—scholars of Buddhism have had to disregard the
primary materiality of enlightenment. They have dared to treat enlightenment as
a spiritual truth.
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The conquest of Mara
Where better to begin the search for enlightenment at Ajanta than on a wall
sculpted with the tale of the buddha’s enlightenment?
The battle took place in Bodh Gaya, India, when Fakyamuni was 35 years old.
But its antecedents encompass a history reaching back uncountable aeons.
To keep the story short, the bodhisattva first learned about human frailties only
six years before the battle. On a day seemingly like any other, he set out for an
afternoon’s diversion in a country garden. Though there was no hint of wind or
rain, Fakyamuni did not reach the garden. For on the road the prince saw some-
thing new: a man broken with age. At 29, Fakyamuni had been raised in such
delicate circumstances that he had no prior experience of old age; nobody had
ever told him that people wither with senescence. He returned home to ponder the
dull eyes and sagging muscles of that man, with terrible foreboding. The follow-
ing day, a second trip to the garden was interrupted when the bodhisattva saw a
bloated man and learned of sickness. Then a third journey on a third day failed
due to his first sight of a stiffened corpse. Fakyamuni’s father, who had sought
only the best for his son, now feared the worst. For on the fourth day the prince
met a renunciant, who, though head shaven and dressed in ragged robes, was
serene and self-possessed. Soon the prince left his kingdom, his position, his wife
and father, to seek that same tranquility for himself: to be free from every fear of
old age, disease, and death.
Six years passed without bearing their desired fruit. Fakyamuni learned to
concentrate his mind and climb through psychic trances like rungs on a ladder.
He starved himself, and patiently endured the cruel play of local villagers, who
poked his ears with twigs. Still, he did not know himself to be free from the
relentless repetitions of old age, disease, and death. So he resolved to change his
approach. Rather than concentrate on the exhaustion of his self through rigid bod-
ily and mental discipline, he would attempt to examine that self and that body to
intuit their mystery. He matched his resolve with action, shifting over to a new
seat, the vajrasana, the diamond seat at the base of the Bodhi tree, where he
declared: “I will not unfold my legs until I have stopped up the torrent of defile-
ments.”21 Mara, the Evil One, could not ignore this challenge. As sovereign lord
over the Realm of Desire, Mara held his subjects fast through their own mental
and moral filth. By not yielding his seat beneath the tree, the bodhisattva threatened
Mara’s own in heaven.
Six years of striving climaxed in a final night, at the end of which bodhisattva
became buddha. That evening’s combat, pitting prince against god, became a pop-
ular subject for bauddha literary and visual arts. Some of the finest examples of
the latter are found at Ajanta. In Caves One and Six, once-lively paintings of the
battle cover a large wall near the monolithic icon of a buddha. Both paintings have
been damaged by rain, insects, and souvenir hunters. But what remains illustrates
Mara’s army, 360 million strong, with the delight of macabre whimsy. His cavalry
is staffed by wild hybrids, dwarves transmogrified into boars, inauspicious owls,
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and all manner of demons with red bulging eyes; his infantry held a phalanx of
snake-breathing discus-throwing blemyes. Though stone places restrictions on the
artist’s imagination, it is also permanent. As one donor at Ajanta observed:
“[Because] a man will enjoy [himself] in heaven for as long as his memory
remains on earth, one should create a memorial that lasts as long as the sun and
moon in the mountains.”22 Indeed, a 11’ tall by 10’ wide mural cut into Ajanta’s
mountain, depicting Fakyamuni triumphant over Mara, can lead us through the
story, though its individual figures are poor compared with those in the paintings
(Figures 4.2 and 4.3).
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Figure 4.2 Cave Twenty Six’s Maravijaya mural (note, the bottom left corner is cut).
Photo by author.
Cave Twenty Six’s bas-relief can be read starting at the bottom left, where
Mara, crowned and shielded by the umbrella of royalty, enters the scene to dis-
place the bodhisattva from the vajrasana.23 At first the Evil One tried sly sub-
terfuge, weaving a tale that involved Fakyamuni’s ne’er-do-well cousin
Devadatta, a palace coup, and harm to the prince’s family. Mara urged him to
leave this place and dutifully rescue his kin from Devadatta. Though this story did
shake the bodhisattva with unsettled angers and desires, he quickly saw through
the trick and calmed himself.
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Figure 4.3 A line illustration of the Maravijaya. From John Griffiths, The Paintings in the
Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta (London, 1896), 1:24.
As a god, Mara next challenged the bodhisattva’s right to the vajrasana through
a contest of karmic authority:
“Why are you sitting here?”
“To attain supreme knowledge.”
“Prince, where will your supreme knowledge come from?”
“You became sovereign over the Desire Realm, Evil One, by performing
just one sacrificial rite. Over the course of three countless aeons, I
made innumerable trillions and trillions of sacrifices, giving away my
head and hands and feet and eyes and flesh and blood, my sons and
daughters, my gold and silver, all with the express purpose of attain-
ing supreme knowledge. Really now, how could somebody like myself
suppose that he will not attain supreme knowledge?”
But Mara was not deterred: “You yourself admit that I hold dominion over the
Desire Realm, proving the efficacy of my action. Where’s the proof of your grand
claims?” Looking now at the image, we see the bodhisattva’s right hand point
toward the ground, an iconographic gesture called “touching the earth,” for the
earth goddess herself had been an eyewitness to all the bodhisattva’s acts of
personal sacrifice. At Ajanta, the goddess climbs out of the earth to the right of
center; one knee is bent, the other straight; her left hand holds a billowing scarf,
while her right hand at her mouth calls all to hear the truth: “Evil one, it is just as
the Blessed One says!”24
Despondent at Fakyamuni’s solid victories, Mara pondered how else he might
harm the bodhisattva. But Mara was not alone in his quest. At the bottom right of
the mural, Mara’s three young and enticing daughters—Desire, Pleasure, and
Lust—offer their support. They would gladly dance and sing their way into the
handsome prince’s heart. But the cymbals did not move him, nor the drums, nor
the calls to erotic play. The bodhisattva’s silent composure can be read in this
mural by the shift of visual focus from its lower register to its upper. In Ajanta’s
stone, Mara’s daughters remember the still promise of ecstasies forestalled
forever. For them it was a cruel fact that, in Sanskrit, smara means both memory
and love.
Mara was not able to best the bodhisattva by appeal to his affection for his fam-
ily, his libidinal urges, let alone the magnitude of his sacrificial deeds. The only
avenue of attack left was violent force. Hence, the upper left shows an army of
ugly demons as frighteningly angry as Mara’s daughters were appealing. Again,
the bodhisattva countered the assault. Ironically, it was emotion that saved him.
By filling his mind with benevolence, the bodhisattva transformed every missile
and arrow into a flower, which then fell softly to the ground. Marveling at their
failure, Mara’s soldiers are shown in active retreat. Clasped hands display
obeisance as they pass off the wall in the upper right.
Finally, in the top center, the gods beat the kettledrum of victory. Tonight
a buddha will be born!
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Mara attacked Fakyamuni in the evening. The lifetimes of hard practice that
had prepared the bodhisattva to withstand that onslaught found their fruition over
the course of a single night. This was not a swift moment of blinding intuition,
but a nine-hour marathon of mental gymnastics. Once Mara was dispatched,
the bodhisattva entered into a series of progressively deeper meditations until he
reached what Fakya scholastics call the Fourth Trance. In this cognitive state,
he could still perceive and contemplate materiality, while remaining wholly
untouched by matter. The first thing the bodhisattva did then was to develop
several superpowers, the psychic effluvia of this trance. Now he could fly, walk
on water, or swim through the earth, and even hear human and inhuman cries no
matter how far away. These powers would come in handy.
Next the bodhisattva decided to investigate why Mara’s troupes had become so
malign. With his new psychic abilities, the bodhisattva read their minds, which he
found to be perverse and poisoned and prejudiced. These investigations gave him
a detailed knowledge of the many different states of mind. Fakyamuni could tell
the impassioned from the disciplined, the confused from the clear, and so on. He
began to wonder who among the horde had been his kin in former lives and who
his enemy. For the answer, the bodhisattva surveyed his own thread of past
existences. He saw the countless times he had been born and died, learning the
details of every single life. Then Fakyamuni’s divine eye shifted from himself to
other beings. He ascertained that all beings are like himself. All die and are reborn
into high castes or low castes, wealth or poverty, heaven or hell, based upon
whether they do good or bad deeds, support or contemn holy men, hold correct
views or believe in lies.
About six hours had passed when the bodhisattva finally discerned a pattern
within all this frenzied busyness: living beings are caught in the eddy of saÅsara
by currents of desire, birth, and ignorance. Three hours till dawn, but now
Fakyamuni could dry out these floods of evil inclinations, saÅsara’s subterranean
source. Thus he focused his attention on the four truths that transform one into
spiritual nobility. He realized in precise terms, “This is the noble truth of
suffering. This is the noble truth of suffering’s origin. This is the noble truth
of suffering’s end. This is the noble truth of the path that leads to the end of
suffering.” Once the bodhisattva had perceived these four truths directly and fully,
his mind was released from the flood of desires, rebirth, and ignorance. Free, he
became aware of his freedom.
My birth is finished!
My effort is consummated!
What had to be done is done!
I will never be born again!
Now a buddha, he had realized perfect enlightenment, and lit up like a ball of
living flame just as the sun began its daily ascent.
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Reading and rationality
Ajanta’s stone relief—100 square-feet of Fakyamuni triumphing over Mara—
would have remained suggestively inchoate without the appropriate texts to
identify its forms. In the early nineteenth century, when Europeans first visited
the Ajanta caves, they had no literary precedents through which to determine what
they saw. Thus they saw very little beyond hunting scenes, domestic scenes,
seraglio scenes, Welsh wigs, Hampton court beauties, elephants and horses, an
Abyssinian black prince, shields and spears, and statues that they called “buddha”
because of the curly hair.25
Early visitors to Ajanta described what they knew, saw what they thought they
knew, and ignored the rest. In this, those intrepid travelers were hardly alone.
Indeed in the eighteenth century, as colonists increasingly found it necessary to
understand India, early Orientalists asserted their intellectual mastery of the
subcontinent squarely upon their ability to read its texts. Before the study of
India’s languages had begun in earnest, tradesmen, adventurers, and missionaries
relied upon native informants for lay ethnographic data. In the 1767 opinion of
John Zephaniah Holwell (best known for his contemporaneous report on the
Black Hole of Calcutta), however, this lay reportage was not especially valuable.
At best a native informant could tell the British that “such and such a people . . .
worship this stock, or that stone, or monstrous idol.”26 Think back to Lieutenant
Blake from the prior chapter, who ridiculed his Bhil informants’ belief that
Ajanta had been created by the gods in a single night, and that the caves were
inhabited by gods whose names Blake had never heard before or since. Blake
knew Ajanta as Buddhist: this is Holwell’s legacy. For Holwell’s generation of
Orientalists introduced the principle that a hard-won reading knowledge of native
languages was the only path by which Europeans would reach the rational pith of
India’s people:
A mere description of the exterior manners and religion of a people, will
no more give us a true idea of them; than a geographical description of
a country can convey a just conception of their laws and government.
The traveller must sink deeper in his researches, would he feast the mind
of an understanding reader . . . . [W]as he skilled in the language of the
people he describes, sufficiently to trace the etymology of their words
and phrases, and capable of diving into the mysteries of their theology;
he would probably be able to evince us, that such seemingly preposter-
ous worship, had the most sublime rational source and foundation.27
As for the living, so too for the rocks. The earliest British to visit Ajanta suspected
that the caves were Buddhist. The first European report on the caves, William
Erskine’s 1821 address to the Literary Society of Bombay, made this judgment
largely because the site contains “sitting figures with curled wigs.”28 (This
same detail inspired Lieutenant Alexander to hypothesize that Buddhists were
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originally “crisp-haired aborigines . . . who were driven from India to Ceylon after
the introduction of Brahmanism.” That hypothesis, in turn, led him to “conceive
the age of the caves of Adjunta to be nearer three than two thousand years.”29)
Erskine’s 1821 address is balanced by an interesting account concerning
Dr James Bird’s visit to Ajanta in 1828:
A Dr. Bird from Sattarah . . . comes with a design to draw up some account
of the caves, dismounts from his horse at 8 a.m. Mutual greetings. In three
minutes my new acquaintance praises Mr. Erskine of Bombay; quotes him
and swears by him, and tells me these are Jain cave temples.30
And twenty years later, James Bird’s own monograph called Ajanta bauddha overall,
but identified several of the site’s monolithic sculptures as jaina, either because of
emblems on their thrones or because he saw them as naked.31 Perhaps two visitors in
1828, Mr Ralph and Captain Gresley, put it best as they bantered back and forth,
ignorant yet enthralled. Gresley warned Ralph, “The fewer theories you form, the
fewer blunders you will make,” to which Ralph responded with Thoreauvian
extravagance, “We must form theories—we cannot remain awake and not do so.”32
Whether one agrees with Ralph or with Gresley, one thing is certain: scenes
like that of the bodhisattva and Mara were left in stony silence during the first
half-century of reportage on Ajanta. Such figures were just too exotic. Though an
eye educated in Greek steles and the art of medieval Christian miracles might
have decoded this mural’s method for spatializing time—repeating Mara in each
quadrant—the zigzag from bottom left to top right would not have been obvious,
and the nature of the battle or its ultimate outcome even less so.
Writing in the mid-eighteenth century, J.Z. Holwell called Indians’ worship
“preposterous,” yet he also expected that their religion sprang from a rational
source. I trust that Holwell would approve of the above interpretation of Ajanta’s
narrative relief, based as it is upon an appropriate text, the Mulasarvastivada
vinaya (MSV). By genre, the MSV is a compendium of disciplinary rules for
Fakya renunciants; it also contains a trove of narratives, folklore, descriptions of
practice, and doctrines. The absolute date of this text is uncertain, though we can
be confident that some form of it was current at Ajanta, and that the site’s painters
and sculptors often used it as a direct inspiration for their compositions.
Nevertheless, Dieter Schlingloff, who has completed the greatest amount of work
toward identifying specific literary antecedents for Ajanta’s narrative art, also
observes that these murals cannot be reduced to mere illustrations of literary
precedents: “Although the artists were bound fairly closely by the literary tradi-
tion of a particular school, which can usually be identified, they nevertheless
retained a certain degree of freedom to pursue their own iconographic tradition,
or to use their own imagination.”33 This mural both subtracts from the text (the
MSV’s description of Mara’s army includes many more types of figures than are
actually shown; in the MSV, when Mara’s daughters ply their womanly charms
the bodhisattva turns them into wizened crones), and adds to the text (in the
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bottom right, Mara is shown drawing on the ground with a stick, a detail without
precedent in the MSV).
Holwell had predicted that knowledge of native languages would give colonists
a new, more sympathetic understanding of native practices. This certainly comes
true in application of the MSV to Ajanta’s wall. Not only does the text permit the
identification of the mural’s many figures, it even enables the discernment of a
coherent logic in its plan. This latter intuition is in keeping with the British
Orientalists’ expectation that the knowledge of native languages would be a prel-
ude to comprehending the lost heart of native theologies and rituals, in which
reposes a universal rationality and wisdom.
Determinism, from Laplace’s 
demon to Luther’s god
Interpreted through the MSV, Cave Twenty Six shows us more than a coherent
narrative. It reveals Ajanta’s fifth-century Fakyas to have been Enlightened and
modern after their own fashion. Recall, Chapter 2 touched upon the link between
modernity and Enlightenment. If Enlightenment is a mode of living critically
engaged with one’s own present world, then modernity is an attitude or ethos
that emerges out of a universe of possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms
accepted and rejected. According to Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?” an Age of
Enlightenment will be one in which reasonable explanations, developed through
the analysis of regular patterns in nature, supercede intellectually puerile expla-
nations that invoke god’s plan or god’s inscrutable purpose. In this Kantian light,
Fakyamuni’s enlightenment provides an allegory of modernity’s heroic progress.
A celebration of rational perfectability, Ajanta’s wall tells a timeless tale.
The MSV permits us to determine figures, to determine meanings, even to
determine rationality. It satisfies (in part) Erskine’s desire for simple and obvious
criteria through which to determine an answer to the question, Are these
artifacts Buddhist? Moreover, it allows me to determine the first element of the
anthropology of e/Enlightenment: e/Enlightenment is possible insofar human
beings are rational beings. This is not a blinding insight, true, but it does provide
a ground for further analysis. As foreshadowed on page 113, my full exposition
of the anthropology of e/Enlightenment will focus upon the so-called scrip-
tural human. “Scripture,” here, bespeaks a curious union of rationality and
religiosity, whereby every human being carries within himself everything neces-
sary for knowing that which is worth knowing about every other human being.
To get from here to there, we might ask why Erskine expected that criteria for
determining an artifact’s identity would provide a sufficient basis for fixing
that artifact’s identity. What would he have understood to be the intellectual force
of the act of determination? This question leads to “the scriptural” in two
steps, as we trace the naturalistic determinism of Enlightenment science back to
the religious determinism of faith in the Word, articulated in the Protestant
Reformation.
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As always, Kant is a prime spokesman for the Enlightenment ethos. He
concludes the Critique of Practical Reason with the following meditation:
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and
reverence, the more often and more steadily one reflects on them: the
starry heavens above me and the moral law within me . . . . The first
begins from the place I occupy in the external world of sense and extends
the connection in which I stand into an unbounded magnitude . . . . The
second begins from my invisible self, my personality, and presents me in
a world which has true infinity but which can only be discovered by the
understanding.34
Dwarfed beneath the heavens, so vast and regular, Kant found within himself a
moral universe of equal rationality and grandeur. The brilliance of Boyle and
Newton encouraged Kant to fancy that human choices and actions might also
be brought into conformity with regular, irrevocable, and (in the ideal) fully artic-
ulable laws. In the examples of chemistry, physics, and mathematics, he found
reason to recommend “that we take the same path in treating of the moral predis-
positions of our nature and can give us hope of a similarly good outcome.”35
When it comes to knowing both the inner and outer worlds, Kant held “science
(critically sought and methodically directed) [to be] the narrow gate that leads to
the doctrine of wisdom.”36
Of course, the expectation that scientific method could be brought to bear on
humanity hardly originated with Kant. No better example is available, perhaps,
than the way in which the name of Isaac Newton became an epithet for scientific
genius in the human sciences. Christopher Berry’s study of the Scottish
Enlightenment tells of Newton’s transfiguration into a trope. Isaac Newton was
“the hero of the Enlightenment,” and thus Adam Smith was called the Newton of
political economy; Jean-Jacques Rousseau became the Newton of the moral
world; and David Hume, the Newton of the human sciences.37 The historian who
first mentioned Ajanta in 1821, William Erskine, himself a child of the Scottish
Enlightenment, sought “simple,” “obvious,” and “instantaneous” criteria for
determining whether a monument is Buddhist, Hindu, or Jain. Erskine did not
express an ambition to be the Newton of Indian archaeology, though he certainly
would have understood the title, and welcomed it. To earn this honor, a man had
to translate Newton’s scientific determinism into his own respective sphere of
human inquiry.
In the Enlightenment ideal, deterministic explanations à la Newton would be
brought to bear on all dimensions of human social and psychic life. Despite the
will toward a positive science of humanity, however, the most coherent expressions
of determinism continued to come from the natural sciences. In the Principia
Mathematica, Newton described his “wish” to derive all natural phenomena
“by reasoning from mechanical principles.” Yet, it was not Newton, but the
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Marquis de Laplace, who gave us a vision of determinism in its most perfect form:
We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of
its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for
one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by
which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beings who
compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to
analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the
greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it,
nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present
to its eyes.38
Later physicists christened this intelligent being, “Laplace’s demon.” Possessing
full knowledge of the universe at one moment, and knowing all the rules govern-
ing celestial mechanics, Laplace’s demon is able to calculate the past as well as
the future with absolute precision. Probabilities and indeterminacies have no
place in this demon’s universe, for his supernal intelligence resolves multiple
visions into a single omniscient gaze. In order to update this deterministic vision
for a modern audience, Karl Popper likens the Laplacian cosmos to a motion-
picture reel. Like a film, “the future co-exists with the past; and the future is
fixed, in exactly the same sense as the past.”39
We are heirs to this Enlightenment determinism. This legacy is shown by our
“faith” in the value of linguistic knowledge, inherited from colonial Orientalists.
But even more crucially it is seen in our status as beneficiaries of determinism’s
metaphysical assumptions. This metaphysics conditions how we receive Ajanta’s
mural. We see Mara reduplicated into every corner and thus measure a linear tem-
porality. Mara defines the limns of this visual world through his distributed pres-
ence: we follow Mara to follow the story’s progress. Once we know the narrative,
it seems self-evident that the mural should be read as a narrative. The MSV gives
us simple and obvious criteria that a literate observer, even if transient, can apply
instantaneously. In this way, we make ourselves over into Laplace’s demon, at the
pinnacle of a hierarchy of rationalities. We scan back and forth, from the inchoate
mural, to the Sanskrit book, now again to the mural. We expect that if our intellects
were vast enough, and possessed the full surfeit of data, then nothing here would
be uncertain. We gauge the difference between the variety of data about the bud-
dha’s life and the MSV’s representation of that life. We gauge the difference
between the MSV and other literary accounts. We gauge the difference between the
MSV and Ajanta’s sculptural relief. We comprehend all of this with an Enlightened
mind that presupposes (as did John Zephaniah Holwell) that all worship has a
rational source, even if it appears preposterous at first glance. We thereby take on
the mantle of conservators of religious normativity and judges of religious action.
We expect that by resolving indeterminacy we might comprehend Ajanta’s Fakyas
within a single omniscient gaze, just as we comprehend this mural.
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In this practice, we are the faithful heirs of Roger Bacon, Isaac Newton, and
other founders of Western science, whose ambitions Roger Hausheer describes in
the clearest terms:
They sought all-embracing schemas, universal unifying frameworks,
within which everything that exists could be shown to be systematically—
i.e., logically or causally—interconnected, vast structures in which there
should be no gaps left open for spontaneous, unattended developments,
where everything that occurs should be, at least in principle, wholly
explicable in terms of immutable general laws.40
If this describes Laplace too, it also speaks to the humanists who investigated
people and social formations in anticipation of equally robust results, scholars of
Buddhism included.
There is still another connection to be made between the scientists of physical
nature and of human nature. As the story goes, Napoleon Bonaparte once asked
Laplace why he did not mention god in his work on celestial mechanics. At the
time, the Marquis’ answer, “Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis,” might have
seemed the height of wit. Now, it bespeaks the Marquis’ naivete. For it has
become an historical idée reçu that the epistemological context within which
modern science arose was highly inflected by the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies’ diverse theologies. Belief in the existence of all-embracing schemas and
universal frameworks, complemented by faith in the human mind’s ability to com-
prehend that totality, has a “religious origin,” connected by Karl Popper “with
ideas of divine omnipotence . . . and of divine omniscience.”41 I prefer the word
“theological” in lieu of Popper’s “religious” here. Still, why would not the same
be true for the human sciences, which so modeled themselves on the physical? If
the anthropology of e/Enlightenment is a scriptural anthropology, it is because the
Enlightenment’s anthropological universalism has a theological genus.
Popper names Martin Luther and Jean Calvin in particular as the godfathers of
scientific determinism. Indeed, to meet the eternal forebearer of Laplace’s demon
one can open Luther’s The Bondage of the Will (hailed by its translators as “the
greatest piece of theological writing that ever came from Luther’s pen”) virtually
at random.42 Neither Laplace’s demon, nor the Protestant god leaves anything
to chance:
Natural reason herself is forced to confess that the living and true God
must be One who by His own liberty imposes necessity on us. He would
be a ludicrous Deity . . . if His foreknowledge of the future were unreli-
able and could be falsified by events . . . . He would be equally ludicrous
if He could not and did not do all things, or if anything were done with-
out Him. . . . Seeing that He foreknew that we should be what we are, and
now makes us such, and moves and governs us as such, how, pray, can it be
pretended that it is open to us to become something other than that which
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He foreknew and is now bringing about? . . . Either God makes mistakes
in His foreknowledge, and errors in his action (which is impossible), or
else we act, and are caused to act, according to His foreknowledge and
action. . . . This omnipotence and foreknowledge of God, I repeat, utterly
destroy the doctrine of “free will.”43
For Luther, divine attention, knowledge, will, and action are coequal. Indeed,
because the universe expresses god’s will in everything, even damnation is
just: “The highest degree of faith is to believe that He is merciful, though He
saves so few and damns so many; to believe that He is just, though of His own
will He makes us perforce proper subjects for damnation.”44 Just as later scientists
expected to discover nature’s laws through reasoned induction based upon empir-
ical observation, so Luther deduced that “on reason’s own testimony, there can be
no ‘free will’ in man, or angel, or in any creature.”45
Determining Buddhism
Luther’s god was an ancestor of Laplace’s demon, yet one cannot overestimate
the importance of the shift from religious determinism to scientific determinism.
Laplace described his demon as omniscient but not omnipotent, since for him
nature is moved by laws that express no will beyond their own lawfulness. (The dis-
enchantment of nature will make possible a theory of fetishism as fallacious
re-enchantment.) This caveat noted, however, one also cannot ignore Peter Gay’s
amusing reminder: “All the men of the Enlightenment were cuckoos in the
Christian nest.”46 Laplace did not honor his theory’s relation to god. We should not
be equally unfilial. If the previous section introduced the Protestant genus of sci-
entific determinism, this one turns to that god’s role in determining the identities
of sculpted figures at Ajanta. Is there some way in which, by reading the Cave
Twenty Six mural through the MSV, we are apprehending it with “Protestant” eyes?
Granted, it seems mere common sense for historians to use the MSV as the
interpretive key for Cave Twenty Six’s mural. The appeal to a textual precedent is
normal behavior, sequenced right into a historian’s DNA. But I am not the first to
interrogate this practice. Gregory Schopen does just that in a celebrated article
from 1991, “Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions in the Study of Indian
Buddhism.” Schopen is an ingenious scholar of Buddhism; his fresh ideas express
a historiographical vision sensitive to the limitations and problems of the avail-
able sources. This 1991 article is a case in point. In it, Schopen calls attention to
an odd theological gene twisted into the helix of Buddhist Studies’ genome.
Determinism in the academic study of Buddhism is a bastard child of religious
determinism, for according to Schopen a specifically Protestant attitude toward
scripture has served as the primary determinant of Buddhist Studies’ evidentiary
focus and intellectual agenda.
“Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions” begins with an expression of
surprise at Buddhist Studies’ “decidedly peculiar” history. In the eighteenth and
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nineteenth centuries two bodies of data became available to European scholars,
the archaeological and the literary. Why, Schopen wonders, was “overriding
primacy [given] to textual sources”?47 Why did historians choose to reconstruct
Indian Buddhism through texts that “may not even have been known to the vast
majority of practicing Buddhists,” rather than relying on material artifacts “that
record and reflect at least a part of what Buddhists . . . actually believed and
practiced”?48 Schopen’s answer, briefly stated, is that those early scholars were
guided less by Enlightenment epistemology than by Protestant soteriology:
“The methodological position frequently taken by modern Buddhist scholars,
archaeologists, and historians of religion looks . . . uncannily like the position
taken by a variety of early Protestant reformers,” such as Luther, for whom “true
religion” was located solely in the scriptural Word.49 In Schopen’s view, Buddhist
studies’ genetic Protestantism predisposes it to ascribe primary authority to
literary sources. “Textuality overrides actuality. And actuality—as expressed by
epigraphical and archaeological material—is denied independent validity as a
witness.”50
If you doubt Schopen’s insight, just recall John Zephaniah Holwell’s 1767
directive to fellow colonists: Do not attend to India’s exterior manners and reli-
gion but to the etymologies of its words and the mysteries of its literate theology.
Or read Erskine in 1823, for whom archaeological remains are not sources of
“authentic history” because “the external symbols of these religions depend, as
might be expected, on the doctrines and mythology which they teach” in their lit-
erature.51 Instead, sacred books and “chief religious works” are the essential
media through which to determine “the peculiar tenets and practices of the
Bouddhists that are likely to affect their religious edifices.”52 Erskine allows
scholars to use archaeology to indicate the otherwise lost presence of Buddhists
on the Indian religious landscape, but only books will tell us what those
Buddhists were really about.
Which sources are contingent, and which necessary, for the proper study of
Buddhist history? By shifting the contingency/necessity line between texts and
artifacts, Schopen makes it impossible to accept unconditionally the earlier inter-
pretation of Cave Twenty Six’s wall. Granted, the artifact does correspond to the
text. But is this correspondence a sufficient basis for closing off further inquiry
into the mural’s primary significance? Or is the identification of the mural as
Fakyamuni’s triumph over Mara itself contingent upon our treating Ajanta’s
Fakyas as if they were like Protestants, for whom texts determine total meaning?
We acknowledge that Cave Twenty Six’s sculptors were innovative in their use of
literary precedent. Should we not be still more willing to imagine that the cave’s
diverse visitors saw this wall with diverse eyes—and that such diversity also
matters? The heart of Schopen’s critique is his concern that the singular privileg-
ing of literary sources “effectively excludes what practicing Buddhists did and
believed from the history of their own religion.”53 When texts alone determine
what we see, “our picture of Indian Buddhism may reflect more of our own
religious history and values than the history and values of Indian Buddhism.”54
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Schopen’s cautions are serious. However, the trajectory of this chapter—skittering
from Fergusson to Erksine to Holwell to Kant to Laplace to Luther—forces the
question: Are Schopen’s cautions serious enough? Most scholarship, in his view,
“does not even consider the possibility that the texts we are to study to arrive at a
knowledge of ‘Buddhism’ may not even have been known to the vast majority of
practicing Buddhists.”55 But why does Schopen ironize only Buddhism here?
If Ajanta’s Fakyas would not recognize the scholars’ Buddhism, why assume they
would recognize themselves as the scholars’ Buddhists? Must there have been
Buddhists or Buddhism in ancient India, institutional identities that are
structurally parallel with Protestant and Christianity? If we eschew the primacy
of texts for the writing of history, should we not also be willing to relinquish a
model of social order abstracted from those texts, when that model also expresses
“Protestant presuppositions”? And how about our conception of human beings
and human nature? John Zephaniah Holwell proffered linguistics as grounding a
hermeneutical recovery of India’s original rationality, with language as the avenue
to theology. What are the stakes in his correlation of the rational with the religious?
These questions lead in two directions. The first is somewhat fanciful. Schopen
does not renounce the use of all literary sources. Texts “that could be shown to
have been actually known or read at a given place at a given time, or to have
shaped the kind of religious behavior that had left traces on the ground” are suit-
ably archaeological.56 The MSV meets these criteria when applied to Ajanta. But
does that mean the MSV necessarily must be used? What might we apprehend in
Cave Twenty Six if we interpret its sculpture without direct reference to a Fakya
literary precedent? The next section will take this question seriously: a thought
experiment to open our eyes, if you will, to the limits of Schopen’s reworked
necessity/contingency line. For beyond privileging literary texts over artifacts, the
field’s anthropology has Protestant presuppositions as well.
When the Enlightenment disentangled omniscience from omnipotence, it
became increasingly easy to see that the praxes of knowledge themselves are sites
of power; our knowledge, our naming, creates the objects that we study. Thus after
the thought experiment is concluded, we will return to a discussion of theological
traces in Buddhist Studies’ practice. This second iteration will not ask how
Protestant presuppositions determine the sources we use to reconstruct the past,
but rather how they determine our conception of the people who created, used,
and still use our “sources.” It seems inconceivable to study the religion of past
humans without due consideration of the history within which humanity and
religiosity were constituted as objects of scientific knowledge (even if only in the
human sciences). Enough preaching, now for some fun.
Other readings. Other rationalities? 
A counterfactual interlude
Historical and disciplinary assumptions predispose scholars of Buddhism to
expect that the most accurate and valid way to interpret an archaeological artifact
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is to determine its relation to a scriptural text. Nevertheless, eyes released from
that assumption might still read meaningful patterns on Cave Twenty Six’s wall,
inconsistent with those derived from the MSV. Occam’s razor is a sharp tool with
a slippery handle. Granted, the principle that plurality should not be assumed
unnecessarily provides a cornerstone of the modern academy. But necessity is a
social judgment, not a matter of a priori logic. The proposition that Luther is an
Enlightenment forefather makes it “necessary” to imagine alternate readings of
the Ajanta relief. Will these other readings be better than the one we already have,
based upon the MSV? Already the game has begun: better in what context? better
for whom? For now, let us simply pursue these alternate theories for alterity’s
sake. Let us be extravagant.
The first alternate approach to this mural will ignore the plot, forget the
temporal dimension, and shift attention away from the relief ’s outer quadrants
toward its central axis. Without that outlying visual noise, the remaining elements
line up neatly. On center, reading from top to bottom, we see flying dwarves beat-
ing a drum, the canopy of a Ficus religiosus hanging over a throne on which there
sits a man who gestures toward a woman dancing, accompanied by musicians.
How can we make something of this tableau? Well, if the earlier appeal to the
MSV was informed by a theory of time, then let us now try one of space: Mircea
Eliade’s exposition of sacred space.
Sacred space is useful here because Eliade presents its universe as the polar
opposite of the cosmology envisioned by the Marquis de Laplace. “For religious
man,” Eliade begins, “space is not homogeneous; he experiences interruptions,
breaks in it; some parts of space are qualitatively different from others.”57 The
antithesis of such religiously inflected space is Laplace’s “geometrical” profane
space, whose extent is “homogeneous and neutral; no break qualitatively
differentiates the various parts of its mass.”58 The former is subjective, the latter
objective. The profane sphere gives “no orientation . . . by virtue of its inherent
structure.”59 The sacred, by contrast, “allows the world to be constituted, because
it reveals the fixed point, the central axis for all future orientation.”60 For Eliade,
Homo religiosus is defined, in the first place, by his fixation upon this center.
“It seems an inescapable conclusion that the true world is always in the middle,
at the Center.”61 And this center is a privileged place, not only because it orients
existence, but also because it marks “a break in plane and hence communication
among the three cosmic zones,” heaven, earth, and underworld.62 Homo religiosus
knows where he is, where he wants to go, and how to get there.
To read the relief as a narrative through the MSV is to arrive at the ironic
conclusion that Mara is the story’s hero (albeit a tragic hero) whose actions unify
the plot.63 It is perhaps fitting, therefore, that this reading relies upon a model of
space as profane, for it requires that every place on the wall possesses equal value
vis-à-vis the overall significance. Certainly an emotional chiaroscuro grades the
space in shadow and light. But the shades balance fully. Mara and bodhisattva
need each other for this story to work: Mara has no place apart from his interest
in moving Fakyamuni from the tree; Fakyamuni has no narrative identity except
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through his reciprocal relation (we know which moment this is in the bodhisattva’s
life through the presence of Mara).
Sacred space, too, can be located in the relief. Sacred space is oriented space.
Its full dimensionality is not the product of skillful manipulations of light and
dark on a two-dimensional plane, but rather of the inability to be kept in plane,
snapping the lines that separate heaven, earth, and underworld. The supermun-
dane reach of this axis is well-represented in the sculpture at Ajanta, where
heaven is the drum-beating dwarves; earth is the tree, throne, and man; and the
realm of death is the dancer. By means of that tree, this regal man will be able to
renounce the girl in order to ascend into the sky. He will attain divine status when
he forsakes death’s cacophonous troupe for the syncopations of eternal life. Thus
told, the mural is paradigmatic, not narrative. One can eschew text-derived iden-
tities, names like Fakyamuni or Mara, and still retain meaning. The activity in
each of the four quadrants is equally peripheral to the ultimate significance, for it
is all equally not central to the spatial composition.
For Eliade, sacred and profane are not strategic categories, derived from
observation, used to organize a body of data. To the contrary, he treats these as
elemental categories that structure consciousness a priori. This is why the
Eliadean interpretation can, on its own terms, find a rationality sculpted on
Ajanta’s wall without direct reference to textual sources, whether bauddha or
otherwise. The meaning, essentially, is in the archetype which is able to teach the
viewer by its visible structure alone, no words needed. The following commentary
is quite in sympathy with Eliade’s view: “There is nothing intellectual about the
Ajajta frescoes. Everything of importance is perceived by direct apprehension.”64
There is a moment of puzzlement here. If Eliade’s archetype locates the center
as an axis linking heaven, earth, and underworld, on what grounds does the dancer
represent death’s nether region? Flying dwarves may be self-evidently celestial;
trees, thrones, and human beings, terrestrial. But in whose phenomenology do
dancing girls manifestly belong to the underworld? To answer this, one might
point to a pandemic misogyny that has included the bauddha among its historical
vectors. However, the delineation of sacred space should require no such stigma-
tization of a textual tradition. Might we make this equation, instead, oriented by
the model of sacred space itself, based upon the appearance of three registers
stacked on a central axis? Is there an elemental algebra to this space, in which an
axis mundi  heaven  earth requires the deduction of an underworld for its
solution? In short, without reference to a bauddha narrative, ought we neverthe-
less associate the dancer with death because human beings are “hardwired” to
see, and sculpt, the sacred oriented along the center in just this way?
A historian of Zen and Buddhist visual practice, Bernard Faure, denies this
possibility. Faure’s criticism is directed, not at Eliade, but against a tradition of art
criticism that considers the visual act to be precognitive:
“Seeing comes before words,” John Berger argues. Yet our gaze is always
already informed by words, discourse . . . . As the conscious gaze . . . is
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always already mediated by discourse, apparently no primacy of perception
exists. Although words can never replace seeing, seeing is already
informed through knowledge, discourse, and words.65
Following Faure, let us contemplate Ajanta’s dancer once more. Overt visual
information from an unstudied glance provides no cue that she is a fatal attrac-
tion. Her hips are heavy with promise, her breasts ample. What in this mural
warns one away from her enticements? Indeed, an eye lightly educated in tradi-
tional Indian dance would become still more desirous. Her right hand holds a
position known as kapittha, used to narrate acts such as offering flowers, applying
kohl, or milking cows, as well as iconographically used to indicate the goddesses
of prosperity and learning, Laksmi and Sarasvati. In short, if one assesses this
sculpture’s central axis without presupposing the Eliadean scheme, but also with-
out resorting to bauddha narratives, one will see an auspicious performer before
a royal seer; maybe even Laksmi dancing for beloved Visju, her time marked in
the skies as well as on the ground. The army in the upper corners? It belongs to a
failed suitor. We skip from the MSV’s tragedy to Eliade’s allegory to a possible
romance or comedy.
To find death in this dancer we must still look outside the picture-plane to
“knowledge, discourse, words.” Interestingly, Eliade’s schematization of sacred
space coordinates with the MSV. The name Mara itself translates as death; our
discursively conditioned gaze watches death’s daughter. Eliade’s spatial archetype
and bauddha texts lead to parallel readings of the relief: the mundane sphere is
transcended by renouncing deadly passions embodied in the female form. Still
despite this coincidence, the Eliadean reading cannot fully support its own self-
authorizing claims without appealing to an intertextual network of possibilities.
Granted, an Eliadean might approach the relief with texts other than those used
by the Buddhologist—perhaps texts that are less overtly tied to the intentionali-
ties of this place—but the necessity for a discursive guide remains. If death is
definite here it is only because, as Faure reminds us, we know bauddha names.
The Eliadean reading may be no more ideological than that based upon the MSV,
but ideology becomes ever more evident as it becomes less hegemonic.
It seems that this little exercise in producing an alternate reading for alterity’s
sake confirms the early Orientalists’ prediction: fluency in ancient languages is
key to recognizing India’s native rationalities. This encounter with Eliade was not
a complete loss, however. If nothing else Eliade reminds us, first, eyes compre-
hend multiple grammars; and second, pay attention to the center as the axis of
presence. In fact, these two lessons might suggest that we have been reading this
image all wrong. Eliade’s crypto-theological vocabulary cannot stand on its own.
But does the MSV provide the right vocabulary? Does it speak the language of
this mural? For although Ajanta’s artists did not slavishly adhere to texts, if we
lock our gaze in an even tighter focus—it has moved from a total view, involving
tension between center and periphery, to the central axis, now look to the
sculpture’s central point—we see an iconographic innovation that borders on
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a transgression. There is one more language to bring to bear on this sculpture: a
formal language of gesture.
Drawing from the model of dance drama, Indian iconography developed a
vocabulary of symbolic hand gestures (mudra). Several of these mudras—for
instance those indicating generosity, meditation, and fearlessness—were part of a
pan-Indian gestural vernacular. One mudra, however, was exclusively bauddha; it
was used only to mark the moment at which Fakyamuni bodhisattva called upon
the earth goddess during his battle with Mara. In bauddha art this gesture, the
bhumisparfa mudra (literally, gesture of touching the earth), often is found alone,
the sole iconographic marker for the grand array of events spelled out on Ajanta’s
wall. When describing the relief (see page 116), I reported that the bodhisattva’s
right hand is in the bhumisparfa mudra, in keeping with that convention. In fact,
I lied. The bhumisparfa is formed by the fingers pointing straight downward and
the palm facing toward the bodhisattva’s knee. At Ajanta, the hand is lightly
cupped, its palm facing outward toward the viewer. This is the varada mudra, the
gesture of giving a vara (literally, a “chosen,” and hence something desired,
a boon) (See Figure 4.4).
When one reads along the center axis it does seem that the bodhisattva, on the
cusp of enlightenment, is making a gift that somehow directly involves the lithe
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Figure 4.4 Two standing buddhas, their right hands in varada mudra, from the facade of
Cave Nineteen. Photo by author.
girl toward whom his hand appears directed. The certainties here are few, the
possibilities multiple. The use of the varada mudra suggests that this bodhisattva,
whose image cut into Ajanta’s mountain will last as long as the sun and the moon,
perpetually fulfills desires. Whose desires? Desires for what? Is the bodhisattva
rewarding the girl for her dance? Is she now guaranteed buddhahood in some
future life because she has offered her body thus? Is the bodhisattva rewarding
those people who paid for the creation of this relief? There are the small kneeling
figures at the image’s lower corners, outside the main picture-plane. Will those
patrons become buddhas? Will they be reborn in heaven, there to enjoy the
ecstasies of celestial nymphs? Is she a gift? Or again, is the gift being given to
viewers, you and I? The bodhisattva’s right hand is six feet from the floor; his
finger tips graze our heads as we walk past. Will we become buddhas? Will we
enjoy heaven? The girl is just our same size, and looking right at us. Is she ours to
enjoy? Are we implied by the scene as well? These many questions share no one
answer. But we do know that after the battle with Mara the bodhisattva became an
enlightened buddha infinitely capable of satisfying every being’s every desire.66
A brief note on hegemony
The moment of extravagance has passed. Where before there was one interpretation
of the Cave Twenty Six image, now there are three. Each corresponds to a distinct
way of gazing at the figure, and thus to a distinct construction of space. For the
first interpretation—the mural as Maravijaya—every point on the wall is more or
less essential to the construction of meaning since every point is equally neces-
sary for a complete reconstruction of the sculptor’s intentions. Those intentions,
in turn, are identified by reference to a literary source, the MSV. Here, linguistic
knowledge, granting primary access to bauddha doctrine and myth, is the sine qua
non of significance. The mural’s second interpretation—the Eliadean—does not
require specialized linguistic knowledge. In the Eliadean gaze, the configuration
and location of an artifact in space mark its meaningfulness. Look to the central
axis! Homo religiosus recognizes this significance naturally, without training;
secular scholars require the technique of phenomenological comparison to re-
discover these universal structures of meaning. Finally, our third view of the
Ajanta relief is gained through eyes focused on a single point: the main figure’s
gesture of generosity. This gaze has such a tight focus, however, and the boon
offered is so particular in nature, that we cannot see what the vara is, to whom it
is being given, or why exactly it is being sought.
This much is obvious: only the interpretation substantiated by a Sanskrit text
holds consensus amongst professional scholars of Buddhism. The other two are
speculative; they over-interpret the evidence; they make for fancy rhetoric, but lit-
tle knowledge; they are tendentious, and show their agendas a little too openly.
Fakya texts offer the most accurate basis for interpreting Cave Twenty Six’s mural
and for Ajanta in general. But it is this appearance of indisputability, this going
without saying, that interests me; just as the second chapter was interested in
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UNESCO’s naming Ajanta a World Heritage monument possessed of exceptional
universal value; just as Chapter 3 was interested in the differentiation of inscrip-
tions from graffiti as sources for history. I do not know if anyone has ever been
moved by the spirit to see the dancer in Cave Twenty Six’s relief as Laksmi rather
than as Mara’s daughter. Nor can I calculate how many are offended by the pro-
posal that Fakyamuni is offering a dancing girl for orgasmic pleasure to his
devotees, instead of calling the earth goddess to witness his aeons of self-sacrifice.
This is not a numbers game. I do know, however, that the considered acknowledg-
ment of the potential for such alternate views transforms a seemingly value-free
observation into the articulation of a historically situated institutional discourse.
Still, the point of this exercise is not to champion an eisegetical anything goes!
in the interpretation of Ajanta’s artifacts. As Ernesto Laclau observes, “to say that
everything is contingent . . . would only make sense for an inhabitant of Mars.”67
Allow me to continue Laclau’s thought:
It is true that in the final instance no objectivity can be referred back to
an absolute ground; but no important conclusion can be drawn from this,
since the social agents never act in that final instance. They are therefore
never in the position of the absolute chooser who, faced with the con-
tingency of all possible courses of action, would have no reason to
choose. On the contrary, what we always find is a limited given situation
in which objectivity is partially constituted and also partially threatened;
and in which the boundaries between the contingent and the necessary
are constantly displaced.
There are no groundless interpretations of Cave Twenty Six’s wall. But now this
can be translated into the understanding that there are no apolitical interpretations
of Cave Twenty Six either. If hegemony is marked by the “spontaneous” experi-
ence of the contingent as if necessary, or of the political as if apolitical, then the
purpose of the previous section’s extravagant fancies was to shift our eyes back to
those quotation marks around spontaneous. The “spontaneous” acceptance of an
interpretation as apolitical indexes hegemony achieved; strident assertions of
apoliticality index a will to hegemony still unrealized.
Schopen redux: true religion
This long aside began in response to the critique of Buddhist Studies articulated
in Gregory Schopen’s “Archaeology and Protestant Presuppositions.” The
problem is twofold. First, in Schopen’s words, scholars of Indian Buddhism
“uncannily,” “remarkably,” and “strikingly” resemble sixteenth-century Protestant
reformers, for they locate “true religion” in written documents, in the word.68
Second, insofar as scholars look for Buddhism in texts rather than artifacts, in the
study of ideologies rather than that of embodied practices, their reconstructions
of religion must reflect Western religious history and values as much as (if not
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more than) those of Indian Buddhists themselves. The field’s contingent textualism
subverts its necessary positivism: this is Schopen’s critique. Schopen writes
against the Protestant presupposition that texts trump things, but for him it still
goes without saying that there exists an historical entity, Indian Buddhism, that
historians should represent on its own terms with the greatest possible precision.
Moving forward, it is noteworthy how Schopen expresses his positive agenda.
The final few pages of the article speak repeatedly about the location of reli-
gion. And indeed, the concluding sentences suggest that Schopen might himself
be on a crusade to relocate “religion” to his side:
It is possible, finally, that the old and ongoing debate between archaeology
and textual studies is not—as is frequently assumed—a debate about
sources. It may rather be a debate about where religion as an object
of investigation is to be located. It is possible, perhaps, that the
Reformation is not over after all.69
But I am not interested in the Christian tussle so much as in the fact that Schopen
does not interrogate the positive object of his analysis, by asking whether there is
a religion, or religion-in-general, to be (re)located. For him, the question always
is of place: “where religion is actually located.”70 Thus although Schopen recog-
nizes and acknowledges that his archaeological imperative remains entangled in
a theological skein, he does not move to cut the knot. Like the scholars whom he
critiques, Schopen would follow the thread of evidence to religion’s true or actual
location. And that is why, although I find his scholarly voice refreshingly punchy,
I also find him to be still too “Protestant.” Let me explain.
Schopen cites Karlstadt, Zwingli, and Calvin as authorities, but Martin
Luther’s doctrine of sola scriptura fits this same pattern. Luther, like his
sixteenth-century brethren, positively embraces scripture while repudiating other
sources of knowledge. Recall from an earlier discussion, Luther propounds an
ideal of perfect determinism. Given that god’s attention, knowledge, will, and
action are simultaneous, Luther demands “reason’s own testimony” deduce that
neither men nor angels have free will. However, although god determines every-
thing, human beings have only limited comprehension of this all-pervading will.
The Word alone tells us what god wants us to know, and therefore what we
ourselves should desire to know. The attempt to discern god’s nature and majesty
and plan through any source other than scriptural Word is sinful and wrong.
Thus Luther even repudiates reason when it treats nature as a book to be read
theologically. Reason engaged in natural theology or in the theology of nature
is “the devil’s bride . . . the lovely whore . . . the foremost whore the devil has.”71
One cannot pull aside the curtain of transcendence by force of logic, but in the
scriptural Word one might catch a glimpse of that beyond.
Although Schopen is a singularly innovative and exciting scholar of Buddhism,
he is also frustratingly conservative. For when Schopen encourages Buddhist
Studies to think beyond its Protestant presuppositions, he addresses only half of
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Luther’s legacy. The doctrine of sola scriptura is not easily disentangled from
Luther’s theological distinction between “God Himself ” and “the Word of God,”
that is, total reality versus what human beings are given to know of reality.72 (This
is just a preliminary foray into Luther’s theology and view of scripture. Both
receive fuller treatment in page 142.) Schopen critiques the Protestant’s exclusive
attention to the scriptural Word, saying that there is more to know than the stuff
of books, but he never questions the determinist ideal that underlies it. That is,
Schopen advises scholars to give up the History of Religions, “which was and is
essentially text bound.”73 He urges them to pursue an Archaeology of Religions,
“primarily occupied with three kinds of things then: religious constructions and
architectures, inscriptions, and art historical remains,” for these things directly
reveal “what religious people actually did.”74 But this archaeological practice,
like the textual practice of “Protestant” Buddhist Studies, keeps faith with the
recoverability of the genuine, the original, the pure, and the actual.
This faith makes Luther’s shade laugh! Luther too insists that scripture is
adequate to reality, since the Bible “can have no more than one simplest sense,
which we call the scriptural or literal meaning.”75 In this case, adequacy is guar-
anteed by the fact that the Holy Spirit is both scripture’s author and its best inter-
preter. The apparatus of scientific philology—expertise in original languages, in
grammar, in the historical conditions of authorship, and so on—contributes to
eliciting scripture’s literal significance. But in the end, for Luther, scriptural real-
ity must be accepted on its own terms, “no matter how absurd those things which
God says in his Word may appear to reason.”76 Likewise, archaeological artifacts
are adequate reflections of historical reality only if they are scriptural after this
fashion. Schopen expects the sources for an Archaeology of Religions will legis-
late their own closed and, in the ideal, perfectly determinate network for inter-
pretation that one must accept—even if it violates every preconception about
Indian Buddhism that has been derived from books. In sum, Schopen argues over
which objects deserve to be treated as scriptural, but does not ask whether the
very fact that he raises this argument might itself mark scripturality as an abstract
property open to further interrogation.
Where we’ve been and where we’re going
This chapter began with puzzlement at James Fergusson’s observations about
Ajanta’s religious provenance. On the one hand, he consistently calls the site
Buddhist. On the other hand, he identifies two minor images which contradict this
point; and he suggests that Buddhists themselves did not have an exclusivist
religious identity—one could be Buddhist almost as a matter of daily fashion.
Buddhism, for Fergusson, seems to possess a pure core which is not affected by
the practices or beliefs of living people, but which does provide a basis for cate-
gorizing expressions of personal religiosity. William Erskine is less complex. But
he too writes as if Buddhism is a substantive, self-evidently meaningful category,
of primary value for the reconstruction of Indian history.
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Neither Fergusson nor Erskine names Buddhism’s essence, but several
introductory textbooks do. If Buddhism is the sort of thing that can be simply,
obviously, and instantaneously identified, then enlightenment is the reason why.
Fakyamuni’s enlightenment is Buddhism’s historical condition of possibility.
I supposed, accordingly, that if Ajanta is Buddhist, enlightenment will be writ
large upon its walls. I gave myself an easy task. The walls are painted with sexy
queens and dwarfs and elephant processions, all of which might have been more
difficult to link to enlightenment than the chosen relief. My search for enlighten-
ment involved a determinist chain of inferences, leading from inchoate stone, to
assumptions about a universal human rationality, to the MSV, and then back to a
recognition of the enlightenment-event itself right there in Cave Twenty Six. This
hermeneutic strategy, I proposed, would be obvious and immediately acceptable
to most practitioners of Buddhist Studies. Gregory Schopen might be an excep-
tion, insofar as he problematizes the field’s valorization of literary sources: this
bias expresses Protestant presuppositions, and it results in inaccurate representa-
tions of Indian Buddhist values and religiosity. Inspired by Schopen, I imagined
alternative interpretations of Cave Twenty Six that putatively did not rely on
Sanskrit texts, or enlightenment, or even the buddha. Rather, these readings
treated the wall as “scripture” in its own right: as an object that reveals actual reli-
giosity, conveying the key to its true and proper interpretation. My point in that
exercise was not to propose better or more viable interpretations of the mural than
that provided by the MSV, but to suggest that Protestantism is more than a source
for Buddhist Studies’ presuppositions about the wellspring of true religion. It is
the field’s élan vital. Schopen himself is working within a “Protestant” predication
of the human being as a historical actor when he imagines that there is true
religion, or true religiosity, to be recovered through the scholarly analysis of
archaeological artifacts. Artifacts can be scriptural only as a displacement of the
human beings who created those material remains. Only a scriptural being can
author scripture, as when the Word revealed the Word.
If that is where we have been, then the Enlightenment anthropology that
conjoins scripture with reason is where we are going. As overdetermined nodal
points, religiosity and human nature have been sites of fierce ideological conflict
for the past half-millennium. The history within which European intellectuals
came to believe in an unchanging, uniform human nature, explicable in terms of
general laws, is a political history. Just as the concept “law of nature” mediates
the encounter between human rationality and the physical world, so religiosity has
come to serve the same purpose for the psycho-social world.
Let me clarify this point with a ready example. David Hume’s essay, “Of
Miracles,” famously begins with the definition of a miracle as a violation of natural
law, and just as famously concludes with the maxim that “no human testimony can
have such force as to prove a miracle.”77 Were Almighty God Himself to perform a
miracle, no reasonable man could accept it as such. For the laws of nature discovered
through regular empirical observation are sufficient to explain all terrestrial events;
any personal experience or second-hand testimony that might seem to substantiate
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a violation of nature’s laws can itself be explained-away in naturalistic terms. Hume’s
argument can be translated into our terms thus: Natural phenomena are not, and can
never be, overdetermined. In the reworking of Protestant theology by Enlightenment
rationalism, religiosity came to play a parallel role for the human world broadly
construed. There is a genealogy of religion such that the assumption of a natural,
universal—even rational—religiosity has become the means of regulating—even
denying—the overdetermined, multiple possibilities for being human.
Rational human beings are religious beings has become a determinant law of
human nature, and thus the predicate of a unitary humanity. Just read the follow-
ing words of Peter Berger, a leading sociologist. Berger’s essay seeks to explain
why secularization theory—the theory that economic and political modernization
would bring about a decline in religion—failed, and why religion so dominates
contemporary world affairs:
Cardinal Ratzinger and the Dalai Lama will be troubled by different
aspects of contemporary secular culture. What both will agree upon,
however, is the shallowness of a culture that tries to get along without
any transcendent points of reference. And they will have good reasons to
support this view. The religious impulse, the quest for meaning that tran-
scends the restricted space of empirical existence in this world, has been
a perennial feature of humanity. (This is not a theological statement but
an anthropological one—an agnostic or even an atheist philosopher may
well agree with it.) It would require something close to a mutation of the
species to extinguish this impulse for good.78
Even granted that Berger’s book is published by Eerdmans, a Christian press, his
rhetoric is striking.79 For Berger, religion is concerned with transcendence. And
religion thus gives life meaning. And humanity, as a biological species, has
always been religious. And this impulse to transcend the human world is self-
evidently good. And not even atheists should deny the foregoing description
because it rationally belongs to the secular discourse of anthropology. And
secularists who deny these points are small-minded and anti-human, bothersome
to both an arch-reactionary, Cardinal Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), and
arch-modernizer, the Dalai Lama.
We can see here how Berger overdetermines secularization theory’s failure: so
numerous are the reasons that “genuine” secularism is impossible. At one level,
Berger acknowledges a distinction between the theological and anthropological as
discursive spheres. A science of humanity need not incorporate one of divinity.
But how is a statement that equates the will toward god with the will for good not,
at least, crypto-theological? Eliding the two, Berger (re)produces a science of
humanity that I call a scriptural anthropology. Berger’s discursive sleight-of-hand
is not unique. It also informs Schopen’s faith that archaeological artifacts can be
revelatory of actual Buddhist religiosity. Likewise, we are guided by a scriptural
anthropology when we treat Cave Twenty Six’s mural as something whose identity
can be substantially fixed by reference to an ancient bauddha text.
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The scriptural human 1: the human component
In 1808, J.D. Paterson found “striking proof ” that Hinduism “was founded on
pure Deism.”80 Twenty years earlier, Sir William Jones allowed that Indians had
seen by the light of natural religion until they “deviated, as they did too early
deviate, from the rational adoration of the only true God.”81 And still one-half
generation before that, John Zephaniah Holwell claimed that
howsoever mankind, either of Europe, Asia, Africa or America, may
differ in the exterior modes of worship offered to the Deity, according to
their various genius; yet . . . there are some fundamental points of every
system, wherein they agree and profess unanimous faith; as may be
gathered, either from their express doctrines, or evidently implied, from
their modes, or ceremonials of worship, howsoever differing in manner
and form, from each other.82
Holwell then enumerated fourteen such fundamental points. Indeed, we might
follow the Orientalists’ discursive entanglement of human nature with rationality,
with belief in divinity, still further, back through another century, back to Edward
Herbert, Lord of Cherbury (1582–1648). Writing in 1757, John Leland called
Edward Herbert the first, most eminent, and best of Deist philosophers. For our
purposes now, he is the most useful. Herbert sought (in Leland’s words) “to over-
turn all revealed, or as he calls it, particular religion, and to establish that natural
and universal religion . . . as that which alone ought to be acknowledged and
embraced as true and divine.”83
Edward Herbert lived in a Europe agitated by the Thirty Years War, and an
England enduring a Civil War. He was a soldier and diplomat; a self-professed
Citizen of the World in a world sundered by sectarian animosities—schisms among
Protestants, as well as the mutual hatred of reformers and Catholics. As a social the-
orist, hoping to convince fractious sects to unite into “a true Catholic or universal
Church,” Herbert was a laughable failure.84 As a theorist of religion, Herbert’s
importance, noted by John Leland in the eighteenth century, remains noteworthy
today. When Peter Berger uses biology to justify religion as universal and good he
echoes Edward Herbert’s assertion that if we deny the somatic foundation of reli-
giosity we “strip ourselves of all humanity.”85 For Herbert, religion determines
humanity’s unity as a species. “Religion is the ultimate difference of man.”86
As an epistemologist, Herbert began his chief work, On Truth, with a series of
axioms, the first of which reads, simply, “Truth Exists.”87 For Herbert, truth is eter-
nal, omnipresent, self-revealing, differentiated, measured to human capacities, and
intellectual.88 For all this, however, truth is not a transcendental substance; it is not
the sort of thing that can be the special property of ecclesiastical authorities or
mystical visionaries. Truth, rather, is comprised of the clear certainties that “all
men of normal mind believe,” and thus is imminent in human relations.89 Indeed,
Ronald Bedford describes Herbert as “obsessed” with “the problems of sectarian
persecution, the claims of individual Churches to possession of an exclusive route
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to salvation, and the abuse of religious instinct by ‘authority.’ ”90 Herbert sought
the facts about humanity and its world that receive universal acceptance, without
resort to institutional authority. For as he repeated throughout the work, “whatever
is believed by universal consent must be true”; “universal consent . . . is in the last
resort the sole test of truth.”91 Epistemological universality offered Herbert the
most assured ground for imagining a Europe in which people recognize their
common humanity, unite politically, and live together in peace.
The ground of Herbert’s epistemological universality is a creature I call “the
scriptural human.” This phrase will remain suggestively obscure until the end of this
section. And while it might seem that its elucidation should begin with Herbert’s
theory of knowledge, it begins in fact with Calvinist theology. For Calvinism dom-
inated the England of Herbert’s day, and he dedicated On Truth “to every sane and
unprejudiced Reader,” in order that they might reject the faults of Calvinist exclu-
sivism in favor of religious universalism.92 In particular, Herbert assailed the
Calvinist understanding of Providence: how god expresses his will in-and-through
creation. Earlier I cited several passages from Luther’s The Bondage of the Will,
attesting to a vision of god as an absolute sovereign whose knowledge, will, and
action are coequal. Calvin concurs in this view of divine majesty, taking it to a log-
ical extreme. Whereas Luther’s god is an inscrutable judge who is righteous though
he makes us damnable, Calvin preached that even before creation god had already
determined whom he would save and whom he would damn.93 This principle, which
Calvin himself called god’s “dreadful decree,” was restated at the international
Synod of Dordrecht (1618–19), convened five years before On Truth’s publication:
That some receive the gift of faith from God, and others do not receive
it proceeds from God’s eternal decree . . . . Election is the unchangeable
purpose of God, whereby, before the foundation of the world, he has out
of mere grace, according to the sovereign good pleasure of his own will,
chosen, from the whole human race . . . a certain number of persons to
redemption in Christ . . . . This elect number, though by nature neither
better nor more deserving than others, but with them involved in one
common misery, God has decreed to give to Christ, to be saved by
him . . . . The good pleasure of God is the sole cause of this gracious
election; which does not consist herein, that out of all possible qualities
and actions of men God has chosen some as a condition of salvation; but
that he was pleased out of the common mass of sinners to adopt some
certain persons as a peculiar people to himself.94
Some men are foreordained for everlasting life, and some for neverending
torment; damnation, no less than salvation, being given gratuitiously, totally
irrespective of an individual’s merits.
This understanding of Providence provides an entry into Herbert’s theory of
knowledge, for he deemed its vision of humanity as wholly in thrall to the caprice
of a gloomy god to “blasphem[e] against Nature.”95 In lieu of Calvin’s
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Providence, entangled with “so many dispensations, secret decrees, and doctrines
of predestination,” Herbert presented Providence as threefold. The first,
“Supreme Providence,” that is, god’s ultimate wisdom, expresses itself in the human
world in two lower forms: as nature, which Herbert called “universal Providence,”
and as grace, which he called “particular Providence.”96 By attributing all positive
value to god’s will alone, Calvin sundered natural processes from divine grace.
By setting grace and nature on an equal plane, Herbert hoped to show that human
beings could contribute to their own salvation. And truth was the means for
accomplishing that end. The very existence of truth presupposed a god who cre-
ated human beings with minds capable of knowing truth, and who fashioned
nature such that knowledge of it could result in saving grace. “Our mind,” in
Herbert’s words, “is the best image and specimen of divinity.”97
Supreme Providence created human beings in god’s image by inscribing us
with what Herbert calls Natural Instinct. This Instinct is “not the mind or soul
itself.”98 Rather, it is a faculty by means of which objects are known, each accord-
ing to its own specific nature. Herbert, like Kant in Chapter 3, would assent
to Thomas Aquinas’ definition of knowledge as the “conformity of a thing with
the understanding.”99 For Herbert, every object possesses its own inner
mark; “every difference . . . indicates a principle of individuation which character-
izes it and serves to distinguish it from others.”100 For truth to be possible,
therefore, the mind must have some structure that recognizes these differences.
“Every object corresponds to a reciprocal faculty in us.”101 That faculty is Natural
Instinct.
This brings us, finally, to the core of Herbert’s epistemology: the Common
Notions, matters of universal assent without which “it would be impossible to
establish any standard of discrimination in revelation or even in religion.”102
Given that Herbert defined Natural Instinct as “whatever appears in the same way
in every man,” the Common Notions that derive from the exercise of Natural
Instinct must also be panhuman.103 Herbert’s translator explains:
“Common Notions are criteria of truth because there is universal agreement
upon them . . . . Common agreement on points of religion or morality among
people of all periods and countries is the sole test of truth. It provides math-
ematical certainty, and is the first and last word of philosophy and theology.
Unanimity of opinion is the surest mark of divine purpose.”104
Of the many Common Notions Herbert discussed, those concerning religion
form the doctrine for which he is now best remembered. Herbert adduced five
such Common Notions:
1 There is a supreme deity.
2 This deity ought to be worshiped.
3 Virtue combined with piety is the chief part of divine worship.
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4 Men should repent of their sins and turn from them.
5 Reward and punishment follow from the goodness and justice of god,
both in this life and after it.105
For our purposes, these specific doctrines are not important, but rather the logic
whereby these Notions become universal truths. All human beings must be
religious, for god created both nature and humanity in such a way that the exercise
of Natural Instinct would produce these five Common Notions. By Herbert’s
logic, if all beings are not religious in just this way, then religion itself cannot be
true. Thus he held atheism to be impossible. When Herbert heard of a remote
people lacking religious beliefs and practices, he summarily dismissed the report
with a claim that its author was “ignorant of the language of that country”; this
appeal to language nicely foreshadows J.Z. Holwell and the British Orientalists.106
Hariseja ruling over fifth-century India, no less than 1819’s officers of the
Madras Cavalry, belong to the same single human species by virtue of their iden-
tical innate religiosity: “I conceive that our mind is not only created in the image
of God or in the copy of that image, but it has, in the Common Notions, some
shares in the Divine Universal Providence.”107 Although the Common Notions
form a self-authenticating epistemological structure, any remainder of uncertainty
can be disregarded due to their ultimate derivation from god.
Herbert’s Common Notions fulfill a structural role within his epistemology that
is parallel to Holy Writ for Lutheran/Calvinist soteriology. Herbert’s anthropology
was articulated (in part) in opposition to the Calvinist predication of the human
being as debased by sin, wholly alienated from the divine, and saved or damned
through god’s gratuitous election without any justification through personal
merit. But as I suggested in the previous section, the representation of humanity
as naturally religious closes off the multiple possibilities for being human, just as
the Calvinist doctrine of gratuitous election negates the soteriological efficacy of
free will. Herbert determined that human beings cannot determine that there is no
god. Luther/Calvin determined that human beings cannot determine their own
salvation. Hume determined that even god cannot determine a violation of nature’s
laws, a miracle. If the logic of overdetermination holds that every identity is
incomplete and negotiable, then determinism works through a strategy of stipulat-
ing which possible identities must be rejected as impossible. These “impossibili-
ties” thus become the condition for the possibility of social-belonging. One denies
atheism and becomes a Herbertian; one denies the soteriological efficacy of works
and becomes a Lutheran/Calvinist; one denies the miraculous and becomes a
Humean. Look back to Berger. Note the echoes of Herbert in his attribution of the
following propositions to even atheists and agnostics: religiosity is a fact of human
genetics; religiosity is good. Note his exclusionary strategy: to deny these points
is to deny one’s own humanity, and even to deny goodness. If the human mind was
“created in the image of God,” and “shares in the Divine Universal Providence,”
then the study of humanity’s natural religiosity is itself the stairway to heaven.108
The “secular” religious studies scholar naturally fulfills religion’s aims.
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The scriptural human 2: the scriptural component
I still have not explained the scriptural human: the human being who, like
scripture, is autonomous and self-authenticating insofar as he serves god’s will.
The discussion of Edward Herbert, Lord of Cherbury, brought us through the
human half of this discussion. To clarify scripture, let us again return to Martin
Luther and Jean Calvin. For although Herbert deemed their theology to be
“a blasphemy so great that those who indulge in it seek to destroy not merely
human goodness, but also the goodness of God,” their discourse nevertheless per-
meates his own.109 The place to begin is with The Bondage of the Will, where
Luther resorts to a theological trope, the distinction between “God Himself ” and
“the Word of God.”110 (I introduced this distinction in a cursory manner in page
135, while discussing Gregory Schopen.) The former, Luther sometimes calls
the Hidden God, and instructs, “Wherever God hides Himself, and wills to be
unknown to us, there we have no concern.”111 In the abstract this makes good
sense. If god is the source of all, one should gratefully accept the little he
willingly reveals. But how can the hidden god not be an object of fascinated
speculation? This is god himself as the determiner of life and death, as the author
of predestination’s mysteries. And so again Luther cajoles, since the will of
“God in His own nature . . . is inscrutable and incomprehensible,” he must “be left
alone.”112
Believers, rather, should shift their gaze toward scripture. Eyes averted from
God Himself are directed to the gospel, “for it is by His Word . . . that we must
be guided.”113 Peter Steinmetz intimates the novelty of Luther’s emphases, by
characterizing his approach to scripture as “a Reformation understanding of the
gospel.”114 Robert Grant further explains:
Scripture for the reformers is not one of several pillars which uphold the
house of faith; it is the sole foundation . . . . The Church was not to be the
arbiter of the meaning of scripture, for scripture, the word of God, was
the Church’s judge.115
Unlike Edward Herbert, a relatively unknown figure, Protestant hermeneutics has
been a subject of widespread investigation, so I will try to move through it with
unusual dispatch, by making three points.
The first is encompassed by Luther’s slogan: sola scriptura. Scripture is all we
can know of god’s will, and that is sufficient. For Luther, “no believing Christian
can be forced to recognize any authority beyond the sacred scripture”; and for
Calvin, “the Scriptures obtain full authority among believers only when men
regard them . . . as if the living words of God.”116 For this reason, Luther
and Calvin speak against other avenues to god, such as speculative reason and
mystical union. Catholic scholasticism allowed for natural theology, reading god’s
will in the body of nature. But for Luther and Calvin, despite the fact that all
creation expresses divine order, one cannot find god in nature, only in scripture.
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The translators of Calvin’s Institutes explain,
the revelation of God in creation, for Calvin, would have been the basis
of a sound natural theology only “if Adam had remained upright.”
Because of sin no sound theology of this type is possible. Scripture is the
only medium of knowing the Creator.117
Not the world, but the Word, is the way to know god.
A second dimension of the Reformation’s understanding is that scripture is
self-authorizing and self-interpreting. Peter Steinmetz speaks of an “exegetical
optimism” in early Protestantism, which believed in the possibility of “a theology
which was wholly biblical and excluded all philosophical and speculative
questions.”118 The basis for such a hermeneutics is to be found in another slogan:
scripture interprets scripture. Given that scripture is the only way to know the
divine, everything worth knowing has to be enveloped therein. This, in turn,
entails a twofold revision of scriptural hermeneutics away from medieval
paradigms. First, Luther and Calvin emphasize that scripture is easy to interpret,
even for the common man. Per Luther, “Those who deny the perfect clarity
and plainness of the Scriptures leaves us nothing but darkness.”119 And one can
appreciate the metaphorical irony of a second citation:
Everywhere we should stick to just the simple, natural meaning of the
words, as yielded by the rules of grammar and the habits of speech that
God has created among men; for if anyone may devise “implications”
and “figures” in Scripture at his own pleasure, what will all Scripture be
but a reed shaken with the wind, and a sort of chameleon?”120
Calvin concurs: scripture should to be taken at face-value—read literally not
figuratively—since “we have an open and naked revelation of God in the
word . . . and it has nothing intricate in it, as the wicked imagine, to hold us in
suspense.”121 The only requirement placed on an interpreter by Calvin is “to let
his author say what he does, instead of attributing to him what we think he ought
to say.”122 Scripture contains the revealed will of god himself; its revelation is
overt, on the text’s surface. Thus it takes precedence over institutionalized
churches and learned schools of interpretation. There is no valid source for
scriptural authority or scriptural meaning outside scripture itself.
Almost. After all, even literal readings can disagree. This brings us to the third
crucial dimension of Luther and Calvin’s engagement with scripture. Only a
select few have the capacity to interpret scripture correctly: those who have been
enlightened by god. As Calvin writes:
This bare and external proof of the Word of God should have been amply
sufficient to engender faith, did not our blindness and perversity prevent
it. But our mind . . . has such a dulness that it is always blind to the light
of God’s truth. Accordingly, without the illumination of the Holy Spirit,
the Word can do nothing.123
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And there is a spectacular corollary to this enlightenment: faith in scripture
indexes election to eternal life through god’s saving grace. As Weber’s Protestant
Ethic famously explicates, Protestants were not willing to heed Luther’s pleas to
“let God be God,” and to “only fear and adore” god without any direct concern
for their own posthumous fate. But while Weber elaborates the relationship
between this anxiety and economic activity, Calvin sticks to the Word. His dis-
cussion of predestination begins with the “baffling question” of why “out of the
common multitude of men some should be predestined to salvation, others to
destruction.”124 Of course, the mystery of why the world was created in this fash-
ion belongs to the hidden god, and cannot be answered. Nevertheless, god does
give the elect a sign by which they can recognize his gratuitous call to salvation:
“the very nature and dispensation of the call . . . consists not only in the preaching
of the Word but also in the illumination of the Spirit.”125 Merely encountering the
Word is not a sign of election. Those who lack god’s favor may also read the
gospel; but for them it is “wrapped in enigmas” because god wants to cast them
“into greater stupidity.”126 Those whose hearts have been enlightened by the Holy
Spirit, by contrast, will receive his Word with proper faith. They will understand
the book, accept its authority outright, and not indulge in curious inquiries about
eternal election. One who can act so possesses “a trustworthy attestation of the
eternal predestination of God.”127 (Figure 4.5)
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Figure 4.5 A billboard along I-10 in Beaumont, California, February 2005. Photo (and
photoshop) by author.
With this, we can now read the scriptural human. Here I expand the meaning
of scripture to include the class of objects possessing the following three charac-
teristics: (1) Scriptures are accepted as self-authorizing sources of exceptional
universal value. This requires no further comment. (2) Scriptures are accepted as
coherent and totalizing texts that carry within themselves the key to their true and
proper interpretation—such interpretations are often called “literal.” Competing
interpretations based upon extrinsic keys are necessarily false. The doctrine that
enlightenment through the Holy Spirit is a prerequisite for proper understanding
of the Bible is paradigmatic here. This stipulation allows subjective, personal
readings of the gospels to be represented as objective and literal, since, after all,
when one reads the Bible through the Spirit one is merely allowing Word to
interpret Word. (3) Anybody who voices doubt over the naked performativity of
points 1 and 2 is threatened. Yes, Luther and Calvin certainly do seem to be
engaged in some shady hermeneutics. But do not forget that the Holy Spirit’s
enlightening touch also leaves the stain of salvation: the only way to be sure one’s
faith is a genuine gift of grace is to be able to accept, without question, exactly
that which most severely violates good common sense, reason, and regular expe-
rience. Someone who cannot accept scripture according to points 1 and 2 should
not expect to escape an eternity of brimstone.
Mutatis mutandis, the Herbertian scriptural human possesses exceptional
universal value because, created in the image of god, his mind is structured through
Natural Instinct. Thus he knows the Common Notions, which require no special
insight to realize because he has been “hardwired” by Supreme Providence.
Moreover, he knows they are true because they receive universal assent, that is, they
are self-authorizing and provide their own interpretive key. When one asks why that
should be the case, Herbert’s rejoinder parallels that of Luther/Calvin. Like reading
Word through Spirit, god is both the Common Notions’ definitive subject and their
ultimate author. A belief in god’s Providence is necessary. Without it, Herbert’s epis-
temological system, not to mention his hopes for a world in which sectarian strife
is inconceivable, comes to naught. Nevertheless, as with the Luther’s and Calvin’s
shady hermeneutic, there is still room for doubt. John Butler observes, “the weak-
est part of Herbert’s argument is his stress on the argument of consensus gentium,
believing as he did that it transcended religious, political, philosophical, and ethnic
considerations.”128 Again, Luther’s and Calvin’s discourse is strategic. Like the
reformers, Herbert threatens unbelievers. The five truths of natural religion serve
the divine judge as criteria for his Final Judgment:
Every religion, if we consider it comprehensively, is not good; nor can
we admit that salvation is open to men in every religion. For how could
anyone who believes more than is necessary, but who does less than he
ought, be saved?129
To misuse the human mind, the best image of divinity, by formulating novel
doctrines that divide man from man, is perilous in the extreme.
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Herbert’s anthropology is Christian prejudice mystified by association with
god-given reason and truth, instead of Christian prejudice mystified by associa-
tion with god-given Spirit, Word, and faith. For Herbert, human beings themselves
are scriptures to be read. At the most “literal” level this reading tells us that we
are religious beings because we are rational beings, and vice versa.
Overdetermination and the politics of impenetrability
Standing before the Literary Society of Bombay in 1821, William Erskine shared
a series of truths with his audience: Religious identities are simple and obvious;
they sit on the surface, so that even transient observers might distinguish them
immediately; yet surfaces only give material expression to deeper theologies and
myths, which themselves are ciphers for the essential core of what it means to be
a human being. As for rocks, so too for the living. Now we know something of
the anthropological background to this common sense, in which religion
conjoined with reason becomes the basis for humanity’s unity-in-difference. This
is not to say that the men of the Literary Society of Bombay were necessarily
Herbertians. Between the seventeenth century and the nineteenth, theorists pro-
posed many different versions of natural religiosity. John Locke, for instance,
directly criticized Herbert. Where Herbert disallowed atheism, Locke accepted
that whole nations can have no god or religion.130 And where Herbert’s god
inscribed human beings with a natural instinct, Locke denied all innate ideas,
including that of god: the exercise of reason upon external sense data or the inner
workings of the mind, leading from the known to the unknown, was the only
avenue to the divine. Yet, Locke did adduce a theory of natural religiosity, for like
Herbert he too correlated religiosity with universal rationality. God was “the most
natural discovery of human reason.”131 When Locke scratched an atheist, he
found a man who had squandered his god-given rationality by not pursuing the
thoughts that would lead him to the creator.
Despite their differences, Herbert and Locke were both stakeholders in an
economy of human nature for which reason and religion are twin coins of the
realm. Let me repeat, Locke was only one among many to nuance the category
“natural religion” after Herbert and before Erskine.132 Though fascinating, I will
not survey that company, for all its members work within the determinism of a
scriptural anthropology: every human being carries within himself everything
that he needs in order to know what is worth knowing about every other human
being. But look back to my definition of scripture: there must also be a threat. In
this case, the predicates of natural religiosity protect human beings from their
own indeterminacy. Thus Kant sermonized to the “friends of the human race and
of what is holiest to it” against dangerous libertines who indulge in “an unbelief
of reason.”133 Though logic cannot prove god’s existence, Kant held that reason
nevertheless “needs to assume” that divinity really exists.134 For without god,
rationality cannot provide the ultimate touchstone of truth. Rather every man
would be able to assert that his own subjective enlightenment is a universal
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reality, resulting in social anomie.
If it disputed that reason deserves the right to speak first in matters
concerning supersensible objects such as the existence of God and the
future world, then a wide gate is opened to all enthusiasm, superstition
and even to atheism.135
Ominously, there would also be “a confusion of language.” Likewise, Voltaire
called the belief in “a rewarding and revenging God” a “universal, necessary prej-
udice,” and a “very good prejudice” at that.136 In Herbert’s day, in Voltaire’s day,
in Kant’s day, the rational belief in god, or the strategic teaching that morality
requires theism, may well have been regarded as effective countermeasures
against sectarian fanaticism. In our day, Peter Berger continues their line.
Now if we would give up god, we should be also willing to accept that human
beings are like a mountain’s ancient mural: overdetermined and often impenetra-
ble. Any actual religiosity we find likely belongs to our own economy of desire.
In sum, this chapter explored tensions that arise from the determinist encounter
with overdetermined matter—rock and living. The concept of overdetermination
was first introduced by Freud, who understood dream-elements to have more than
one cause or express more than one wish. And because dream-elements (let alone
hysterical symptoms) have multiple antecedents, they legitimately support multi-
ple explanations or interpretations. There is no gainsaying the lithic facticity of
Ajanta’s wall. However, whether it enters discourse as a “Buddhist” fact or a
“Hindu” fact, a “religious” fact or a “political” fact, is not a “fact” of the stone
itself, but of the discursive sphere within which the stone is contemplated and
identified. Attention to overdetermination acts as a ward against scripturalization,
that is, against imagining that an object can contain or determine the singular key
to its own literal interpretation. As I fantasized about possible readings of the Cave
Twenty Six mural, I was interested less in their verisimilitude to truth than in their
hermeneutic ramifications. It is possible to tell stories without referring to the
MSV or any other bauddha source. The Eliadian can find archetypal Man transit-
ing to The Divine; the Hindu can work up a nice local myth about Visju and
Laksmi; the libertine can use the MSV, but end up with a pimp buddha.
Perhaps nobody would ever call such interpretations Buddhist. But a historical
investigation that presupposes that words like Buddhist and Buddhism provide sim-
ple, obvious, and immediate access to the living—as they are on their surface and in
their depths—has not yet engaged with the materiality of material artifacts. This is
why I chose to focus on a mural depicting Fakyamuni’s enlightenment-event. The
chain of inferences linking a sculpted image to a tale about Mara’s defeat on the eve
of enlightenment will not be more complex than the sequence of steps leading from
the totality of Ajanta’s artifacts to the world religion, Buddhism. In the former
instance, the MSV provides the key link, enabling historians to express certainty
about the stone’s meaning. In the latter, enlightenment fulfills the parallel function.
Enlightenment is a nodal point; the definitively “Buddhist” cipher for natural
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religiosity; the sort of thing that can resolve a human being’s true identity. If
humanity is determined as a species by its religiosity, then Buddhists throughout the
world are those humans whose religiosity is articulated in terms of enlightenment.
As a religion, Buddhism begins with the buddha’s enlightenment.
But enlightenment becomes enlightenment only in the midst of a hermeneutic
process, within a discourse. If enlightenment is not a fact of Indian history but of
the discursive sphere within which that history is articulated, can Buddhism be
otherwise?
Mainstream Buddhist Studies is an academic discourse about Buddhism that
analyzes the religious discourse of Buddhism. That must change if Buddhism is
itself not a determinate thing—not a religion, that is, a historically delimited, insti-
tutionalized expression of humanity’s innate and constitutive religiosity—but a dis-
course, ultimately impossibly fixed through an enlightenment which is
itself inextricably discursive. Now, if you are worrying—as did Kant—about the
slippery slope of indeterminacy, in which communication degenerates into a
confusion of tongues and thence to eisegetical libertinism, recall Ernesto Laclau
and Chantal Mouffe’s logic of overdetermination introduced near the beginning of
this chapter. Multiplicability of meaning is the basic post-structuralist insight. But
Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that politics is a logical entailment of this anti-essen-
tialism. Identities can never be fixed, but the struggle to fix them, however impos-
sible, is how we spend our time! Indeed, when has politics not been constitutive of
Buddhist Studies? Gregory Schopen critiques the field for its Protestant politics,
which locates true religion in the scriptural Word instead of material artifacts or rit-
ual behaviors. And where Schopen sees a symptom I see a syndrome: Buddhist
Studies’ discourse assumes a universal religiosity tied to Protestant anthropology; a
methodological positivism tied to Protestant theology; a determinist ideology tied
to Protestant cosmology; a privileging of texts tied to Protestant soteriology. Thus I
criticize Schopen in turn for his politics: for still valuing true religion; for still hav-
ing a stake in the past existence of Indian Buddhism; for still accepting a discourse
within which enlightenment is plainly religious. In turn, how can I not expect that
members of an academic field that valorizes determinate meaning will not resist my
attempt to deprive its source materials of unique, innate, self-constituting, field-
specific criteria for fixing real significance?
By imbricating bauddha enlightenment within the discursive construction of
humanity as naturally religious, scholars transform a place containing ancient
artifacts, partially inspired by bauddha ideologies, into a Buddhist Ajanta. Let me
reiterate: my aim in redescribing Buddhism as a discursive formation is to under-
mine the construction of humanity as a natural class whose values and salvation
are uniquely fulfilled by religious institutions (or by engagement in an non-
institutional “spirituality”). This is a matter of politics, not ontology. Accordingly,
deconstructive claims—“Buddhism did not exist,” “Ajanta is not Buddhist”—are
only intermediate steps in a longer query into the privileging of abstractions and
universals in the imagination of social order.
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5
WHAT DO GODS HAVE TO DO WITH
ENLIGHTENMENT?
His illusions were all the imagination he had—a ferocious poverty.
(Peter Straub, Koko (New York: Dutton, 1988), 560)
There are no gods in Buddhism
We live in remarkable times. Today, unsure how to begin this chapter, I decided
to order books for my next semester’s course, “The Buddhist Imaginary.” Then to
delay further, I read the reviews posted to amazon.com of my preferred textbook,
Rupert Gethin’s The Foundations of Buddhism.1 In what earlier era could I have
learned instantly the opinion of Todd Martin from Agua Dulce, California:
✩✩✩✩ The WORST book on this subject EVER
This autor is writing about some other religion. It’s the only explanation.
Not one thing he says in the first 20 pages is factually correct. I stopped
reading shortly after he says “The Gods gathered on the day the Buddha
achieved enlightenment as if they knew something important was going
to happen.” All I could think was, “what gods?,” because there are no
gods in Buddhism. The very idea of a God or Gods goes against everything
the Buddha ever taught.2
I know nothing more about Todd Martin. But his review (which 6 of 44 people
found helpful) brings us to the heart of this chapter: What do gods have to do with
enlightenment? What do India’s long-dead bauddha have to do with Buddhism?
What does Buddhism have to do with what the buddha taught, the dharma?
What was Todd Martin thinking? To my eye, the passage he cites from Gethin
looks benign. Gethin does not grant the gods an instrumental role in Fakyamuni’s
enlightenment. He does not represent buddhahood as a gift conferred by heavenly
grace or as an instrument of divine will. Nor does Gethin magnify gods into
omniscient, omnipresent, omnibeneficent beings, who, through their own power,
fashion the cosmos ex nihilo and determine universal providence. Had Gethin
made those claims, Martin’s voice would probably just echo a chorus of critics
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rehearsing Buddhist arguments against the theological construction of monotheist
creator gods. But Gethin does not say that.
Todd Martin’s condemnation is all the more curious in light of Fakya sources,
in which divinities (Mara, Indra, Brahma, Narayaja, Fiva) are ubiquitous. Fakya
books give advice on how to achieve divine status. At Ajanta, heavens and gods
are painted on the walls; the desire to be born in their midst is announced in the
inscriptions. To get personal about it: If the mere mention of gods is transgressive
for a Buddhist, then how should we classify Buddhabhadra, the donor of Cave
Twenty Six? Buddhabhadra’s bona fides seem beyond reproach. He calls himself
a bhiksu and a learned bodhisattva who hoped to assist all living beings on the
path to buddhahood.3 Yet other words through which Buddhabhadra identifies
himself may appear less than enlightened: rich, powerful, desirous of worldly
pleasure as well as of liberation. Moreover, Buddhabhadra is a theological tri-
umphalist. His prafasti compares the buddha to Fiva and Krsja by name. The
buddha is superior to those gods because, despite their divine status, both have
fallen subject to other’s will: Fiva was cursed (on many occasions) and Krsja
died. Buddhabhadra declares, “gods’ victories are reversed, for they are subject to
adversity,” but nowhere does he problematize divinity itself as an existential state.
Indeed, Buddhabhadra desired that his parents and benefactors would enjoy
themselves in heaven for as long as a sun and moon hang above the earth. That,
in part, is why he commissioned his cave in the mountains.
Given that Todd Martin rates The Foundations of Buddhism as the worst-ever
book on Buddhism, must Buddhabhadra then be the worst-ever Buddhist?
Perhaps Buddhabhadra was not a Buddhist at all. For on amazon.com Martin
opposes even the most temperate appeal to divinity. His words are clear. God in
the singular, and gods in the plural, have no place in Buddhism. Any positive
discourse on divinity is antithetical to the entire corpus of Buddhist teachings.
Todd Martin’s frustration with Foundations evidences a common, intractable
problem for scholars of religion: where to draw the line between what is
necessary or essential to a particular tradition and what is contingent. Indeed,
Martin’s remarks have a long pedigree, for observers and scholars have often
expressed uncertainty about the bauddha treatment of divinity. One of the first
notices of such puzzlement is found in the 1691 memoire of Simon de La
Loubère, an envoy to the Siamese court from France. Loubère reports that the
Portugese understand nirvaja to mean that the soul has become god. In Loubère’s
opinion, however, the Portugese get it wrong. The Siamese do not understand
nirvaja to entail any such apotheosis, since for the Siamese nirvaja is “a manner
of being,” not of divinity.4
Loubère’s account is suggestive. But let us skip centuries, to the nineteenth,
when growing knowledge of Asia inspired diverse, contradictory attempts to
comprehend Buddhism in theological terms. Common sense held that if most
souls living in Burmah, Siam, Laos, Pegu, Cambodia, Thibet, Japan, Tartary,
Ceylon, the Loo-Choo, China, Siberia, as well as Swedish Lapland were all
established in one religion, with one founder, then all would also adhere to one
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common theological principle, at least.5 Yet Buddhism was so varied theologically
that scholars could not even be sure what to call it. Was Buddhism “The
Protestantism of the East” as was argued in the 1869 Atlantic Monthly. Or did the
Buddhist religion resemble Roman Catholicism, as was argued in the 1870
Atlantic Monthly?6 Or was Buddhism, “no real religion,” per the observation of
Oxford’s Boden Professor of Sanskrit, whose thought continues: “It has no
God, no Supreme Being, no real prayer, no real clergy. It lays no claim to any
supernatural revelation.”7 Or was Buddhism better considered “a philosophy
rather than a religion” because Buddhists pursue the enlightened goal of univer-
sal rationality?8 Or was the Sinologist, Samuel Beal, correct? Buddhism is “a
religious system” in terms of its practices and a philosophy “so far as the abstract
principles are concerned.”9
These various citations and authors date to the 1860s through 1890s. One
generation earlier, scholars had fewer facts about the bauddha but were no less
confused. Frederick Maurice’s The Religions of the World and Their Relations to
Christianity (1847) offers a nice summary of the state of the field in his day:
What are we to say of a doctrine which is sometimes represented as one
of almost perfect Theism; sometimes as direct Atheism; sometimes as
having the closest analogy to what in a Greek philosopher, or in a
modern philosopher, would be called Pantheism; sometimes as the
worship of human saints or heroes; sometimes as altogether symbolical;
sometimes as full of the highest abstract speculation; sometimes as
vulgar idolatry?10
Maurice asks, what are we to say? By the end of this chapter, we will still not have
said anything to solve these nineteenth-century problems: Are gods essential to
Buddhism? Is the buddha himself a god? Is Buddhism a religion or philosophy? For
(a)theological issues are not resolved through enlightenment, theistic or atheistic,
but through the analysis of hegemony, that is, of the social force exerted by the
assertion and acceptance of a putatively non-speculative, necessary, apolitical truth.
This chapter inquires into the hegemonic function of the disarticulation of gods
and enlightenment. What is the social force of the claim that a positive discourse
on divinity is antithetical to Buddhism, the religion of enlightenment? For a
quick, clear example of ideological disarticulation as social articulation, consider
the work of Edward Conze, an important twentieth-century buddhologist. What is
Conze doing when he advises, “Much of what has been handed down as
‘Buddhism’ is due not to the exercise of wisdom, but to the social conditions in
which the Buddhist community existed . . . One must throughout distinguish the
exotic curiosities from the essentials of a holy life”?11 Later in this same work he
returns to this point in a comparison of Buddhism and Hinduism: “There is
nothing, or almost nothing, in the Buddhist interpretation of spiritual truth which
ties it to any soil or any climate, to any race or tribe. Hinduism as compared with
it is full of tribal taboos.”12 What is Conze doing?
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Each of the chapters in this book has considered hegemony after a fashion:
Chapter 2, the hegemony of exceptional universal value over the discursive
construction of Ajanta’s spatiality; Chapter 3, the hegemony of linear intentional-
ity over the discursive construction of Ajanta’s temporality; Chapter 4, the
hegemony of a scriptural anthropology over the discursive construction of
Ajanta’s materiality. In this way, Ajanta provided a basis for exploring how
Enlightenment (and by extension, Protestant Christian) ideologies are articulated
through the representation of Buddhist enlightenment. By contrast, this chapter
will not focus on Ajanta. Instead it will look somewhat more systematically at
the work of hegemony. This reflexive moment is appropriate since I, no less than
the Protestant or Buddhist, am engaged in a struggle for ideological dominance.
This analysis in terms of hegemony asserts my own e/Enlightened perspective,
my own ability to recognize, and disclose, contingencies of power that others
regard as necessities.
The discussion proceeds in several stages. The first takes a closer look at Todd
Martin, whose brief posting on amazon.com provides a basis for reviewing
several categories presented in previous chapters: scripturality, hegemony,
discursivity. Following that, the discussion turns to two contemporary bauddha
theologians, Satya Narayan Goenka and Richard Hayes, for whom Buddhism,
when taken on its own terms, is not religion but truth. This section culminates in
Hayes’ dualist social vision, pitting an ideal Buddhist society modeled on what he
calls “the original Sangha” against a foolish society dedicated to what he calls
“the mythology of enlightenment.” The conclusion then summarizes the chapter’s
diverse points in a catchphrase: vigorous public polytheism is secular wisdom for
the modern age.
Enlightenment in the garbage heap
Why should a historian care what some guy from Agua Dulce, California, thinks
about gods and enlightenment? What is the scholarly value of an opinion posted
on a bookseller’s website? This is just information-age archaeology, like excavating
a garbage heap. The workaday charge of ephemera is what makes it interesting.
Indeed, one might dig still deeper into the heap, seeking the logic that divides
enlightenment from the gods. For Todd Martin that logic is a matter of fact. Thus
Martin accuses Gethin: “Not one thing he says in the first 20 pages is factually
correct.” The most egregious error of fact: Gethin places gods at the buddha’s
enlightenment. Likewise, Martin denounces Gethin’s scholarship as devoid of
value because he fails to assert positive facts:
The writing is dreadful. The author goes on and on giving dates as facts,
only to turn around 2 sentences later and explain how those facts are
disputed and probably wrong. He spent at least 5 pages talking about
events 1500 years before Buddhism that had absolutely nothing to do
with Buddhism itself.
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I skimmed ahead and saw page after page after page listing date after
date as if any of it was relevant, regardless of the Buddhas teaching
about the poison arrow. If you know the Buddhas teaching of the poison
arrow you will know what I mean. Those dates are irrelevant at best. The
fact that there is no proof they are accurate is dangerous.13
Martin uses a discourse of fact and facticity in order to pair secular history and
theological belief together as two iterations of a single epistemological error. A
concern for historical uncertainties, like a concern for the gods, diverts one’s
attention toward incorrect facts, irrelevant facts, even dangerous facts, that are
only ever matters of debate and speculation. Martin is particularly dismissive of
god and gods, I would guess, because divine beings are signifiers for ultimate
value(s). To treat a being as absolute when it is not even a positive matter of fact
that the being exists—this is a gestural synecdoche for total unenlightenment.
Conversely, I would guess, demythologization must be the enlightened gesture
par excellence.
As a hermeneute, Todd Martin authorizes his rejection of gods, of academic
history, of The Foundations of Buddhism—in sum, of unenlightenment—through
appeal to a scriptural precedent, “the teaching of the poison arrow,” found in “The
Shorter Discourse to Malukkya.” This brief text from the Pali canon involves a
dialogue between Fakyamuni and a monk named Malukkyaputta. The latter
initiates the conversation by asking the buddha to resolve several metaphysical
conundrums: Is the world eternal? Is the world infinite? What is a buddha’s exis-
tential status after his final nirvaja? In fact, Malukkyaputta threatens to abandon
his robes if the buddha withholds the answers. Fakyamuni’s response has two
parts. First he interrogates Malukkyaputta’s expectation. To paraphrase with some
dramatic license: “O foolish, foolish man, when I made you a monk did I promise
to answer questions such as these? No! So why now do you act as if I did make
that promise?” Following that, the buddha speaks in parables in order to explain,
not the answers Malukkyaputta wants, but why Malukkyaputta’s questions are
themselves inappropriate:
It is as if there were a man struck by an arrow that was smeared thickly
with poison . . . . And the man might say, “I will not draw out this arrow
as long as I do not know whether that man by whom I was struck was a
brahmin, a ksatriya, a vaifya, or a fudra . . . .as long as I do not know his
name and family . . . .whether he was tall, short or of medium height . . . ”
That man would not discover these things, but that man would die.14
Todd Martin’s “poison arrow,” in short, is a figure for Buddhism as an anti-
speculative pragmatism that focuses on duhkha (suffering; imperfection),
duhkha’s causes, and the means for bringing duhkha to an end. This purpose
delimits the buddha’s teaching and discipline. No other knowledge is necessary.
Indeed, language found in the Mulasarvastivada Vinaya provides additional
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scriptural backing for Martin’s position. Recall, from the preceding chapter, the
night of enlightenment. The story ends when Fakyamuni realizes the “correct”
facts, the undisputed, unchanging facts about duhkha. But the story begins with
Mara, and with Fakyamuni’s puzzlement as to why Mara’s followers are so nasty.
Curious, Fakyamuni uses his psychic abilities to probe those demons’ minds, and
in so doing develops a taxonomy of mentalities. He distinguishes the impassioned
mind from the disciplined, the confused mind from the clear, and so on. Of
particular interest here is a phrase the text repeats to describe the cognitive
process whereby Fakyamuni pursues this mind-science: X yathabhutaÅ prajanati,
Fakyamuni recognizes X for what it is.15 This Sanskrit phrase connotes epistemic
exactitude. Fakyamuni recognizes every mental state and every truth in its own
particularity, and then apperceives the dharma, the universal law that establishes
an equivalence among all those particulars.
In this light, a properly Buddhist datum must meet two criteria. It must be
definite, not speculative; also it must serve the project of enlightenment, which is
nothing other than the bare recognition of reality as it is. And there is a third
criterion. For one still needs a way to be certain that one is asking the kinds of
questions that lead to enlightenment’s clarity. Who wants to waste billions upon
billions of lifetimes pursuing useless queries? The Shorter Discourse shows the
way. At the end of the text, the buddha’s last words to Malukkyaputta are given in
the form of a command: “Accept what I did not explain as ‘unexplained.’ Accept
what I did explain as ‘explained.’ ”16 The buddha neither affirms nor denies his
own occult capabilities. Perhaps he could have satisfied Malukkyaputta’s
metaphysical curiosity, or maybe not. Fakyamuni just articulates a binary structure
for knowledge, and redirects Malukkyaputta’s attention from the wrong pole to
the right one. What Todd Martin calls “Buddhism itself ” belongs entirely to the
right chain of equivalences on Table 5.1. The left column must represent either
pseudo-Buddhism or that which is not Buddhism at all.
Todd Martin’s review is odd and unsettling. Odd, in part, because his words are
so poorly chosen. Unsettling, because Martin’s primary linguistic infelicity is to
use “Buddhist” and “Buddhism” as if these words do adequately name the class
of things explained by Fakyamuni; as if these identities are not themselves
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Table 5.1 Organization of knowledge based upon “The Shorter Discourse to
Malukkyaputta”
The “unexplained” The “explained”
Gods; informational facts about history, Duhkha; the cause of duhkha; the cessation of
especially those that are matters of duhkha; the path leading to the cessation of
scholarly debate duhkha
Speculative Factually correct matters about which one can
be certain
Prolongs saÅsara Leads to detachment, quiescence, 
enlightenment, nirvaja
matters of history, speculation, and dispute. Martin writes his criticism of Gethin
in the language of fact. Yet, one needs only a quick glance back to the first chapter
to recognize the counterfactual burden Martin places on these words. That chapter
cited The Buddhist Religion, whose first page reports, “Buddhism . . . is a recent
invention. It comes from the thinkers of the eighteenth century European
Enlightenment and their quest to subsume religion under comparative sociology
and secular history.”17 I imagine that Martin’s distaste for Gethin’s book stems, in
part, from the fact it argues for this selfsame point.18 The point is not simple but
simplistic: If Buddhism is of recent provenance, then Buddhism cannot itself have
been explained by the buddha. If there is no act more unenlightened than placing
ultimate value in a god whose existence one cannot assert as a positive matter of
fact, then, mutatis mutandis, there is no identity more unenlightened than
Buddhist, for as a historical entity, Buddhism is not a positive matter of fact.
Granted, the words Buddhist and Buddhism have become accepted “insider”
categories; the sort of people who treat the Shorter Discourse as scripture also use
these words for themselves and their religion. Nevertheless it is a matter of unen-
lightened speculation to project this contemporary usage to a time before the
words originated within an “outsider” discourse. The next three sections will
consider the structure of that unenlightenment by reviewing three themes
introduced in earlier chapters: scripturality, hegemony, and discursivity.
A look back, stage 1: the scriptural
Todd Martin is not a nut. The Shorter Discourse to Malukkya is frequently cited
in academic introductions to Buddhism, as well as in contemporary publications
of a more openly popularizing or apologetic nature. Nor is Martin’s mistrust of
speculation remarkable. Look back to the prior chapter’s discussion of early
Protestant theology which, in David Steinmetz’s words, sought to be “wholly biblical
and exclude all philosophical and speculative questions.”19 Early Protestants
shared this Pali text’s anti-speculative stance: only knowledge derived from a lit-
eral reading of scripture as revelatory of god’s will had value; the ability to read
the Bible literally held the promise of election. We find the same complex of
values expressed in Edward Herbert’s statement: “How could anyone who
believes more than is necessary . . . . be saved?”20 Or recall Gregory Schopen’s
puzzlement at the fact that scholars have not used solid archaeological matter to
reconstruct Indian Buddhism, but rather rely upon texts about which they must
speculate concerning their dates and places of authorship as well as their
community of interest. All give the same e/Enlightened advice: Attend only to
that which is there, right before one’s eyes, just as it is; for only by doing so can
one achieve something real, lasting, or legitimate. All share an aversion to the
speculative, though their stakes vary. For a man poisoned by an arrow, correct
knowledge brings the correct antidote. The Protestant becomes confident of his
own salvation. Schopen rights an academic field gone awry. And the Buddhist
who sees things just as they are inquires into duhkha, becomes detached, attains
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enlightenment and, finally, nirvaja. Speculation, metaphysics, theory, drsti,
violate the e/Enlightened understanding, since they build reality as it is into an
architecture of desire.
A nice statement of this principle is found in Diderot and d’Alembert’s
Encyclopédie. The entry dedicated to the philosophe teaches that a such a man
“knows how to suspend judgement” when he does not possess a “proper basis”
for correct judgment.21 The Encyclopédie calls this rationality the philosophe’s
“most perfect trait.” Is it not wise advice? Yet, even such Enlightened wisdom
permits Cartesian doubt: How does one know that a proper basis exists, that is,
that correct judgment is even possible? Or, granting that such a basis does exist,
how does one know that one has found it, and not a deceptive simulacrum
conjured by an evil genius? Uncertainties are legion. Would it not make more
sense for a philosophe simply to suspend all judgment? Should not a perfect
philosophe be a perfect sceptic?
Similar questions were raised in the preceding chapter, which sought a proper
basis for identifying a mural in Ajanta’s Cave Twenty Six as the Maravijaya,
Fakyamuni’s victory over Mara. That chapter wound in serpentine fashion to
conclude that historical certitude presupposes anthropological determinism. As I
wrote in page 137: There is a genealogy of religion such that the assumption
of a natural, universal—even rational—religiosity has become the means of
regulating—even denying—the overdetermined, multiple possibilities for being
human. Rational beings are religious beings has come to be viewed as a
determinant law of human nature, and thus the predicate of a unitary humanity.
Yet that was not the final answer—and for the same reason that the Shorter
Discourse to Malujkya does not simply reject metaphysical speculation and affirm
the pragmatics of duhkha. After rejecting and affirming, the Pali text adds two
imperatives: “Accept what I did not explain as ‘unexplained.’ Accept what I did
explain as ‘explained.’ ” This is the last thing the buddha says in this text. Dharetha
(accept!), a second-person imperative, is derived from the root, dhr, to hold, which
is commonly used in bauddha literature for meanings that range from actions of
the body—carry, bear, and wear—to actions of the mind—remember, memorize,
and understand. The translation accept bridges these two realms of meaning. One
steps onto the straight path to enlightenment when one holds Fakyamuni’s words
as authoritative. Not only does that act of holding require Malukkyaputta to relin-
quish his idle curiosity and metaphysical wonder, he must drop every subject the
buddha did not see fit to explain. Without the buddha’s guidance Malukkyaputta
would only bring himself pain and more pain, death and redeath, caught in a
fantasia of the unknown. The buddha makes no direct threat; he does not bully; he
imposes no penalties. But as the image of a poisoned arrow makes clear: this is a
dangerous world. Safety lies in wisely accepting the buddha at his word. To stray
beyond the buddha’s literal word is to expose oneself to limitless suffering.
Enlightened beings are wise beings who identify appropriate authority, accept
it, adhere to its dictates as they engage in worldly activity, evade danger, and
become assured of their own emancipation. The preceding chapter introduced this
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complex explanation under the rubric of the scriptural—integrating rationality,
religiosity, interpretability, certitude, and threat of danger. In more schematic
terms, the scriptural is known through three criteria: Scriptures are self-authorizing
sources of exceptional universal value. Scriptures are coherent and totalizing texts
that carry within themselves the key to their true and proper interpretation; such
interpretations are often called “literal.” And to doubt a scripture’s absolute value
or to read it improperly results in limitless suffering.
At stake in the scriptural is the location of authority. Does it lie on the open
surface or in the hidden depth? Ostensibly, the scriptural requires that one accept
surfaces at face-value, for a scriptural surface does not merely re-present reality;
the scriptural surface is literal reality itself. Recall Martin Luther’s distinction
between the “Word of God,” which is revealed, and “God Himself,” who remains
hidden. A genuine Christian (for Martin Luther) accepts the Word and does not
strive to know God Himself; a genuine Buddhist (for Todd Martin) accepts the
truths of duhkha and does not strive to know other truths. But as we proceed now
toward a review of the structure of hegemony, it is crucial to recognize that the
priorities in this relationship are out of balance. The surface is given pragmatic
and epistemological priority, since it is an empirical object; the depth is given
logical and ontological priority, even though it is unfathomable. Thus Luther’s
genuine Christian accepts the Word and does not strive to know God Himself,
even though that Christian also does believe there is more to God Himself than
the Word. Thus the Buddha deflects Malukkyaputta’s focus to duhkha, but does
not obviate the things about which Malukkyaputta speculates, such as eternity
and nirvaja. This is the scriptural sleight-of-hand: surfaces are able to sustain the
burden of reality because, in fact, they do re-present an occult reality. God is a
universal who particularizes himself in scripture. But it is the anticipation of
universal excess—the imagination of an incalculable surfeit of divinity—which
guarantees that those particulars add up to more than their sum total.
In turn, let us recall how Luther coaxes readers to adhere to the surface of the
Word, thereby avoiding a dangerous fascination with the transcendental unknown.
He promises that a reader who can accept the literal Word can also know himself
to have been accepted by the Holy Spirit. “Nobody who has not the Spirit of God
sees a jot of what is in the Scriptures”; “those who deny the perfect clarity and
plainness of the Scriptures leave us nothing but darkness.”22 To read the Word
literally is to read it spiritually. This spiritual/literal reading does not speculate,
does not express personal desire, does not calculate or connive, but rather
betokens acceptance, grace, salvation. So too Calvin: the ability to take scripture
at face-value, without wrapping it in enigmas, is possible only for one illumined
by the Spirit. Only the elect can accept that god saves some and damns others
gratuitously; only the elect can praise this god as perfectly just, when from a
human perspective, he appears cruel, random, and malicious. Or to paraphrase
The Shorter Discourse, only a member of the elect can obey the command
dharetha: accept the elect as “elect” and accept the unelect as “unelect,” even
when that means that perfectly “innocent” people must suffer infinite torment.
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In fact, it is easy to recognize the unelect. If you think, “aha, the politics of the
apolitical,” when you read the following phrases, then consider yourself damned:
the collapse of the literal into the spiritual; the warning that to seek beneath the
surface is unnecessary and dangerous; the derogation of speculation, fantasy, and
intellectual whimsy.
A look back, stage 2: hegemony
There is another word that describes the process by which one segment of a
society proffers its own desires and ideals as exceptional, universal values bearing
on the social whole: hegemony. The damned are damned because they clamor
about hegemony, a noise heard most strongly earlier, in this book’s first chapter.
Recall, that earlier discussion of hegemony drew heavily upon the work of
Ernesto Laclau, for whom the political, the social, and hegemony represent three
phases in the contingent expression of power.
Politics is “the ensemble of decisions taken in an undecidable 
terrain . . . in which power is constitutive.”
The social is “the sedimented forms of a power that has blurred its own
contingency.”
Hegemony is a “theory of the decision taken in an undecidable 
terrain . . . [This category] emerged in order to think about the political
character of social relations.”23
In short, hegemony is not a fixed, irrevocable state of unequal power. Power is
always contingent and one investigates hegemony in order to understand the
dynamic struggle to manage and erase traces of that contingency. The successful
hegemon controls discourse such that his wants are accepted as proper and
necessary by his community. The erasure of contingency, the disavowal of
partisanship, the representation of truths as absolute and experiences as sponta-
neous—unsullied by arbitrary wants or selfish calculations—is the foundational
social act. There can be no society as such without hegemony.
In this light, scripture is an especially effective instrument of erasure. For a scrip-
tural community will deem itself good, wise, blessed, saved, elect, because its mem-
bers are able to see a “spirit” that outsiders do not see. For these insiders, the spirit
sits there right on the surface. How dull-witted must those others, those outsiders,
be if they do not see it!? As literal-spirit, scripture fosters the coalescence of social
wholes. Scripture effectively divides a righteous, rational, illumined, spiritual elect,
whose members live peaceful lives in accord with the explained/revealed, from an
unelect, whose members, to their peril, dabble in the unexplained/hidden.
There is no need to recapitulate the first chapter’s explication of hegemony in
full. Let me revisit the points that will become useful as the current chapter
progresses. Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics provides a groundwork.
Saussure’s theory, in turn, is best considered against the background of a
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correspondence-theory of language. We encountered such a theory in page 154,
in the Mulasarvastivada Vinaya’s use of the phrase yathabhutaÅ prajanati to pair
the buddha’s cognition of mental states with characterizations of those states.
Genesis 2:19–20 provides a still better example:
So out of the ground the Lord God formed every animal of the field and
every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would
call them; and whatever the man called every living creature, that was its
name. The man gave names to all cattle, and to the birds of the air, and
to every animal of the field.
Here, words are meaningful inasmuch as they match discrete elements of
objective reality, that objectivity being guaranteed by the creator’s transcendence.
Saussure’s innovation was to disentangle the subjectivity of words from
the objectivity of things. Linguistic value is not a function of a positive
congruence between this word and that thing, but rather is relational within a total
rule-based system of sounds and significances. A word’s meaning is relative to its
place within a system of linguistic difference, in which the relationship between
signifieds and signifiers is arbitrary and conventional. Indeed, it is crucial to
remember that Saussure does also limit contingency. Social convention provides
an external basis for judging linguistic usage.
Saussure’s theory is complex, and one might wonder whether we need it for the
language of everyday stuff, beasts and birds. When it comes to abstract entities
and foci for ideological contention, however, wonderment ceases. Consider Todd
Martin and Rupert Gethin. Martin is fully certain: there are no gods in Buddhism.
Yet every account of Fakyamuni’s life includes tales of gods; every stratum of the
archaeological record includes images of gods; and the people of every Buddhist
land worship gods. This discrepancy is easily explained when we recognize that
Martin is working with a correspondence-theory of language. For him,
“Buddhism” has only one legitimate referent: what the buddha taught. To apply this
word to any other subject matter is just plain wrong. Appeal to a correspondence-
theory allows Martin to reject conventional usage, for he does not use the word
“Buddhism” to communicate, but to indicate reality. By contrast, Rupert Gethin
demonstrates Saussure’s salubrity when he writes, “As is fashionable to point out
these days, ‘Buddhism’ is something of an intellectual abstraction: in reality there
is not one Buddhism but many Buddhisms.”24 By loosening the connection
between linguistic meaning and worldly facticity, Saussure provides a ground-
work for Gethin’s articulated integration of the abstraction, Buddhism, with the
concrete reality of diverse Buddhisms. Some Buddhisms are theistic, others are
atheistic; Buddhism is thus both and neither.
Structural linguistics loosens the connection between wordly meanings and
worldly objects. Poststructural discourse analysis severs it. In this latter analytic
mode, Buddhism is not an intellectual object that bears an abstract, albeit
substantive, correspondence to some thing in the world, mediated through diverse
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Buddhisms. Buddhism, rather, is fully a discursive object in its own right. There
is no need to posit a set of Buddhisms as objective antecedents to the abstraction,
Buddhism. Both words, “Buddhism” and “Buddhisms,” have their own specific
values, determined by their differential locations within a system of verbal and
intellectual practices. So, if Saussurian structuralism sabotages Todd Martin’s
attempt to affix “Buddhism” to the objective reality of the buddha’s teachings,
poststructural analysis sabotages Gethin’s attempt to affix reality to the
multiplicity of “Buddhisms.” That is, we would not even recognize the existence
of historically particular Buddhisms were we not already in possession of
the translocal, transtemporal abstraction, Buddhism.
To return now to the matter of hegemony: Poststructural linguistic analysis
(i.e., deconstruction) and hegemony are complementary, “two sides of the same
operation.”25 Indeed, I find Ernesto Laclau useful precisely for his application of
this poststructural turn to the formation of social order. Deconstruction addresses
the process by which discursive objects come to be accepted as extra-discursive
objects. We might even say that deconstruction destroys scripture, for it “reactivates
the moment of decision that underlies any sedimented set of social relations.”26
The analysis of hegemony then addresses the broad consequences of that
“moment of decision” within the human world. In our terms, deconstruction
problematizes “Buddhism” and “enlightenment,” allowing the study of hegemony
then to consider how Buddhism and enlightenment function to create a
“Buddhist” identity at both the personal and collective levels.
Laclau writes, “The hegemony of a particular social sector depends for its
success on presenting its own aims as those realizing the universal aims of the
community.”27 This sounds sinister, so remember, hegemonic struggle is struc-
tural to signifying systems. There is no society without hegemonic articulations,
just as there is no communication without shared linguistic conventions, for the
very concept of “system” presupposes a closed totality. Structurally, hegemony
requires an “exclusionary limit.” On one side, the system is fully present; on the
other, fully absent. Inside, everything is equivalent to everything else. The “empty
signifier” lends its name to this shared identity and is valued as a “simple
principle of positivity—pure being.”28 From an insider’s perspective, apolitical
characterizes the equivalential relationship within the system, for it seems to be a
relationship in which selfish power has no role. One can trust that the command,
dharetha, is issued only for benevolent reasons. Within this same phenomenol-
ogy, politics is what transpires beyond the exclusionary limit. Out there,
everybody and everything is not equivalent. Differences of power, of belief, of
identity breed fear, anger, want, and strife. Indeed, when difference is itself
perceived as a kind of equivalence, then the far side of the limit becomes the locus
of pure negativity, the agent of calamity, the genius of damnation, Mara. If the
command dharetha comes from out there, one will not follow it, for one does not
trust its intent. The crucial point is that the determination of what counts as
apolitical and benevolent, distinguished from what counts as political and
treacherous, is itself always a political determination.
WHAT DO GODS HAVE TO DO WITH ENLIGHTENMENT?
160
One speaks of hegemony as a matter of struggle since, being propagated
through contingent articulations of power, hegemony is never total or complete.
The creation of a social identity at any scale—person, community, civilization—
separates an “us” from a “them.” That boundary, in turn, is contingent, imper-
fectly drawn, mutable, and always a potential source of contention. For instance,
one might define a Buddhist, stipulatively, as someone for whom a buddha is an
ultimate authority; a Buddhist trusts that, because a buddha is perfectly enlight-
ened, his command dharetha must always lead to beneficial results. Insofar as one
is a Buddhist, one’s abstract ideals, concrete cosmologies, economic pursuits,
clothing and bodily comportment, even diet, can be traced back to one’s trust in
enlightenment. In this instance, so-called Buddhists might legitimately differ over
the details of doctrine, diet, and so on, as long as they concur on this one point:
there is a buddha who realized unexcelled and complete bodhi. Of course, this
unanimity vis-à-vis bodhi also necessarily excludes everybody who disagrees
from membership in the Buddhists’ consensual society. That exclusion is an
irreducible ground of social antagonism. Even if there really are Buddhists as I
describe, even if there really is synarchy inside their social unit, even if internally
all antagonisms are allayed, there is no logical solution to the possibility of
external antagonism, since, by definition, “they” are not members of “our” soci-
ety. “They” have no necessary stake in “our” peace. Closure—no matter whether
it establishes personhood or peoplehood—is the ground—the very bedrock—of
the political: it is the condition of possibility for identity and it is the condition
for the impossibility of peace.
A look back, stage 3: Buddhism as a discursive object
Todd Martin condemns The Foundations of Buddhism. By his count there is not
even one factually correct statement about Buddhism in its first twenty pages.
After this review of hegemony, Martin’s gambit is clear. Martin seeks to deny the
implications of the arbitrary, radically historical constitution of the Saussurian
sign, taking “Buddhism” as his empty signifier. Martin would fill this signifier’s
void with the same prudence taught to Malukkyaputta. Martin fails, in part,
because the word “Buddhism” cannot be adequately emptied. As an English word,
“Buddhism” is a nineteenth-century discursive formation that just cannot be
disentangled from its modernity.
The first chapter explored that modernity in some detail by reference to
Philip Almond’s The British Discovery of Buddhism. Recall, Almond argues
that neither Asians nor Europeans possessed a conceptual category equivalent
to Buddhism before the nineteenth century. Buddhism did not exist: not even as
an unnamed object “floating in some aethereal Oriental limbo expecting its
objective embodiment.”29 That is to say, in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, Asians themselves did not exhibit a specific sense of ideological solidarity
across nations, such that a so-called Buddhist populace in Thailand would
have actively identified the peoples of Tibet, or China, or Japan, as members of
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their same community. In fact, Almond adduces only a single citation to the
contrary, from 1795, in which one Michael Symes reports the “Birmans assert
with confidence that the Chinese are Boodhists.”30 Having neither an expectation
that natural religiosity is a universal human constant, nor a conception of religion
in which god holds first place, Asia’s “Buddhists” did not perhaps realize
that they must share a corporate identity, determined by their common interest
in the buddha. They were not aware that their mutual differences, historical and
cultural, differences of worship and dogma and social organization and mores,
were subject to reduction, leaving as a remainder what seemed, to Westerners, to
be a shared reverence for a single deity. They did not know they were all
Buddhists.
If the simple maxim of discourse analysis reads, the word supports the thing, then
any dullard will realize that to change a thing he must first change its name. Thus
have I attempted to circumvent Buddhism’s discursivity, to span a 1,500-year gap,
by identifying Ajanta as Fakya or bauddha when discussing it in a fifth-century CE
context, and reserving Buddhist for references to the site and other phenomena as
manifest (materially or discursively) in the modern age. A majority of Ajanta’s
inscriptions identify individual patrons as a Fakya-bhiksu or Fakya-upasaka; it is a
positive fact that Fakya was the dominant index of social identity at the site in the
fifth century. The designation bauddha is attested, not at Ajanta, but in ancient tex-
tual sources, as an outsider’s name for followers of the buddha. I assert as positive
truth: In the fifth century, Ajanta was locale dominated by self-identified Fakyas,
and a place at which the people revered buddhas.
This truth creates a new set of problems, of course, for discourse analysis is not
just newfangled nominalism. It does not presuppose a correspondence-theory of
linguistic value, but a theory derived from Saussure in which linguistic value is
an emergent property of arbitrary conventions fluxing through time and power.
No objective middle ground exists for translating the sounds we use, or the concepts
associated with those sounds, from one linguistic system to another. The cogni-
tive map of a twenty-first-century English speaker simply cannot be isomorphic
with that of a fifth-century speaker of Sanskrit; and the precise quantity of lost
meaning is incalculable. This is all well known. At one level, it makes the denial
of Ajanta’s Buddhism a tempest in a teacup, a portentous reiteration of the banal:
Sanskrit and English are different languages.
Yet, even if one grants that bauddha and Buddhist have divergent meanings
within their native linguistic structures, why not treat them as two names for a single
phenomenon? Let me rephrase this questions in terms of two metaphors, corre-
sponding to two approaches to the issue. First, is there no way for a historian to
determine the major constellation of practices and doctrines they share in common
by blacking out the few odd stars at which they diverge? Second, is there no ana-
lytic value in the fact that the two belong on the same family tree, linked through a
common ancestor, the enlightened buddha? Let me take up each possibility in turn.
As for the first, a taxonomic tool for stipulating identity-in-difference is ready
at hand (Table 5.2). In 1975, Rodney Needham introduced polythetic classification
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into the lexicon of the social sciences and humanities, borrowing this technique
from the natural sciences, where taxonomy has been a matter of theoretical
interest since Aristotle.31 Perhaps the best way to describe polythetic classification
is by contrasting it with the more obvious monothetic classification. In the latter,
all members of a class share one unique taxon (or set of taxa) as a necessary and
sufficient condition for class membership. A rigid logic divides monothetic
groups. Polythetic classification, by contrast, is more robust since this method
organizes taxonomic classes around a gestalt of features. “No single feature is
either essential to group membership or is sufficient to make an organism a mem-
ber of the group.”32 The analyst himself—or rather, the analyst as member of a
profession and institution, anticipating a specific outcome, and barraged by an
endless stream of niggling distractions—names the classes (e.g., Buddhism;
Hinduism) and stipulates the taxa (e.g., accepts the past existence of an enlight-
ened buddha; shaves head; asks reasonable questions after skin is pierced by
poisoned arrow). The analyst weighs the relative value of each taxon for indexing
class membership; and he assigns the statistical measure of affinity required for
class membership. Moreover, because this method entails the logical possibility
that characteristics shared by members of taxonomic class may be fewer in
absolute number than characteristics not shared, the analyst himself artfully
chooses the exact harmonic at which the crisp note of identity sings through a
potentially infinite static of difference.
Indeed it should be easy to articulate a matrix of polythetic taxa to classify the
fifth-century bauddha and twenty-first-century Buddhist as belonging to the
same class. A polythetic approach would unify the bauddha and the Buddhist
through their mutual possession of taxa , , , 	, while acknowledging that the
fifth-century bauddha’s taxa 
 and  are not shared by the modern Western
Buddhist, who is uniquely possessed of  and . As a hermeneutic strategy,
polythetic classification bridges the gap of categorical and intellectual difference
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Table 5.2 Individuals 1, 2, 3, 4 form a polythetic group, while 5 and 6 are monothetic.
After Rodney Needham’s “Polythetic Classification” 
Individuals
1 2 3 4 5 6
  
  










opened up by Saussurian linguistics. It is a means for asserting identity through
the management of difference.
This management matters, the fact that anyone can articulate a scheme to
rationalize his desires through the management of difference. Remember Jean
Calvin—a brilliant man—taught that it is reasonable, indeed necessary, to read
the bible as a literal document. The book means just what it says! Somebody who
scoffs at this literalism and reads the bible as an allegorical or mystical document
is deranged by god. Certainly, no secular historian of Christianity asks himself
whether god truly prefers one kind of reading or another. The question is non-
sense. A historian, rather, will reduce Calvin’s god to a logical or psychological
or sociological or martial or economic function, asking: What does Calvin do
with taxa when he differentiates sociological units, the elect from the unelect, by
claiming that god has a definite hermeneutic agenda? Likewise, any intelligent
student could—as a final exam question, for instance—generate a list of words,
texts, doctrines, and rituals shared in common between a fifth-century bauddha
and a twenty-first-century Buddhist. But we would not then ask: Are the two truly
the same, or truly different? We would inquire, first, into the student’s taxa of
choice. What presuppositions and priorities did the student bring to bear on his
choice of taxa? How does the student manage the differences? This leads into a
second question: Why would a professor ask his students to create a taxonomic
system within which commonalities between groups are given discursive priority
over differences? By definition, a taxonomic system is a system that emphasizes
similarity by hierarchizing difference. Why does the teacher want “Buddhism” to
belong to a taxonomic system at all? What does this tell us about the politics of
knowledge in his classroom? And third we wonder about broad context. How do
identities become quasi-transcendental objects, treated as if they express them-
selves in history, rather than being emergent products of history? These questions
are not meant to illuminate reality, theological or historical. They illumine human
choices, institutions, hegemony.
The redescription of Buddhism as a discursive object problematizes the utility
of Buddhism within the writing of positive history. Polythetic classification
represents one method for managing that problem. There is no good reason that
scholars should not identify Ajanta’s Fakyas and today’s Buddhists as members of
a shared class. Yet there is also every good reason for them to recognize the
artifice involved, and to bear in mind the contingencies of their practice, driven,
not by past facts, but by present needs. To study Buddhism is the scholar’s right
because it is his responsibility.
Polythetic classification provides a synchronic approach to the identity-in-
difference between Ajanta’s Fakyas and today’s Buddhists. New problems and
possibilities arise when we inquire into the groups’ diachronic relationship as two
descendants from a common ancestor, and thus as “blood-kin” in the same family.
Donald Lopez’ introduction to his anthology of modern Buddhist writings,
A Modern Buddhist Bible, helps us to think through this case. Lopez, here, is
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concluding his answer to the question, “What is this form of Buddhism, and in
what sense is it modern?”
Like all religions, Buddhism has evolved over the centuries . . . . The
Buddhism encountered today, both in Asia and the West, is very much
the product of this historical evolution. The starting point of that
evolution would seem to be with the founder of Buddhism, the Buddha
himself . . . . Yet it is difficult to describe his original teachings, for none
of the words traditionally attributed to the Buddha were written down
until some four centuries after his death. Over the centuries Buddhists
have sought to represent his original teachings and true intentions in an
effort to secure the acceptance of a wide variety of developments in
Buddhist thought and practice. During the past two centuries, Buddhist
thinkers from across Asia and the West began to describe a Buddhism
that transcends the concerns of locale and sect. This version of
Buddhism . . . I refer to as modern Buddhism. . . . 33
What reader would pause over these sentences? Who would think twice about
Lopez’ words of choice, so pat and so true, representing Buddhism as a typical
religion that began during the life of its remarkable founder. Lopez’ statement is
nuanced. Carefully, he does not exaggerate the facts and avoids any reference to
a transcendental essence that unifies Buddhism’s evolving forms. By using the
subjunctive, “would seem to be,” and noting that teachings attributed to the
buddha post-date his death by several centuries, Lopez emphasizes the religion’s
dynamic historicity. But notice, the sentence beginning “Over the centuries” uses
the word “Buddhist” twice: once for people, once for cultural phenomena. Why
such inelegant prose from a usually excellent craftsman? The odd repetition
suggests that Buddhist thoughts and Buddhist practices exist independently of,
even prior to, Buddhist people. Buddhists look to the buddha to authorize
thoughts and practices that are, in some way, already “Buddhist.” The condition
of possibility for Buddhism to have an integral existence as an evolving religion
is that Buddhists act as if their thoughts and practices originate with a specifically
Buddhist buddha.
Recall Laclau’s words about the complementarity of deconstruction and
hegemony cited in the previous section: “The role of deconstruction is . . . to
reactivate the moment of decision that underlies any sedimented set of social
relations.”34 The image of disturbing sediments well describes the effects of
attending to Buddhism as a discursive object. It is a waste of time to draw family
trees until after one considers the history within which the thing, Buddhism, is a
religion like all other religions; and until after one determines whether this
evolutionary metaphor has systematic explanatory value. What makes the buddha
the ancestral source of all evolved Buddhisms? Is it Fakyamuni’s own natural
property, that is, his enlightenment? Is this his genetic patrimony? Or is it, as
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Lopez hints, the fact that the figure of “the enlightened buddha” has political
power within sectarian discourse? In other words, is Lopez suggesting a new
monothetic taxonomy whereby Buddhists themselves solve the problem of
diachrony for scholars? Namely, a local sect is properly Buddhist—no matter
when it existed, or where—if it identifies Fakyamuni Buddha as a spiritual
ancestor, and if, based upon that family relationship, it lays ideological claim to
the buddha’s original teachings and true intentions? If this is the case, however,
perhaps we should also reconsider the phenomenon Lopez calls modern
Buddhism. Is this not just one more local sect (granted, a very diffuse locality)
that has attained nearly absolute hegemony over the figure of the enlightened
buddha within the Western academy?
Indeed, before one concludes that Buddhism began with the buddha and
evolves like all religions, one must inquire about Fakyamuni Buddha’s value in
Brahmanical discourse. Beginning in the fifth-century, brahmin texts presented
their own gods, usually Visju, as voicing the buddha’s words. Occasionally these
bauddha doctrines are treated as weapons in the war between gods and demons;
bauddha sutras are divine misinformation, propaganda hurled against the enemy,
as effective as any sword or arrow.35 By following the buddha, demons rejected
the real truth, hastening their own doom. Occasionally bauddha doctrines are
treated as seminal Hindu articulations of non-violence and universal compassion.
Thus the twelfth-century Gitagovinda praises Krsja for taking the form of the
buddha in order to end the ritual slaughter of animals.36 Occasionally modern
Hindus name the buddha as a glorious figure in their own past. Two examples
should suffice. In the preface to a collection of essays celebrating the 2500th
anniversary of Fakyamuni’s nirvaja, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, then the
President of India, wrote: “The Buddha did not feel that he was announcing a new
religion. He was born, grew up, and died a Hindu. He was restating with a new
emphasis the ancient ideals of the Indo-Aryan civilization.”37 This point is made
with even greater verve in a 1925 tract, Buddha-Mimansa, which concludes that
“the original Religion of the Buddha was . . . part and parcel of the Hindu system
based upon the World-old Religion (Sanatana Dharma) of the Vedas.”38 When the
buddha’s religion is a subspecies of the Hindu, and Fakyamuni is a teacher
of Vedic truth (if not Vedic sacrifice), then his words bespeak the historical
non-difference, the identity, between “Buddhism” and “Hinduism” so-called, not
the independent evolution of Buddhism itself.
A premature peroration
Here is the heart of the matter. As scholars, it is hardly our role to be partisans for
one faction, or the other, as they struggle to control a shared discourse and, with
it, hegemony over a shared social order. When it comes to a place like Ajanta,
unoccupied for more than one millennium, this much is certain: no modern
Buddhist possesses a prior right to delimit how modern scholars represent its
social and intellectual life; no scholar is under any logical obligation to consider
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modern Buddhist sensibilities when he represents Ajanta. The same holds true
vis-à-vis contemporary Hindus. A scholar who expects that today’s Buddhists
appreciate or understand Ajanta better than he does because they are Buddhists
treats Buddhism as a coherent and integral entity: an entity whose institutions
were founded by Fakyamuni Buddha, and whose doctrines have evolved in time
without losing their abstract core. A scholar who expects that today’s Buddhists
appreciate or understand Ajanta better than he does himself because they are
Buddhists treats enlightenment as something more than a fact of discourse—as if
some people really might become fully enlightened buddhas. For such a scholar,
enlightenment plays a systemic role parallel to the role of “God Himself ” in
Luther’s theology. God Himself is the logical ground of Luther’s system; this
hidden entity is an object for faith, not knowledge. Likewise, no scholar of any
repute would claim to have direct access to pure expressions of the enlightened
buddha’s mind, the foundation of Buddhism itself. Yet, this unknown, unknowable
Buddhism is the logical ground for any representation of Buddhist sectarianism
that systematically denies that sects for whom Fakyamuni is a Hindu god and a
teacher of Vedic truths have as legitimate a claim on the buddha as those sects for
whom he is the foremost critic of Vedic revelation.
Without enlightenment—the “word to which [Buddhist] ‘things’ themselves
refer to recognize themselves in their unity”39—it is impossible to identify Ajanta
as one Buddhist place in a panoply of Buddhist places. Ajanta was a Fakya place,
whatever that might mean. The assertion that “Fakya” is just another name for
“Buddhist,” and thus that Ajanta is now Buddhist, makes sense only within a
modern phenomenology that treats Buddhist enlightenment as a particular
expression of rational, natural religiosity. As scholars, it is not necessarily our job
to be collaborationists in the universalization of religion.
In the fifth century CE, Fakya Ajanta was embellished with naga shrines and
yaksa shrines; with paintings of Indra and Brahma and other gods walking
the earth; with stone panels in which Avalokitefvara rescues distressed petition-
ers from thieves, mad elephants, and demons; with super-sized stone buddhas.
Whether or not the very idea of god or gods goes against everything the buddha
ever taught, gods existed at Ajanta in the past and they continue to live at Ajanta
to this day.40 It matters how we identify Ajanta. Ajanta was a Fakya place. To
mark the difference between this Fakya Ajanta and a Buddhist Ajanta, we would
need to know more about Buddhism as an artifact of modernity. So far, our review
of scripturality, hegemony, and discursivity has transformed Todd Martin’s
assertion, “There are no gods in Buddhism,” from an apophatic definition of
Buddhism into a cataphatic assertion of hegemony. However, this review also
demonstrated that the term Buddhism itself is too well-marked by modernity to
be an effective instrument of differentiation. The claim that Ajanta’s Fakyas were
not Buddhists because they worshiped gods divests the word “Buddhist” of its
conventional significance; the claim that Fakyas were Buddhists despite their
worship of gods makes a fool of Todd Martin. To move beyond this dilemma we
need more sophisticated interlocutors.
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Vipassana meditation and the promise of global 
enlightenment
According to Donald Lopez,
During the past two centuries, Buddhist thinkers from across Asia and
the West began to describe a Buddhism that transcends the concerns
of locale and sect. This version of Buddhism, what I refer to as 
modern Buddhism, although hardly monolithic, has a number of
characteristics . . . that have been widely accepted around the world.41
We might draw two conclusions from this. First, if only two centuries have
transpired since thinkers began to push beyond the boundaries of locale and sect,
then all non-sectarian Buddhism is modern. Either Buddhism did not exist before
the nineteenth century, or if it did exist, it never overcame sectarian parochialism.
Second, all contemporary appropriations of Fakyamuni Buddha are not modern;
even in this day and age there are staunchly sectarian Buddhists. “Contemporary
Buddhism” and “modern Buddhism” are not synonymous phrases. To think
through the tension between contemporaneity and modernity, the next two
sections will consider two modern Buddhist thinkers. How does these modern
Buddhists’ disarticulation of gods and enlightenment (which they articulate, in
part, by critiquing contemporary “sectarian” Buddhists) ground a modern vision
of a universal society of free and equal citizens in which power and partisanship
play no role?
Philip Almond was not the first scholar to recognize that Buddhism balances on a
rickety base. Over a century ago, T.W. Rhys Davids already noted that “the people
we now call Buddhists . . . did not call themselves so”; and, “what we call
Buddhism. . . [is] what the founder of that religion called the Dharma.”42 The two
authors whom I will focus on below join Rhys Davids in presenting the word
“Buddhism” as an anachronism; both eschew (albeit weakly) personal identification
as a Buddhist; both proffer dharma (Pali dhamma) as the appropriate name for their
ideals, values, practices, and goals. The first, Satya Narayan Goenka, is a master of
vipassana meditation. An active teacher and organizer since the 1960s, Goenka has
established more than fifty Vipassana Meditation Centers throughout Asia, Europe,
North America, and Australia. The second writer is Richard Hayes, currently a mem-
ber of the Philosophy Department at the University of New Mexico. Hayes’ website
lists his principal research interests as, “The history of Indian Buddhist scholasticism
in the context of Indian philosophy; Buddhist logic and epistemology; history of
metaphysics in India; Buddhist psychology and Jungian analytic psychology;
Sanskrit grammar and Indian philosophies of language.”43 But Hayes is also an
important voice outside academia, as author of Land of No Buddha, a volume of
sermons and reflections on Buddhism in contemporary North America.
At sunrise on October 26, 1997, Satya Narayan Goenka performed the ground-
breaking ceremony for the Grand Vipassana Pagoda.44 Currently under construction
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in north-east Mumbai, this pagoda will be the largest domed-structure in the
world, 85 meters wide at the base and 96 meters high. To mark the occasion,
Goenka issued a dedicatory plaque, from which we learn that Goenka, his wife,
and “their vast global Dhamma family” hoped that the Grand Pagoda would
“spread the munificent wisdom of Vipassana as truly expounded by the Buddha
Gotama for the benefit, happiness and liberation of many.” For outsiders, these
words are a quick introduction to the ideals of Goenka’s global vipassana
movement. But for those in the know, Goenka’s words are more resonant still,
since they echo a stock passage repeated throughout the Pali canon, which tells
of the buddha sending his monks forth into the world to spread the dharma for the
benefit, happiness, and liberation of the entire world.
Two weeks before the dedication ceremony, Goenka published a short article
entitled, “Why the Grand Vipassana Pagoda?,” in his organization’s newsletter.45
The forceful clarity of Goenka’s words testifies to his enthusiasm for this project.
Someone who accepts Goenka’s authority cannot put down this article without
believing that the Grand Pagoda is an excellent idea indeed!
This article reveals Goenka to have been concerned that his dharma-children
might not recognize the pagoda’s exceptional, universal value. Lacking proper
guidance, a novice might easily mistake this enormous golden monument for a
shrine, a temple, or some other such place at which the votaries of sectarian
religion worship their god. Nothing could be further from reality for Goenka,
since Fakyamuni “was neither a god nor an incarnation of any god nor a prophet
of any god . . . . He was not a mythological being but a completely historical
person.” As a figment of history, Fakyamuni’s genius lay in his having discovered
the “natural laws” of karma, including the law that “meaningless rituals” do not
produce favorable results. How terrible the irony, if the Grand Vipassana Pagoda
were itself to foster credulous and wayward ritualism. How terrible the irony, if
the buddha, who “re-established the ancient true eternal Dhamma in its pristine
purity,” became an object of prayerful reverence as the mere founder of a religious
sect. Goenka calls the pagoda a “bright light-house” that “will again bring to light
the ancient eternal universal tradition of Dhamma for the benefit of the world.”
His apologia, “Why the Grand Vipassana Pagoda?,” should guarantee that no
member of the vast global dharma family will obscure the pagoda’s light behind
the nescience of organized religion.
Even in the world of marketing, it is an immutable law that a successful
company must “own a word” in order to burn its way into the consumers’ mind.46
When one’s good is not a manufactured commodity but something that is ancient,
true, eternal, universal, and pure, not just any word will do. Goenka’s article
begins:
The Buddha did not teach Buddhism. During his lifetime, he did not
convert a single person to Buddhism. One will be surprised to hear this
and will not want to believe it, because we have been hearing, speaking,
reading and writing contrary to this fact for such a long time. But the
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historical truth is that the Buddha neither taught Buddhism nor made any
person a Buddhist. The Buddha taught Dhamma and made people
righteous . . . . Not only during the lifetime of the Buddha but even in the
next few centuries, we do not come across words like “Buddhist” or
“Buddhism” anywhere.
These assertions locate Goenka in the discursive middle ground between
Philip Almond and Todd Martin. Goenka agrees with Almond: it is anachronistic
to treat Buddhism as an ancient phenomenon. Indeed, thanks to CD-ROM
technology, Goenka’s people scanned “the entire teaching of the Buddha as
well as the vast literature of the related commentaries, sub-commentaries, and
sub-sub-commentaries”—7,448,248 words—to establish as fact that “the word
‘Buddhist’ has not been used with regard to his teachings or his followers.” Still,
this agreement is superficial, since Almond and Goenka hold opposite stakes in
the anachronism. Almond disavows any interest in the question “of how
Buddhism ‘really’ was.”47 For Almond, Buddhism as a past realia is an effect of
modern discourse; even its pastness is a contemporary effect, endowing
Buddhism with an appearance of use-value for a cultural economy in which the
exotic past commands a premium charge. For Goenka, by contrast, anachronism
is problematic, not because it mystifies a modern discursive formation as an
ancient entity, but because, by misidentifying the true nature of Buddhism’s
ancient existence, it endangers humanity’s future.
Indeed, Goenka’s shift from Buddhism to dharma betokens his fundamental
agreement with Todd Martin. Both want to speak a language of positive fact as
their only language. From Goenka we learn, the “universal modern technology”
of the CD-ROM offers proof-positive that the buddha did not teach Buddhism.
Likewise, exhibition galleries at the Grand Pagoda will remove misconceptions
about the man, Gotama himself. Space is limited. Not every incident in Gotama’s
life can be displayed. So Goenka has one firm criterion for what to include:
“whatever is exhibited will prove that the Buddha did not establish any religious
sect. He never had any intention of converting anyone and confining them within
the bounds of an organised religious sect.” Moreover, by bringing “the true nature
of the historical superhuman Buddha” to light, these galleries will replace “blind
belief in divine miracles” with a new respect for “human effort and valour.”
Fakyamuni’s “true nature” as a “historical superhuman” must be represented with
precision. This is where Goenka and Martin part ways. To claim there are no gods
in Buddhism is imprecise: there are no gods in dharma.
Or rather, Buddhism is not just an imprecise rendering of Sanskrit dharma or Pali
dhamma. For Goenka, the success of these words, Buddhism and Buddhist, is a
direct sign that the buddha’s followers “forgot the essence of the true teaching.”
Buddhism does not just mislabel dharma, fundamentally it misleads from dharma.
Coined in parallel with terms like Protestantism and Judaism, the word Buddhism
bespeaks an institution that evolved in history, and that only a select few have ever
encountered. Buddhism represents the social displacement of Fakyamuni Buddha’s
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insight, not the enlightened truth itself. Thus, whereas dharma is universal, for
everyone, Buddhism is “limited to those people who called themselves
‘Buddhists.’ ” And whereas dharma has a “universally beneficial nature” that con-
travenes “all the artificial barriers of caste, race, class and religion,” Buddhism is
“confined by the narrow bounds of an organised religion” and finds itself “in the
shallow row of the different religions of the world.” Buddhism demeans dharma.
In terms of the formal structure of hegemony, dharma is Goenka’s empty
signifier, which he uses to exclude Buddhism-as-religion, -as-sectarian, -as-limited,
-as-political from the positivity of “eternal Dhamma in its pristine purity.” Indeed,
Goenka’s answer to “Why the Grand Vipassana Pagoda?” articulates a network of
associations within which the pagoda as a source of dharma also becomes a
source for enlightenment, universal beneficence, universal compassion, universal
love, accurate information about the life and accomplishments of Fakyamuni
Buddha, personal satisfaction for pilgrims, spiritual merit, glory for the city of
Mumbai, civic peace, and even strengthened relations between the peoples of
India and Myanmar.
Finally, at the crux of this system of inclusions and exclusions is the technique
of vipassana meditation, which Goenka sometimes calls “universal” and sometimes
“beneficial.” Universal  beneficial is hegemony’s elemental equation. The prac-
tice of vipassana is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the buddha’s
enlightenment to dharma and liberation from saÅsara. The practice of vipassana
is a necessary condition for an enlightened society, a dharmic society, in which
differences of caste, race, class, and religion have no power to divide. However,
in Goenka’s historical account, the people of India forgot this practice. And
“when the technique of Vipassana was lost, the original teaching of the Buddha
was lost.” And “because of the loss of Vipassana, most people forgot the universal
and eternal importance of the Buddha’s teaching pertaining to all countries.” The
loss of vipassana, in sum, was the proximate cause for the degeneration from the
buddha’s own community, an egalitarian brotherhood organized around dharma,
to what we see today: limited sectarian Buddhisms. Thus, vipassana is the agent
of Goenka’s apocalypse.
Fortunately because a few wise people in the neighbouring country of
Myanmar preserved this universal technique of Vipassana in its pure
form for centuries, from generation to generation, it has arisen again. It
has returned to India. It has arisen again in the world. In the past nearly
three decades through its practice, it has been completely proved that the
original teaching of the Buddha is not meant to be confined within the
bounds of a religion. It is universal. People of all religions, races, castes
and communities of the world can take advantage of this beneficial tech-
nique, they are already benefiting from it. One can believe that by the
spread of Vipassana, the strife, aversion and ill-will between different
religions and communities will end and mutual love and affection will
be produced in all people in this country and in the world.
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Here Todd Martin’s certainty that “the very idea of a God or Gods goes against
everything the Buddha ever taught,” gives way to S.N. Goenka’s certainty that
vipassana meditation as practiced between the years of 1967 and 1997 completely
proves a fact about ancient history: twenty-five hundred years ago Fakyamuni
Buddha did not intend to become Buddhism’s founder, or even a specifically
religious teacher.
Dharma collapses time: Goenka knows what the buddha taught and what the
buddha intended. Thus too dharma erases temporal difference in its organization
of social identity: fifth-century Fakyas and modern Buddhists are non-different
insofar as they pursue dharma and practice vipassana. Insofar as members of
these groups concern themselves with other matters they are hardly closer to eter-
nal universal truth than Hindus or Christians, no matter what they call themselves.
Of course, there is also little doubt that Hindus or Christians who wish to pursue
universal truth through vipassana will, as an intermediate step in their journey at
least, become Buddhists. After all, the Grand Vipassana Pagoda is located on
Buddha Island off the Mumbai coast.
Dharmawise, karmafoolish
Let us now turn to Richard Hayes’ Land of No Buddha, a book whose apologetic
largely coincides with that of Goenka. Goenka looks back to the historical buddha
as a source of transcendental value, and Hayes too uses phrases like “the original
teachings and intentions of Buddhism” and “the original Sangha” as metaphors for
absolute good.48 But where Goenka would revivify Fakyamuni’s ancient order in
its pristine purity, Hayes describes his vision of how Buddhism ought to be in
North America using words drawn from the social and intellectual history of the
West. In other words, Goenka seems unaware that his Buddhist apocalypse is a dis-
tinctly modern vision, framed in dialectical opposition to a post-Enlightenment
figment, Buddhism. I doubt that Goenka even cracked a smile at his own mischie-
vous imagery, when he described the Grand Pagoda as herald to a “second com-
ing.” Hayes, by contrast, plays on ironies. He acknowledges the historicity of his
own “Protestant values and attitudes,” even as he argues for his model of religious
authority as if it truly is timeless.49 Likewise, where Goenka never wavers in his
vision for the Grand Pagoda, Hayes presents himself as being of two minds about
his book. The essays gathered as Land of No Buddha were written in the 1980s. A
prefatory note explains that Hayes’ views had changed, in some cases substantially,
by 1998 when the collection was published. Although Hayes regretted his former
strident tone and harsh polemic, friends persuaded him to publish Land of No
Buddha anyway, to “chronicle” his growth as a Buddhist.50 In light of these con-
fessions, the book’s title is a curious thing, for it is a cross-linguistic pun naming
the book after Hayes himself. No Buddha translates a Korean word, Mubul, the
Buddhist name that Hayes accepted from a Zen master.51 The title displays Hayes’
typical wit: Richard Hayes identifies the land of no buddha as his own eponymous
territory, even as he disavows what he says there.
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In matters of tone, style, and metaphor, Hayes and Goenka could not be more
different. Yet an important parallel is clear: both take the critique of institutional
Buddhism as a starting point for their presentations of dharma as a marker for
Fakyamuni Buddha’s true intentions—intentions about truth and how to spread
truth.
A couple of years ago someone asked me what I thought was missing in
North American Buddhism, and without hesitation I found myself
blurting out, “What is missing? Why, the Buddhism itself!” The word
“Buddhism,” of course, is mostly the invention of scholars of comparative
religion, and does not really have very much meaning at all except as a
convenient label. What I really meant in giving my answer is that the
Dharma is missing, or at least is not yet here in its fullness.52
Hayes concurs with many of Goenka’s views: the buddha was a rationalist and
empiricist; the buddha was not a god or god’s prophet; the buddha did not intend
to found a religious sect but to teach dharma, that is, reality as it is; the buddha is
best followed, not through worship, but through emulation; rituals are meaningless
and have little to do with dharma; the dharma can be a source of benefit, happiness,
and liberation for the entire world; the language of positive fact is the only
language in which to represent the reality of dharma. Still, there are also two
points (or doubtless more) at which they diverge. The first, really, is more a matter
of emphasis. Hayes is a sometimes practitioner of vipassana, and a sometimes
practitioner of zazen. In Hayes’ text meditation is important, but he is not the
partisan of one technique.
The second divergence goes to the nature and content of dharma as an index
of reality. Goenka echoes Sanskrit and Pali narratives of the buddha’s enlightenment
when he describes Fakyamuni as having “discovered and taught the operation of the
natural laws of kamma (action) and the corresponding consequences of kamma as a
result of his direct experience.”53 As we know, the Mulasarvastivada Vinaya tells of
the bodhisattva looking over his own and others’ past lives, from which he discerns
a pattern of actions and results, leading, ultimately, to his realization of the noble
truths of suffering, its cause, and its cessation. And while the phrase “natural law”
has no direct equivalent in classical Sanskrit or Pali, it has become a common trope
among Buddhist modernizers, since it coordinates Fakyamuni’s enlightenment with
the naturalistic positivism of the Enlightenment. Hayes, by contrast, not only does
not represent karma as a law of nature, his book actively condemns karma as an
“obstructive doctrine” that “serves more to impede Westerners than to help them
acquire wisdom and become less self-centered.”54 A too-literal understanding of
karma—and how can a natural law be anything but literal—contravenes the buddha-
dharma, for it “dulls the mind and impairs the faculty of reason” by substituting myth
in the place of reality as it is.
This is a curious position, given that academic histories of Buddhism always
include karma in their glossaries of basic Buddhist terms. In fact, an author’s note
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from the 1990s indicates that Hayes changed his mind, and regretted his earlier
complete repudiation of karma. Still, Hayes’ stridency is consistent with Land of
No Buddha’s other attempts to “fill” dharma with the dominant intellectual values
of the Enlightenment. Hayes does not give dharma a single English equivalent,
be it law, truth, Buddhist doctrine, religion, or wisdom. He is a Sanskritist, fluent
in the problems of linguistic difference. To make dharma a living value for the
West, Hayes needs to transubstantiate it: from exotic Sanskrit loan-word into
Anglo-Buddhist scriptural seme. In the Land of No Buddha dharma is a self-
authorizing source of exceptional universal value; dharma is a term that provides
the key to its own true and proper interpretation; one harms oneself by rejecting
true dharma or by misconstruing its truth. Let us see how.
In a sense, Goenka and Hayes give their audiences different Enlightenments.
When Goenka calls karma a natural law, he speaks the Enlightened language of
Newton and Hume; it is a law induced from empirical observation of regular
occurrences in nature. But Goenka has forgotten Kant. The empirical faculty used
and the elements of nature observed run afoul of the first Critique. Goenka
presents Fakyamuni’s ultimate insight into karma as being accomplished through
unmediated “direct experience,” the pure intellectual intuition of noumenal reality
in itself. In Kantian terms, the claim to have attained enlightenment through direct
realization of a thing in itself is itself a mark of unEnlightenment.
As an academic philosopher himself, Hayes is careful about whom he names
as Fakyamuni’s philosophical brethren. Men of the Enlightenment, Bacon,
Newton, and Locke become the enlightened buddha’s comrades-in-empiricism.55
And Hayes, unlike Goenka, does not cross Kant’s epistemological line, not least
because he rejects karma as a myth. The Land of No Buddha’s buddha is not the
kind of buddha who intuits noumena. He is a philosopher and moralist whose
dharma derives solely from duly circumscribed reason. Thus Hayes mobilizes a
logic of equivalence whereby he fills dharma positively, associating it with values
such as wise and secular, and exemplars such as Socrates and Thomas Jefferson.
Likewise Hayes mobilizes a logic of difference to exclude the myths and rituals
of the masses, who are always fools, from the ambit of dharma’s positive meaning.
This bears elaboration.
Wisdom is Hayes’ favored equivalent for dharma. Hayes calls himself a
Socratic Buddhist, and advises readers,
What makes an awakened person (buddha) awakened, and therefore
distinct from the masses of foolish people (bala-putujjana), is just his
wisdom Therefore the Buddha-dharma is the key virtue of the Buddha,
and the key virtue of the Buddha is just his wisdom . . . . Being Dharma-
centric . . .means making wisdom itself the very centre of one’s life.
Though Hayes always marks wisdom as an ideological good, he is reluctant to
grant it substantial or fixed doctrinal content. The truth of wisdom lies, rather, in
the fact that it cannot be reduced to bumper-sticker slogans.
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True wisdom is always subtle and dynamic and rooted in very particular
and concrete situations. It can never be successfully captured in static
words and phrases and rules and formulas and creeds, because words deal
only with broad generalizations and not with concrete situations.
An “essence of wisdom” does exist, though even the buddha’s own words are
“awkward and clumsy” in their conveyance of it.56
As a dynamic mode of response, dharma/wisdom is predicated upon an
open-minded attitude that Hayes calls secular, pointing toward this-worldly
empiricism. Thus Fakyamuni and Thomas Jefferson are both secular in the sense
that their intellects are “rooted in this world that can be experienced directly
through the human senses rather than in mysterious other worlds that can be
known only through revelation and occult methods.”57 We might imagine a latter-day
Raphael painting, The School of Sarnath, with Fakyamuni flanked by Socrates on
the right and Jefferson on the left. Moreover, a secular dharma is an existentially
effective dharma. Hayes asserts, “The goal of every living thing is to be happy.”58
He also gives us a specific definition thereof, “the only true form of lasting
happiness” is “the ability to see things as they truly are.”59 It would seem that
only an individual who understands dharma as secular wisdom can actually
accomplish life’s universal goal, the full replacement of pain by peace.
Dharma, thus, is a scriptural seme that integrates rationality, religiosity, inter-
pretability, certitude, and threat of danger. Wise, dharma is a self-authorizing
source of exceptional universal value. Secular, dharma is the key to its own true
and proper interpretation; dharma does not re-present reality—it is literal reality.
And no one who goes awry of dharma can realize life’s goal, for the only true
happiness lies in knowing reality as it is, that is, in dharma’s secular wisdom.
From this perspective, the Shorter Discourse to Malukkya is a guide to dharma as
scripture. A wise secular man does not ask inappropriate questions when shot
with a poison arrow. He does not chant oÅ maji padme huÅ, or offer puja to
gods. He ascertains the precise facts of the matter and assesses his prognosis with
dispassionate objectivity. Finally, he heeds Fakyamuni’s command, dharetha,
accept! Accept that I left certain matters unexplained, and that you can safely
ignore them. Accept that I did explain other matters, and that you should pursue
them, for that is how you will end suffering.
It is hardly surprising that dharma and dharetha share the same verbal root,
dhr. Dharma names the cosmic order; dharetha enjoins one’s duty vis-à-vis that
order. Side-by-side dharma and dharetha are a graphic reminder that the apolitical
is political, that necessary realities are contingent expressions of power. Hayes’
easy certainty, that every living being should strive to see things as they truly are,
only makes sense within the ambit of this e/Enlightenment hegemony. Hayes
envisions a humanity, much like that imagined by Edward Herbert, Lord of
Cherbury, in which universal rationality applied to matters of universal consensus
produces universal harmony. For Herbert, this required a scriptural humanity in
the image of god; for Hayes humanity is still scriptural, though the transcendental
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basis is an impersonal dharma realized in rational enlightenment, and naturalized
for his North American readers as secular wisdom. Yet, such assertions of
universal rationality and universal harmony are contingent assertions. This point
is absolutely clear for Herbert, whose five Common Notions concerning religion
are now so self-evidently Christian particulars. Perhaps it is less easy to see
hegemony at work in the Land of No Buddha, where the universal goal is happiness.
After all, Fakya enlightenment and European Enlightenment converge on this
ideal (if not on the substance of “happiness,” or the means of its attainment). Both
e/Enlightenments predict that a radical existential/social transformation will
occur if secular rational wisdom replaces contingent power as the binding
medium of the human social matrix.
The book’s final chapter will note the political failure of this politics of rational
consensus. It will look toward a wisdom that recognizes the secular facticity of
struggle, suffering, and politics, yet responds not by projecting a chiliasm of
politics transcended, but by articulating a politics compatible with irreducible
pluralism; a wisdom that does not idealize the elimination of struggle, strife, and
suffering, but that idealizes the ability to take responsibility for struggle, strife,
and suffering as constitutive and productive dimensions of social/personal life. To
reach that conclusion, however, necessitates a fuller explication of Hayes’
endeavor to homologize enlightenment with Enlightenment.
Hayes is fluent in both dialects of the e/Enlightenment tongue, eastern and
western. His articulation of an equivalence between the truths of enlightened
Fakyamuni and those of the European Enlightenment is not ad hoc. Within Hayes’
essays, a North American who truly adheres to the buddha-dharma is an individu-
alist, rationalist, empiricist, universalist, who, accepting no authority other than
buddha-dharma, is critical of ritual practices, of ecclesiastical institutions, and of
spiritual hierarchies. Likewise this dharma-centrist pursues the four philosophical
virtues as outlined by Socrates: wisdom, justice, patience, and moderation. Likewise,
he shares Marxist outrage at the injustices of economic inequality. Likewise, his
values are shared with the Puritans and Pietists who honor personal integrity and
intellectual honesty. Likewise because, as a North American, he is a cultural
Calvinist and mistrusts absolute temporal authority, he will have a “natural affinity”
for the buddha’s vision of social organization, since the buddha’s “original Sangha
was non-centralized, non-authoritarian, and non-absolutist.” Indeed, he is a
democrat in the tradition of Thomas Jefferson as well.60
Identities are formed on the leading edge of inclusion and exclusion, in the
fluctuating assertions of equivalence and difference. Hayes eagerly expands the
range of those meriting citizenship in his Land of No Buddha. The “essence of
the Buddhist life” is to have an “all-or-nothing sense of dedication and commit-
ment to wisdom.”61 One does not have to be a native, self-identified Buddhist to
belong. Anybody who makes this commitment is a naturalized citizen. To make
this commitment is to be a real Buddhist, whether or not one takes that name.
Of course, truth is also the margin of exclusion. Fools mistake myths, like
karma and rebirth, for realities. But the myths that Hayes condemns most
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frequently are myths about gods. And to the degree that a belief in god or gods is
definitive of the category religion, Hayes is clear: Buddhism is no religion. “If we
associate religion with obedience to divine commandment and restraint through
fear of God, it is equally clear that Buddhism is not a religion in this sense and is
even opposed to such ways of thinking.”62 Accordingly, devout Hindus and
Catholics are barred from the Land of No Buddha. As for Protestants: funda-
mentalists and evangelicals will not make it in, though Deists and Unitarian
Universalists well might. In fact, the huddled masses who are unwelcome in Hayes’
Land of No Buddha, even as guest workers, include feminists, neo-romantics,
sensualists, spiritualists, people stuck in the rut of romantic marriage, and
ritualists.63 The last-named group includes most Asian and North American
Buddhists. They are too foolish to be allowed into his land, for institutional
Buddhism is a mere religion of karma and system of rituals—“a haphazard
assortment of benedictions, blessings, prayers for the dead, supplications for good
fortune and prosperity, exorcisms of malicious forces, and awe-filled reverence
for the supernatural accomplishments of saints”—that all but completely obscure
dharma’s spark of wisdom.64
Just as those who dedicate their lives to wisdom essentially are Buddhists, even
if they do not take the name, so those who do not “discard all forms of revelation
and celebrate reason above all else” are not real Buddhists, even if they do take
the name.65
This brings us to the most egregious foolishness of all. Among Buddhism’s
many myths, superstitions, and empty rituals one stigmatizes dharma at its very
core. Hayes calls this “the mythology of enlightenment.”66 This is enlightenment
as a pathology of authority; this is dharma metastasized into social cancer. For
where Hayes’ dharma-centrist devotes himself to the legitimate task of imperfectly
disseminating the inexpressible essence of a wisdom irreducible to static formulae,
there are Zen masters and Tibetan lamas who claim (or, more importantly, whose
devotees accept) that they are perfectly enlightened beings, more precious even
than the buddha, the dharma, and the sangha. This mythology of enlightenment
creates a hierarchy of spirituality, and fosters spiritual authoritarianism. Not only
does it require students to trust, respect, and revere their teachers as their spiritual
betters, but it requires students to scripturalize their teacher’s every word and
deed, no matter how capricious or self-serving it may appear. These Tibetan lamas
and Zen masters narratize their actions in relation to heroes past—they tell the
story of Naropa, who jumped off a cliff because his enlightened teacher asked
him to do so; they tell the story of Nansen, who cut a cat in half to teach his
students a lesson about their own ignorance—coercing students to accept that
behavior, which an outsider might consider egregious or immoral, is, really, not
an expression of power but, really, a deft strategy for shocking them into enlight-
enment. To criticize the master for being insensitive, malfeasant, or cruel, is to
admit that one cannot see the emperor’s clothes. In other words, the mythology of
enlightenment uses dharma to authorize a community in which the acceptance of
a subordinate position in a fixed power hierarchy is the condition for membership.
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Among all the tomfoolery that Westerners have taken from Asian Buddhism, this is
the most foolish, worse than karma, worse than the worship of this or that god. For
the mythology of enlightenment transforms enlightenment itself into a predicate of
divinity. The dharma-master becomes a supreme god, and dharma becomes a gift of
divine grace rather than of human insight. And thus, this mythology substitutes an
invalid scripture—the “enlightened” teacher’s words and deeds—for the valid
object—the dharma, the realization of which makes one an enlightened buddha.
Gods have everything to do with enlightenment
Hayes’ mythology of enlightenment brings us full circle back to Todd Martin’s
exclusionary definition, “There are no gods in Buddhism. The very idea of a God
or Gods goes against everything the Buddha ever taught.” Though no one can say
if we are now wiser, at least we have a better vocabulary. Indeed, that is why Hayes
has been worth our time. He takes us past Todd Martin and S.N. Goenka, both
because he recognizes that North Americans cannot conceptualize dharma except
within an Enlightened Protestant imaginary, and because he reconceives dharma
to fit that imaginary. Hayes gives us a native English vocabulary through which to
talk about Buddhism as a discursive object, beyond the platitude that Buddhism is
a post-Enlightenment category, and beyond its overt implications: scholars go
awry when they treat Buddhism as a pre-nineteenth-century realia; Buddhists go
awry when they focus on institutions rather than the truth of dharma.
As an Anglo-Sanskrit scriptural seme, dharma divides a dharmawise elect,
whose members live peaceful lives in accord with rational explanation, from a
karmafoolish unelect, whose members, to their peril, pursue unexplained revela-
tion. Hayes models his social ideal on what he calls the “original Sangha,” which
he characterizes as “non-centralized, non-authoritarian, non-absolutist.”67 Despite
the name, however, this original sangha owes as much to the Enlightenment’s
never-achieved “Elysium created by reason” as it does to any now-defunct
community of Indian bauddha.68 Note its likeness to the social model described
by Laclau as quintessentially modern:
Modernity started with the aspiration to a limitless historical actor, who
would be able to ensure the fullness of a perfectly instituted social order.
Whatever the road leading to that fullness—an “invisible hand” which
would hold together a multiplicity of disperse individual wills, or a
universal class who would ensure a transparent and rational system of
social relations—it always implied that the agents of that historical
transformation would be able to overcome all particularism and all
limitation and bring about a society reconciled with itself. That is what,
for modernity, true universality meant.69
Like the Proletarian “universal class” to which Laclau alludes, Hayes’ “original
sangha” reconciles all social particulars into a peaceful universal whole, brought
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about by rational men pursuing rational dharma via rational means following
rational guidelines for behavior. Given all this rationality, Hayes creates real prob-
lems for himself when he suggests that “the model to be followed [in the creation
of an ideal Buddhist society] should be the original blueprint as contained in the
Vinaya.”70 For there is no evidence that an “original blueprint” ever existed,
except as a matter of polemic; we have no reason to believe that an original vinaya
ever existed. Hayes’ vision of a harmonious Buddhist society patterned on an
original vinaya is itself a revelation, a modern apocalypse. Still, he hopes that the
dharmawise will someday organize themselves into this ideal community, though
karmafools may never escape the abusive power-politics entailed by the mythology
of enlightenment.
The first half of this chapter transformed Todd Martin’s amazon.com review
from an apophatic definition of Buddhism into a cataphatic assertion of hege-
mony. The second half explored that hegemony’s subtleties and seductions,
culminating in Hayes’ social vision, which places a society founded in the
mythology of enlightenment at antipodes to an ideal Buddhist society in which
every person is wise, rational, equal, and free. Insofar as these two societies are
non-different we have to wonder to what degree Hayes’ negative valuation of the
former contaminates the latter. Should we worry, for instance, when Hayes
describes Buddhism as possessing “a unique potential to help mankind” since it
“lays a stress on . . . positive moral guidelines that are valid for all men and women
without exception”?71 I have no doubt that Hayes’ personal values are more to my
taste than those of Congressman Tom Delay, discussed in the first chapter. But
I take no greater solace in Hayes’ representation of Buddhism as uniquely uni-
versal than I do in DeLay’s parallel statement about Christianity: “Only
Christianity offers a comprehensive worldview that covers all areas of life and
thought, every aspect of creation. Only Christianity offers a way to live in
response to the realities that we find in this world—only Christianity.”72 If
dharma has an essence that is necessarily inexpressible and yet can be posited as
a universally valid guideline for behavior; if dharma provides an absolute barrier,
separating wisdom from foolishness, rationality from revelation, Buddhism-proper
from debased-Buddhism, a non-institutional inchoate reality from clumsy
institutional dogmas, personal enlightenment from a public mythology of
enlightenment—then “fools” need fear this dharma as they would any sectarian
revelation that comes from a source beyond experience and reason.
Indeed, as we move toward the book’s conclusion, we should note the monstrous
warning the mythology of enlightenment portends for dharma as a scriptural
seme. To paraphrase from an earlier discussion in page 157, a scripture is a source
of exceptional, universal value that does not re-present, but is, literal reality. This
logic is predicated of an imbalance between surfaces (knowable and pragmatic)
and depths (unfathomable but logically necessary). Thus the scriptural sleight-
of-hand: surfaces are able to sustain the burden of reality because, in fact, they do
re-present an occult reality. It is the anticipation of universal excess which
guarantees that those particulars add up to more than their sum total. Hayes’
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treatment of dharma as contextual action that promotes happiness based upon
this-worldly knowledge fits this pattern, for Hayes also posits a “true wisdom,”
an “essence of wisdom,” associated with “the original teachings and intentions of
Buddhism” and pursued by Fakyamuni’s “original Sangha.” Hayes requires the
logical existence of dharma, transcending context, to ground judgements about
the wise/secular/effective/moral character of specific contextual actions.
This dharma is internally split, however, for the contextualism that gives
wisdom its dynamic charge is incongruous with the context-free rationalism that
preordains the scope of what counts as properly secular. That is to say, Hayes
accepts only the facts of this world that accord with empirical experience as
secular; in a perfectly secular Land of No Buddha no one pursues mysteries or the
occult. Hayes also imagines that secular wisdom participates in a universal
economy of truth; even fools might become enlightened. Yet we also know that in
Tom DeLay’s parallel view it is evangelical Christianity that offers the only
reasonable way to live in response to secular realities.
What do we learn? The act of delimiting the secular is always necessarily an
exclusionary act. Dharma cannot be secular and rational and universal except as
an empty signifier, as an instrument of hegemony. Thus dharma is not only split
internally, it is externally divisive as well. On this point, as on most points, Hayes
does not mince words: “Let’s speak plainly. Buddhism is antisocial, if by society
you mean the collective mentality of the half-awake masses who stumble their
way unreflectively from cradle to grave, gaining nothing along the way but a
superabundance of adipose tissue.”73 Hayes acknowledges only one definition of
the rational good. There is only one legitimate way to be a human being: pursue
Mubul’s happiness through Mubul’s truth, even if that means the Land of No
Buddha is left devoid of inhabitants.
Now look at the real world. You see Zen Buddhists and Tibetan Buddhists,
Hindus, Christians, and Muslims all taking recourse to occult mysteries. Of
course, Mubul does as well, with his mythology of enlightenment as a state of
existence in which no one makes myths and everyone is reasonable. Of course,
the fact that he calls this “buddha-dharma” and “the buddha’s dharma” is not
inconsequential. The secular fact is, every community that organizes itself around
a man whom it accepts as enlightened—including Fakyamuni—is a community
grounded in the mythology of enlightenment. People see god and gods every-
where, including Bodh Gaya on the eve of Fakyamuni’s enlightenment. Everyone
always is somebody else’s “fool.” So the question cannot be, do we enlighten
them to make them more like us (or, more like our ideal)? The question is, can we
live with them just as they are? We need a dynamic, indeed wise, means for
coexisting in a pluralistic world. The irreducible multiplicity of irreconcilable
gods, fantasies, myths, ideologies, values, and goods is not just a private fact to
be managed, it is the res publica, the ground of public action. Gods have
everything to do with enlightenment—all of them. Vigorous public polytheism is
secular wisdom for the modern age.




I don’t think you can hold anybody accountable for a situation that,
maybe if you had done something different, maybe something
would have occurred differently.
(Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, III, speaking at a 
United States Department of Defense Briefing on 
Detention Operations and Interrogation 
Techniques, March 10, 2005)
Beyond Enlightenment has explored the political dimension of discursive objects
that are commonly served up as apolitical: extraordinary universal value, original
intentions, scripture, dharma. But these investigations have not advanced a model
for positive engagement in a world where the apolitical is political. I shall
endeavor to do so now. This final chapter will seek a wisdom that responds to the
secular facticity of political struggle, not by projecting a chiliasm of politics tran-
scended, but by articulating a politics compatible with irreducible pluralism; a
wisdom that does not idealize the cessation of suffering, but idealizes the ability
to take responsibility for suffering as a constitutive and productive dimension of
life. And yes, it will be all the sweeter when we find a word for this wisdom in
the Sanskrit of bauddha polemic—icchantika.
Ernesto Laclau has served as something of a bête blanche throughout this
work. Here at the end, however, I take my lead from Chantal Mouffe, Laclau’s
longtime collaborator. If Laclau emphasizes hegemony and the structural contin-
gency of power, Mouffe focuses more squarely upon the constructive potential
opened up by contingency. If Laclau explains how identities, personal and
collective, are formed in contingent assertions of power, structured through
exclusion, entailing the potential for antagonism and conflict, Mouffe in turn
explores how to manage these passions toward progressive political ends.
More to the point, Mouffe urges her readers “to discard the dangerous dream
of perfect consensus, of harmonious collective will.”1 Indeed, Chapter 5 ended
with a sense that danger might really lurk in Richard Hayes’ e/Enlightened
musings about an original sangha. But does not Mouffe’s injunction force us to
181
reach back into still earlier chapters, to weave their diverse threads into one
simple question: If it is impossible to reach perfect consensus over the identifica-
tion of an archaeological site—Ajanta is Buddhist—how much less likely is it that
one set of personal values and daily needs can become the universal basis for a
harmonious collective will? In more general terms, Mouffe argues that given the
possibility of liberty, and the value placed on personal autonomy, along with the
freedoms of conscience and thought, it is impossible for democratic unions to be
free of strife. Any political theory that obviates or ignores the irreducible charac-
ter of social antagonism, theorizing perfect reasonableness and/or neutrality as a
viable foundation for perfect social concord, is necessarily anti-democratic:
For democracy to exist, no social agent should be able to claim any
mastery of the foundation of society. This signifies that the relation
between social agents becomes more democratic only as far as they
accept the particularity and the limitation of their claims; that is, only in
so far as they recognize their mutual relation as one from which power
is ineradicable. The democratic society cannot be conceived any more as
a society that would have realized the dream of perfect harmony in social
relations.2
Thus, for Mouffe, “the main question of democratic politics becomes . . . not how
to eliminate power, but how to constitute forms of power which are compatible
with democratic values.”3
To translate Mouffe’s concern into terms introduced in Beyond Enlightenment,
we need a politics that does not presuppose a scriptural anthropology; that does
not expect it can resolve multiplicity at the “literal” level into a higher-order unity
through appeal to an occult transcendental. The varied arguments throughout this
book have known Mouffe’s call for a wise politics that does not reduce out the
secular violence of social existence. The earlier chapters demonstrate why religious
tropes (e.g., enlightenment; dharma) and religious institutions (e.g., Buddhism)
deserve no special privilege in the modern social imaginary, since they, on the one
hand, are incapable of eradicating the structural conditions that produce conflict,
while, on the other hand, they are not suitable guides to managing conflict in a
pluralistic world. The expectation that enlightenment or dharma or faith or secular
wisdom or Buddhism or religion can resolve life’s challenges—for you and me
and everybody—may well be the “poison arrow” of modern times. The first
chapter cited the Dalai Lama’s affirmation, “there is every reason to appreciate
and respect all forms of spiritual practice.”4 The DL is just plain wrong.
Yet the DL’s affirmation of spiritual universalism also does point us forward.
He used these words in 1996, when addressing a mixed audience of Christian and
Buddhist monks. In the same year, speaking only to other Tibetans, however, the
DL was less generous when he declared a spirit named Dorje Shugden to be a
harmful spirit, and alleged that practices honoring this spirit threaten his own life
and the cause of Tibetan political freedom more generally. The DL asked
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Dorje Shugden’s Tibetan devotees to dissociate themselves, either from the spirit,
or from himself.5 In fact, one can riffle through the bauddha literature of any land
and any time, and find, as did Xuanzang in seventh-century India, “various view-
points [being debated] as vehemently as crashing waves.”6 The bauddha always
have been avid polemicists. This is hardly surprising since there is no Buddhism
apart from the processes of hegemony. “Buddhist” is our name for people who
treat enlightenment (dharma, etc.) as positive indices of meaningfulness, and who
attempt to universalize and normalize their own particular values by filling these
empty signifiers. The bauddha always have been avid polemicists, but in times
past not all were loath to admit it.
So what I would like to do now is look back to the early centuries CE, to a
polemic that provides extravagant allegorical possibilities for the present. I use
allegory here in an elementary sense, as the trope of doubled reading. Allegory
does not simply transfer value from one realm of meaning to another, as does
metaphor. Allegory offers the opportunity to read a text simultaneously within
two separate and distinct intertexts. My allegory is extravagant (recall Thoreau’s
use of this word, cited at the beginning of Chapter 4) because it “leaps the
cowyard fence” of its Indian bauddha origin to seek new pastures in the latitude
of contemporary politics.
Beyond enlightenment stands the icchantika. Several Mahayana texts theorize
that not all living beings are capable of enlightenment. Icchantika is the name
they give to someone who has not and will not become enlightened. Read in an
allegorical mood, characterizations of the icchantika-figure allow us to reimagine
e/Enlightenment as supporting a politics of irresolvable multiplicity, hybridity,
and indeterminacy.
Traditionally, the icchantika played a minor role in the bauddha war of words.
His interest lies now in the fact that he is a creature tied to polemic, the consum-
mate outsider painted in shades of black. The Mahayana Mahaparinirvajasutra
(MNS) offers an open-ended condemnation: “An icchantika is one whose roots of
goodness have been completely eradicated. His original mind is so devoid of any
desire for good dharma that not a single thought of goodness will ever arise in
him.”7 The icchantika seeks his own gratification, unabashedly and wholeheartedly.
Thus “icchantika” came to designate the person who lacks higher values. And in
some descriptions, the icchantika was not only uninterested but also unable to
become enlightened. Again the MNS: “All sentient beings possess the Buddha-
nature. Due to this nature, they can . . . attain the most perfect enlightenment. The
only exceptions are the icchantikas.”8 On the path to perdition, in Robert Buswell’s
words, the icchantika falls short of even “ ‘the lowest common denominator’ . . . of
the Buddhist spiritual equation.”9
The icchantika will never escape saÅsara, a condition usually explained by his
moral, spiritual, and intellectual deficiencies. In most bauddha texts, that is the
end of the matter. The Lakkavatara Sutra, however, adds a second explanation.
The Lakkavatara’s discussion begins with a pun: “How is it that the wanters do
not want to be liberated?”10 The answer then distinguishes two types of
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icchantikas. One type, like that of the MNS, is devoid of merit. Lacking goodness,
he cannot attain nirvaja, and is thus doomed to remain in saÅsara. By contrast,
the Lakkavatara’s second type of icchantika is entirely good. This is evidenced by
his vow: “As long as all beings have not attained nirvaja, I will not attain
nirvaja.” Fully capable of liberation, the good icchantika nonetheless tries to
emancipate beings who neither want nor value the emancipation he would proffer.
He cuts a swath through the public sphere, speaking his truths, knowing that
many of those to whom he speaks will not listen. Some might be moved at their
very core by his words, and others will remain eternally unmoved. The good
icchantika has embarked on an impossible task and has no illusions: he too will
remain in saÅsara forever.11
One might whiff an air of religious zealotry here. But the good icchantika of
my allegory does not transmogrify into the Christian soldier or mujahideen or
neoconservative, for he lacks recourse to an apolitical ground beyond contingency.
He propounds an ideal that he himself has not experienced in the past and, by
definition, will not experience in the future. Neither does he imagine an ultimate
salvation; nor does he have faith in an invisible-but-beneficent hand. He does not
expect and does not receive recompense for his struggles. There is no grace; no
heaven; no bosom of Abraham; no 72 houris. No millennial land of milk and
honey. No escape from Plato’s cave. The good icchantika, in short, articulates
ideals and pursues their realization with his attention fully on this world. He must
fail—indeed, his title icchantika is eponymous with failure—yet he continues to
strive. For all these reasons, the good icchantika acts the part of an adversary but
never the part of an imperator. It is the bad icchantika who becomes so rapt in his
own fervor for faith or truth or peace that he imagines that dharma/justice
demands universal acceptance of his e/Enlightened ideal.
These two icchantika-types have a lexical symbiosis, not because they share the
same desire, but because they both do desire; not because they share the same
ultimate end, but because for both this world serves as an end in itself—and that
end is never ending. Mahayana philosophers delighted in the paradoxical equation
of opposites: nirvaja is saÅsara, saÅsara is nirvaja; form is emptiness, emptiness
is form. Icchantika is icchantika. Is it not far more satisfying when both sides of
the opposition have the same name? The word creates a unit without a unity. It
conjoins the most debased with the most exalted without homologizing or equating
the two. They belong together because they are eternally opposed.
Now, it is clear why the good icchantika is “good.” But for this figure to serve
allegorically within a progressive political imaginary we need also consider the
quality of the bad icchantika’s “badness.” Fortunately, Robert Buswell has
studied the icchantika in Pali, Sanskrit, and Chinese sources, and gives us a firm
starting point. At bottom, the bad icchantika is bad because he lacks generosity:
“the very bedrock of Buddhist soteriology” is “the simple practice of charity, of
giving (dana).”12 This brooks a straightforward doctrinal explanation: charity, in
Buddhist terms, expresses detachment. Someone who can let go of a flower or
dollar can eventually let go of saÅsara. Someone who cannot practice detachment
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can never become a buddha. Buswell notes that this can be a matter of plain old
avarice. But it is also possible the bad icchantika is greedy for enlightenment.
Someone who does not engage in rituals of worship and giving because he sees
them as hollow distractions from the pursuit of wisdom is as “bad” as some-
one who spends his wealth solely on sensual self-indulgence. Sapiential hedonism
is little better than material. To foreshadow: salvational hedonism belongs on this
list as well.
In nuce, the icchantika “worships his own desires” (per the MNS).13 With this,
now, let us shift this extravagant allegory’s intertextual field, from the classical
bauddha to the contemporary, in order to seek the bad icchantikas of our world.
Given the icchantika-figure’s doubling, insight into the bad should also reveal
how now to be good. This will require a brief step away from the icchantikas, to
the mise en scène of our moment.
Consider Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, III, whose words begin this chapter.
As Naval Inspector General, Church investigated allegations of torture performed
by US military interrogators from 2001 through 2004 in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The unclassified version of the Church Report detailed
71 cases of abuse, involving 121 victims and six deaths.14 The chapter’s epigram
comes, however, not from the report but from a press conference Church held
upon its release. In both public fora, Church explained that although US
interrogators abused Afghani and Iraqi prisoners, because the Department of
Defense did not explicitly forbid such abuse, nobody could be held culpable for
its occurrence.
Reread the quotation and consider Church’s logic: A change of cause would
have resulted in a change of effect. However, given that cause X inevitably
produces effect Y, and given that X did occur, who can be blamed that Y followed?
Church displaces the inevitability of a cause-and-effect chain from effect to
cause. The cause itself becomes as if without origin. Where have we seen this
before? This is how Leonard of the film Memento, a man without memory or
scruples, experienced the world. And as Chapter 3 puzzled over Leonard’s
humanity, we must now wonder: what kind of man replaces the moral maxim that
to act with choice is to act with responsibility, with the amoral principle that there
is no responsibility because one’s action is a matter of choice?
The MNS posits that bad icchantikas worship their own desires; they make a
religion of self-interest. One can understand how this rubric might fit Memento’s
Leonard, who intentionally tricked himself into killing the “wrong” man for the
“right” reasons. How about Church? Does the Vice Admiral also magnify his own
self-serving amorality into a cosmic principle of life-and-death? The MNS speaks
of worship: at whose altar does Church worship?
Blame Calvin! To find today’s bad icchantikas look first to Calvin! Yes, all
gods are the objectification of human ideals; all theists worship their own desires.
But it was Calvin who took this construction to the limit: magnifying god into
the greatest absolute monstrosity by diminishing humanity into the weakest
servile dot. It is Calvin who gives stark expression to Feuerbach’s theological
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dialectic: “that God may be all, man must be nothing.”15 It is Calvin’s god who
relieves men of the burden of responsibility for the consequences of their choices.
Chapter 4 cited Calvin: “It is the first business of an interpreter to let his author
say what he does, instead of attributing to him what we think he ought to say.”16
In this spirit, let us follow a loose thread of citations from the Institutes.
What for us seems a contingency, faith recognizes to have been a secret
impulse from God.17
What then? you will ask. Does nothing happen by chance, nothing by
contingency? I reply . . . “fortune” and “chance” are pagan terms. . . . For
if every success is God’s blessing, and calamity and adversity his curse,
no place now remains in human affairs for fortune or chance.18
If politics entails contingent expressions of power, then for today’s bad icchantika
nothing is political, even torture. Politics is not a matter of living, but of rhetoric;
a word to stigmatize one’s opponents with ulterior motives and hypocrisy.
Hypocrisy! Why would not the Grand Inquisitor himself be numbered among the
men of faith?
Truly God claims, and would have us grant him, omnipotence—not the
empty, idle, and almost unconscious sort . . . but a watchful, effective,
active sort, engaged in ceaseless activity. Not, indeed, an omnipotence
that is only a general principle of confused motion . . . but one that is
directed towards individual and particular motions. . . . For when, in The
Psalms, it is said that “he does whatever he wills” [Psalms 115:3], a
certain and deliberate will is meant.19
Beyond politics, Calvin’s predication of god as absolutely autonomous and
absolutely free requires human heteronomy and servitude. Moreover,
God’s will is so much the highest rule of righteousness that whatever he
wills, by the very fact that he wills it, must be considered righteous.
When, therefore, one asks why God has so done, we must reply: because
he has willed it.20
How could torture be “wrong”? The abuse of Afghani and Iraqi prisoners, as a
matter of “free choice” on the part of US soldiers, must be righteous. Indeed,
there is little reason even to worry about whether individual Afghanis and Iraqis
merit abuse, since god himself parcels out retribution apart from considerations
of individual merit. A man is evil just because god wills him to damnation; a man
is guilty just because the US military wills his detention.
We call predestination God’s eternal decree, by which he compacted
with himself what he willed to become of each man. For all are not
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created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for some,
eternal damnation for others.21
He who here seeks a deeper cause than God’s secret and inscrutable
plan will torment himself to no purpose.22
As the causeless cause of life and death, god’s reasons for electing some and
damning others are wholly his own. God gives life and god takes it: this
knowledge is sufficient. So why seek culpability in the case of prisoner abuse?
Yes, Jesus said, “Render unto Caesar.” But here questions of legality merely
confuse the issue. For the Church Report itself allows that “no specific guidance
on interrogation techniques was provided to the commanders responsible for
Afghanistan and Iraq.” How can one ask responsible commanders to be responsible
for guidelines they were not given? What seems to us to have been a contingent,
even immoral choice, faith recognizes to have been a secret impulse from god,
and thus infinitely glorious.
The very inequality of his grace proves that it is free.23
The doctrine of salvation . . . is falsely debased when presented as
effectually profitable for all.24
The Lord wills that in election we contemplate nothing but his mere
goodness.25
We never truly glory him unless we have utterly put off our own
glory.26
For Calvin’s god, the self-expression of autonomous freedom in the pursuit of his
own unquestionable desires is the highest good. Anyone unwilling to worship at
the altar of divine self-interest is thus damned. To doubt god’s plan, righteousness,
omnipotence, and universal providence, is to demonstrate one’s own lack of
election, for the only sure sign of election that god deigns to grant us is our ability
to keep faith in faith itself.
God’s unchangeable plan, by which he predestined for himself those
whom he willed, was in fact intrinsically effectual unto salvation for
these spiritual offspring alone.27
God . . . to show forth his glory, withdraws the effectual working of his
Spirit from them [the wicked]. This inner call, then, is a pledge of
salvation that cannot deceive us.28
Blessed is a United States’ military that stands meekly before the Lord, for it shall
inherit the earth.
Faith in faith is the core tenet of today’s bad icchantika. How could any god be
less charitable than an omnipotent, autonomous creator who saves and damns
gratuitously precisely so that his slaves will recognize his freedom and their
enslavement; so that they will praise him and condemn themselves . . . and in that
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self-abnegation hope for a sign of justification? Such a god relieves our world’s
bad icchantikas of the burden of generosity. Bad icchantikas, trusting providence,
happily satisfy their own personal wants, no matter how terrible the consequence
for others.
Where do we find these bad icchantikas? In 2005 we need not look far. Look for
the scripturalization of selfishness: where even extreme expressions of self-interest
are thought to serve a providential purpose, since an “invisible hand” will ensure
that selfish intention functions as an instrument of the commonweal.
Look to the Christian Right, which opposes “Big Government” as a public
source of financial assistance for those not blessed by providence, while it
agitates for strict governmental regulations that compel citizens to be “moral” in
their most intimate moments.
Look to Constitution in Exile: a libertarian movement dedicated to the elimi-
nation of all laws that impinge on property-ownership, from minimum-wage
legislation, to laws protecting the environment, to measures that protect financial
markets from fraud.29
Look to the conference, “Confronting the Judicial War on Faith,” convened in
Washington DC in April 2005. At this conference, US congressmen mingled with
representatives of the Chalcedon Foundation.30 This latter group’s credo speaks
the language of neoconservative liberty—“the role of the state is in essence to
defend and protect, in the words of the early American Republic, life, liberty, and
property”—which it then reframes in stringently Calvinist terms—
we believe that the Bible should apply to all of life, including the state;
and . . . we believe that the Christian state should enforce Biblical civil
law; and finally, . . . we believe that the responsibility of Christians is to
exercise dominion in the earth for God’s glory.31
Is it any wonder that Tom DeLay was the conference’s keynote speaker? Or that
DeLay spoke thinly veiled words about the need to impeach judges who do not
adhere to a Calvinist worldview? Or that other attendees stated this position
explicitly?
Look to the main hive of bad icchantikas today: George W. Bush’s White
House. Its every piece of legislation is self-serving, yet who could doubt that the
people working in the West Wing are convinced that their efforts at deregulation
and privatization are fulfilling god’s inscrutable plan? The bad icchantika
worships his own desires. In our world, this describes the person who uses his
faith in faith as an ultimate justification for self-serving behavior. Who does this
describe more precisely than George W. Bush and Tom DeLay?
The chapter began with a promise: Bauddha speculation on enlightenment
might yield a positive figure for contemporary progressivism. So, what is a good
icchantika to do? Or to begin, what does he not do? First, definitively, the
good icchantika does not take recourse to a rhetoric of apolitical ideals. If
the good icchantika is “good,” it is because he lacks faith in faith and thus does
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not seek solutions outside the sphere of politics, that is, contingent human
relations. Because he does not claim transcendental freedom he does not then
have to imagine a still-higher objective source of order—god; dharma—in order
to constrain that freedom; to prevent liberty from becoming libertine. Thus the
good icchantika can be a moral agent without taking recourse to a scriptural
anthropology. He does not know a creator god and does not claim a natural right
to accumulate property or treat the earth as his personal domain. He does not
anticipate a next world and does not prophesy a chiliastic vision of ultimate
reconciliation and redemption, for anybody. As they say in Las Vegas: What
happens here, stays here.
Because the good icchantika has no world other than this one, he gives fully of
himself right here, right now. Exchanging his time for others’ benefit, he
cultivates interpersonal bonds. This is how one improves a world fraught with
antagonism. Yet, because he is determined to give to people who will not take, he
also participates in, and perpetuates, the antagonisms endemic to human
relations. Indeed, if this allegory has any pragmatic force, this is it: There is no
single correct or proper way to be a good icchantika. Remember, the good iccha-
ntika exists in opposition to the bad. Human beings are impossibly infinite. So if
bad icchantikas worship their own desires there must then be an endless number
of gods for good icchantikas to both embrace and challenge.
Moreover, the diversity of desires/gods entails a diversity of means for political
action. The various divisions that can lead to the inhibition of political involve-
ment—theory versus practice; organized versus personal forms of resistance;
revolution versus incremental change; working for change from within the
“system” versus from without—are mooted. The good icchantika allows that his
progressive cause is not everybody’s progressive cause; that his agenda, ideology,
and discourse are not for everybody. He does what he can, as he can, without
demanding that all so-called “right-minded people” value what he values,
understand what he understands, or act as he acts. How could he do otherwise?
For the good icchantika too is beyond enlightenment.
What does it take to be a good icchantika? See every social encounter as an
opportunity for adversarial giving. How do you begin? To circle back to the
preface, here is one option. The next time you meet somebody on the road (or, for
that matter, in a book), who says,
Nobody is comparable to me.
I am the only perfect buddha in the world.
I have attained supreme enlightenment.
I am conqueror over all.
I am unrivaled in all realms, including those of the gods.
do not follow Upagu’s lead and slink down another road. Sapere aude! You need
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See * on page 214 for supporting details.)
Who are these men? Who is Divakaramitra? To answer the first: These are men one
normally sees presented as philosophical and religious rivals. The assembly includes
partisans of Fiva and of Visju, atheists and pantheists, materialists and fatalists, ritual-
ists and people who ridicule ritual, scholars of the law and antinomians. Or, to update
the image, there are neo-Marxists and neo-Straussians, Secular Humanists and
Southern Baptists, Wiccans and Wahabis. This sylvan harmony is staggering. Moreover,
Bajabhatta does not simply describe bitter rivals tolerating each other. Faivas and
Vaisjavas, Lokayatas and Bauddhas follow their own truths while actively striving to
“convert” the others. Note the term siddhanta, literally “established conclusion.”
Siddhantas are the doxa and dogmas that differentiate sects; the axiomatic truths
without which there is no sectarian identity; the every-man’s-land of antagonism.
Note that siddhanta is prefixed by sva, “own”; doubled, sva-sva indicates plurality
and particularity. Whatever it means for each man to avow himself as a student of
Divakaramitra, it does not mean he has to stop worshiping his own deity, or to give
up his own distinct sectarian identity, practices, or beliefs. Bajabhatta describes a




So who is Divakaramitra? Bajabhatta calls Divakaramitra a supreme follower of
buddha; names him as the bodhisattva Avalokiteçvara; describes him as somebody
worthy of the buddha’s reverence and of the dharma’s worship. Now if one wonders
how this divine man’s disciples can hold such diverse sectarian views, Bajabhatta
provides the answer. Divakaramitra’s physical body has a unique atomic composition,
namely it is comprised of the syllables of all sectarian treatises. In short,
Divakaramitra embodies the coincidentia oppositorum of all theological truths as
well as all theological disputes.
Divakaramitra is many and one: he embodies all sects at the same time that he is a
supreme bauddha. Because of Divakaramitra’s constitution, individual disciples may
accept Divakaramitra as guru for diverse, idiosyncratic reasons, and yet remain
unified as a group. Divakaramitra’s followers happily pursue distinct sectarian aims
precisely because that is the way to proceed toward a universal good. But
Divakaramitra is also a brahmin who renounced the Vedas to become a bauddha. As
the concrete embodiment of pure religious positivity, Divakaramitra hegemonically
validates all truths as bauddha truths, all gods as bauddha gods, all “spiritual
practices” as bauddha practices.
* The complete account of Divakaramitra’s hermitage is found in Bajabhatta,
Bajabhatta’s Biography of King Harshavardhana of Sthajifvara with Fakkara’s
Commentary, Sakketa ed. A.A. Führer (Bombay: Government Central Press, 1909),
316–18; Bajabhatta, The Harsa-carita of Bana trans. E.B. Cowell and F.W. Thomas
(London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1897), 236–7. The translation of Cowell and Thomas
is unsatisfactory on several accounts. My text is less a literal translation than it is a
gloss, which substitutes the better-known names of sects for those used by Baja.
For these identifications, I have taken the suggestions of Vasudeva Agrawala’s The
Deeds of Harsha: Being a Cultural Study of Baja’s Harshacarita (Varanasi: Prithivi
Prakashan, 1969), 225–6. I do not want to belabor this point since the precise
delineation of these sectarian identities is not important for my purposes, as long as
we recognize the general fact of their theological and doctrinal diversity. The same
cannot be said for the inclusion of Bauddha on this list, so let me discuss that point
further. Baja does not use “bauddha” in this passage, he uses “jaina.” In classical
Sanskrit, however, the word “jina,” conqueror, was given to any spiritual teacher
who had overcome ignorance and/or death—including Fakyamuni Buddha. A follower
of any jina might be called a jaina. Unlike today, these terms had no special connec-
tion to the people we call Jains or their religion, Jainism. Bajabhatta uses jaina three
times in the body of his text. In the first instance, the Harsacarita’s fourteenth-century
commentary glosses jaina as Fakya. In the second instance, the commentary gives
bauddha as the gloss. No gloss is given in the third instance, and no gloss is necessary,
since Bajabhatta uses jaina in this third instance as a direct characterization of
Fakyamuni Buddha’s followers (Bajabhatta, Bajabhatta’s Biography, 97, 316, 325).
5 To investigate this Dorje Shugden incident in greater depth, begin with the Tibetan
government’s official document: The Worship of Shugden: Documents Related to a
Tibetan Controversy (Dharamsala, India: Department of Religion and Culture,
Central Tibetan Administration, 1998).
6 Xuanzang, The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions trans. Li Rongxi
(Berkeley, CA: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1996), 57.
7 Cited in Ming-Wood Liu, “The Problem of the Icchantika in the Mahayana
Mahaparinirvaja Sutra*,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist
Studies 7 (1984): 64.
8 Ibid.
9 Robert E. Buswell, Jr, “The Path to Perdition: The Wholesome Roots and their
Eradication,” in Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello, eds, Paths to Liberation: The
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Marga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought (Honolulu, HI: University of
Hawai’i Press, 1992), 108.
10 Bunyiu Nanjio, ed., The Lakkavatara Sutra (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1956),
65–6; D.T. Suzuki, trans., The Lankavatara Sutra (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1956), 58–9. The pun works because the word icchantika derives from a present
active participle icchant, “desiring.” An icchantika, literally, is a wanter, desirer, or
hedonist.
11 Note, the Lakkavatara does not draw these conclusions. After offering its icchantika-
typology, the sutra then invokes a deus ex machina. It explains that, although the good
icchantika cannot liberate the bad, the buddha does have the power to compel a bad
icchantika to seek enlightenment. Thus, for the Lakkavatara, everybody eventually
does become a buddha. My extravagant allegorization of the icchantika ignores this
most unsatisfactory denouement.
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14 Albert T. Church, III, “Unclassified Executive summary.” http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf (April 20, 2005).
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